6. Social Welfare and the Pension Fund | SerbiaVotingRights.org

Introduction

Social protection and the pension system directly affect people's financial security. In Serbia, these areas are based on legally established rights, public funds, and the work of institutions that hold data on their beneficiaries. Social welfare centers assess needs and decide on certain social welfare benefits, while Serbia's national Pension and Disability Insurance Fund administers the country's mandatory public pension and disability insurance system. The closest comparisons in the United States are the social welfare services and the Social Security system, with differences in organization and the scope of rights.

Political pressure arises when access to legal entitlements or public assistance is tied to support for the ruling party, when a public benefit is presented as a partisan favor, or when beneficiary data is used for political gain. Public institutions control access to benefits, funding, and personal information. Party intermediaries use that access to reach beneficiaries, who may then face political demands or be led to believe they owe their assistance to a particular leader and political party.

These mechanisms take various forms. A social welfare recipient may be directly asked for their vote, party involvement, or to publicly demonstrate loyalty. For pensioners, political advantage can be built through institutional communication, additional payments, and the portrayal of public assistance as a personal achievement of those in power. Direct political pressure and the cultivation of political gratitude work differently, but both can link a citizen's material security to the survival of the same political structure.

These relationships develop between elections as well. Ahead of voting, they are further intensified with payments, aid packages, and messages about future benefits. For the electoral process to be free, it is crucial that citizens can make decisions without the belief that refusing a political request will jeopardize the assistance or income their household relies on.

Social protection is intended, among other things, for individuals and families who cannot independently provide for their basic needs. Regular cash social assistance is granted according to legally prescribed conditions, while one-time assistance also depends on the rules and available funds of the local government. In both cases, decisions should be based on citizens' actual needs, without the influence of their political affiliation.

For a beneficiary who does not have enough money for food, medicine, electricity, or heating, the possibility of losing assistance represents an immediate threat to their daily life. Therefore, politicizing social welfare creates particularly strong pressure. An institution that citizens turn to for assistance can instead become a means of drawing them into political dependence on the ruling party. When access to assistance depends on political officials or party intermediaries, people may come to see their ability to meet basic needs as dependent on obeying those who control public funds.

Political influence on the social protection system is exerted through institutional leadership, local governments, and party organizations. Testimonies from employees at social welfare centers describe hierarchical pressures that are passed down from local political officials, through directors and managers, to the employees who make direct decisions about assistance. In some cases, citizens come to the institution with a party recommendation, while local officials intervene to have assistance approved for individuals who do not meet the prescribed requirements. Employees also described cases in which the amount of one-time assistance was determined outside the social welfare center, leaving professional staff merely to carry out the decision. This replaces professional assessments of social needs with political considerations and turns funds intended for vulnerable citizens into instruments of partisan influence.

A particularly revealing example emerged just days before Belgrade's March 4, 2018, local elections. On February 28, the Belgrade City Center for Social Work distributed approximately $2 million in one-time assistance to 13,900 residents across six city municipalities, with each recipient receiving approximately $144. According to an employee's testimony, lists of recipients had been prepared in advance and delivered to the social welfare centers, and of the 200 people on the list for Lazarevac, only one was a registered client of the center. The money was distributed on the same day approval was received from the Ministry of Labor, without the usual individual assessment of social needs, according to employees. The distribution raised serious concerns that public funds may have been used to secure electoral support for the Serbian Progressive Party. The City Center responded that the aid was redistributed based on a decision by the Government of Serbia, but did not provide the requested explanation of the criteria used to select the recipients. By November 2018, reports indicated that Belgrade's Higher Public Prosecutor's Office had not opened an investigation into the allegations.

Abuse of Beneficiary Data and the Local Network of Party Intermediaries

An especially serious form of political abuse is the unauthorized acquisition and use of citizens' personal data from the records of social welfare centers. These institutions have information on people who lack sufficient means to live, families that depend on financial assistance, persons with disabilities, and citizens who, due to their health condition or other life circumstances, require institutional support. These records are collected to administer legal entitlements and protect beneficiaries. Sharing them with political organizations for election purposes constitutes a misuse of that information. Such a breach of privacy also has direct political consequences, allowing the party to identify financially vulnerable citizens who can be pressured or targeted for electoral support.

An employee at the social welfare center described how a representative of a humanitarian organization linked to a political party requested a list of cash assistance recipients. The employee refused to hand over the data, citing their legal protection. When she contacted the mayor, he confirmed that he had personally sent the organization's representative and questioned why the local government would not have access to that information. According to her testimony, the center's director subsequently provided the requested data. This case shows how a political demand, rejected at the level of a professional worker, can be fulfilled through the intervention of a local official and the head of a public institution.

A particularly serious risk arises when these records become accessible to local party organizations. Information about beneficiaries can then be passed down from the municipal leadership to local committees and coordinators, who are familiar with the circumstances in individual villages, settlements, and households. Rather than providing assistance according to legal criteria, the system allows party intermediaries to target vulnerable families with offers of money, food, firewood, or other necessities in exchange for political support. This approach allows party organizations to mobilize larger groups of voters through influential figures in local communities. Citizens who provided the state with their data to qualify for social welfare thus become the subject of organized political pressure. State records intended to protect the most vulnerable are turned into an instrument for their political surveillance, coercion, and control.

Particularly vulnerable are citizens living in deep poverty, members of marginalized communities, including certain Roma communities, as well as people with disabilities and individuals who, due to health or other life circumstances, cannot provide for themselves. In such environments, political pressure does not have to be exerted directly on each individual voter. It is enough to establish a relationship with a person who has influence within the local community, knows the material circumstances of the households, and can organize a larger number of people. Testimonies from the social welfare system also describe cases in which members of Roma communities spoke of money being distributed in other settlements before elections, organized transportation to polling places, and the presence of local intermediaries who assist them at polling places. Material vulnerability thus becomes the basis for the organized political recruitment of entire groups of voters.

Conditioning Aid on Political Support

The direct conditioning of assistance is particularly clearly illustrated by a case described by a social worker during a 2023 study of political pressure in social welfare centers. The client was a pregnant woman with a young child, no family support, and severe financial difficulties. She told the social worker that local community officials had said she would not receive a food package because she had not attended a political rally. The social worker contacted the local community representatives and learned that the packages were being distributed according to pre-existing lists. After her intervention, an attempt was made to provide assistance to the client. In this case, a family's basic need was linked to a political activity that the woman, due to her pregnancy and family circumstances, was physically unable to fulfill.

Other testimonies describe beneficiaries going to social welfare centers to pick up money that, according to them, was promised for voting or attending party rallies. There are also recorded allegations that some beneficiaries had to give a portion of the aid they received to intermediaries who arranged the payment. Such a practice creates a dual dependency. The citizen becomes politically beholden to the person who provides access to the aid, and at the same time, they may be forced to hand over a portion of the funds intended for their basic needs to the people who control their distribution.

A particularly significant example of the organized connection between local authorities, party structures, and the distribution of social assistance was documented in the municipality of Žitište, in Vojvodina. On February 12, 2024, a criminal complaint was filed with the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Zrenjanin against several local officials and members of the Serbian Progressive Party over allegations of misuse of public funds, pressure on voters, and organized vote-buying during the December 17, 2023, elections. The complaint describes a mechanism for using records from the Social Welfare Center and the local service for assistance to the poor, involving municipal officials, local communities, and party coordinators. According to the complaint, socially vulnerable voters were won over with money, food and hygiene kits, major appliances, and firewood, while certain forms of assistance were linked to expected support for the ruling party. The complaint also covered other election irregularities, but its section concerning the abuse of social assistance is particularly significant for understanding the organization of political pressure at the local level.

Continuing the documentation of the same case, on May 29, 2024, a supplemented criminal complaint with new evidence was filed with the Special Department for Combating Corruption of the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Novi Sad. Procurement records indicated that approximately $101,000 from the Žitište municipal budget had been used to purchase the aid packages. According to the complaint, public funds were used to procure food and hygiene products, which were then distributed to voters by party activists, and the complaint estimated that approximately 2,000 people had been targeted through this form of alleged vote-buying. The collected documentation made it possible to show, in addition to individual testimonies about vote-buying, the financial mechanism by which local budget funds are linked to the activities of the ruling party.

The author of this report worked directly with two colleagues to uncover and document these irregularities. The collected evidence served as the basis for criminal complaints filed in February and May 2024, and the cases were presented to the public. Žitište thus represents a concrete example of the organized political exploitation of citizens' existential dependence, whose mechanisms extend beyond the boundaries of a single local government.

Public Institutions and the Pre-Election Distribution of Aid

The intertwining of institutional and party activities is not limited to decisions on social assistance. During the local elections on June 2, 2024, individuals with lists of citizens were found in the premises of the Center for Social Work in Gornji Milanovac, which, according to the activists present, contained the symbol of the Serbian Progressive Party. The incident was recorded, and the center's director, who was also serving as the president of the municipal election commission, was present at the facility. Opposition representatives alleged that the social welfare center was being used as a political call center to contact voters. The SNS denied these allegations. A criminal complaint was filed over the incident, but the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Kraljevo dismissed it, finding no reasonable grounds to suspect a criminal offense subject to prosecution by the state. This case does not directly concern the conditioning of social assistance recipients, but it highlights the problem of distinguishing a public institution from partisan election activities, especially when its premises and leadership are linked to organizing political action on election day.

Social welfare programs can also become politically linked to elections through special government payments. Immediately before the parliamentary elections in December 2023, recipients of cash social assistance and the allowance for assistance and care of another person were each paid approximately $96. A similar pattern emerged in September 2026, when the state began paying approximately $240 to recipients of cash social assistance, as well as to recipients of the child allowance per child, just over a month before the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 25. The payments were made through existing official records, without special registration from the beneficiaries. Such payments can be legitimate social policy measures in their own right. The problem arises when their distribution is politically appropriated, presented as a personal achievement of the president or the ruling party, or linked to the expectation of future electoral support.

The electoral effect of existential dependency

The electoral advantage gained through the misuse of social assistance extends far beyond a single instance of vote-buying. It is maintained through direct access to citizens, knowledge of their material circumstances, control over the distribution of aid, and the expectation of future political loyalty. The dependency of one household member can become a means of pressure on the entire family, while local party intermediaries maintain the relationship with beneficiaries between election cycles. When assistance is conditioned on political behavior, publicly expressed support, attendance at a party rally, or a vote in an election no longer represent a reliable expression of a free political choice. The citizen makes the decision under the pressure of potentially losing the resources on which their family's daily life depends.

The political use of social assistance is not a phenomenon that emerged with the Serbian Progressive Party's rise to power, as public benefits and various forms of material support were previously used to win the favor of voters. However, of particular concern is the organized and coercive nature of the described mechanisms, in which records of socially vulnerable citizens, institutional authorities, and local party networks are linked for the direct control of political behavior. The pressure becomes particularly cruel when a person who lacks enough money for food, medicine, or firewood is expected to prove their political obedience by attending party rallies, providing votes, or, in cases of such conditioning, by photographing their ballot. This not only misuses public funds, but also human vulnerability. Poverty, illness, disability, and social marginalization are turned into means of political blackmail, and the aid that should protect human dignity becomes an instrument of its humiliation. The systematic exploitation of people who do not have a real option to refuse such demands represents one of the most insidious and inhumane forms of political abuse. It not only undermines equal conditions for electoral participants but also strikes at the very essence of the right to vote freely, forcing people to choose between their political convictions and the basic necessities on which their survival depends.

6.2. The Pension System, Beneficiary Data, and Political Mobilization

Serbia's Pension and Disability Insurance Fund administers the country's mandatory public pension system, on which more than 1.66 million beneficiaries depend for their financial security. Its primary function is to ensure the realization of citizens' legally established pension and disability rights.

A pension is a legally established entitlement, and the responsible institutions are obligated to make regular payments and adjust benefits as required by law. One-time government assistance to pensioners is funded separately from public resources and is not part of their regular monthly pension payments. Politically linking these rights and benefits to the president and the ruling party creates the impression that pensioners' material security depends on their remaining in power.

Political patronage and party control of the pension fund

Since February 2023, Serbia's Pension and Disability Insurance Fund has been headed by Relja Ognjenović, a member of the Serbian Progressive Party's Main Board. His professional career began with training as a physical therapist, after which he obtained an education in economics. At 23, he became a member of the Voždovac municipal council, responsible for traffic, paving, and public transportation; at 29, he became the deputy director of the PIO Fund; and at 32, its director. Before joining the Fund, he had no documented professional experience in pension insurance or managing a comparable financial system. He himself publicly highlighted his closeness to the President's family. Responsibility for managing one of Serbia's most important public institutions, on which a large share of the population depends for financial security, has therefore been entrusted to a party official whose previous professional background shows no experience in the field for which he has taken responsibility. His appointment represents a concrete example of political patronage, in which party affiliation and proximity to the highest levels of government are visible factors, while the professional qualifications needed to manage a complex public system are pushed aside.

His political involvement has also been linked to serious incidents. During a pro-government rally in Belgrade on April 12, 2025, a crew from the local television station KTV from Zrenjanin was physically attacked. Several members of the crew were injured, one television technician had three teeth knocked out, and the equipment was damaged. According to public statements by the journalists who were attacked, Ognjenović was among those involved in the confrontation and was leading a group of party security marshals, while the police officers present did not intervene. This incident further highlights the issue of political patronage and the accountability of those entrusted with leading the most important state institutions.

A direct example of using institutional authority for partisan promotion was recorded on November 23, 2023. Announcing the one-time payment of approximately $192 to pensioners via an official PIO statement, Ognjenović concluded his address with the slogan "Serbia must not stop," which was simultaneously the slogan of the Serbian Progressive Party's electoral list. An official notice intended to inform pensioners about their legal entitlements thus became a vehicle for communicating the ruling party's political message in the immediate run-up to the parliamentary elections on December 17, 2023.

Misuse of pensioners' personal data in political communication

One of the most serious forms of political abuse of the pension system is the use of its beneficiaries' personal data for political promotion. The Republican Pension and Disability Insurance Fund (PIO) has records containing the identity, addresses, and other data of more than 1.6 million pensioners. This data was collected for the purpose of exercising legal rights from pension and disability insurance, not for the needs of political parties or election campaigns. Using that information for political persuasion departs from the lawful purpose for which it was collected and represents a serious intrusion into beneficiaries' privacy.

Over several election cycles, personalized letters signed by Aleksandar Vučić were mailed to pensioners throughout Serbia, with messages about pension increases, additional government assistance, and the importance of continuing the existing policy. This practice continued for years. In September 2026, approximately 1.9 million letters were distributed to pensioners and social assistance recipients. The letters were delivered through Serbia’s postal service, while the envelopes identified the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund as the sender. Inside them were letters signed by Aleksandar Vučić, with messages about the government's achievements, benefit increases, and its concern for the oldest citizens. A public institution responsible for beneficiaries’ personal data thus became directly involved in the president’s mass political messaging.

Significantly, this practice has continued across multiple election cycles and changes in the Fund’s leadership, with Aleksandar Vučić remaining its central political figure. During the latest distribution, the question of collecting additional contact information from beneficiaries through postal workers was also raised. The central concern, however, is that public institutions and their records may be used for direct political communication with nearly the entire pensioner population. Citizens who have entrusted their personal data to the public system to exercise their legal rights become the target group for political messages, while pension increases and public benefits are presented as the personal achievements of the same political leader. Such a connection of institutional capacities, personal data, and political promotion blurs the line between the state and the ruling party and creates an electoral advantage that is not available to its political competitors.

One-time government payments during election periods

In addition to regular pensions, the state has paid one-time cash assistance to pensioners in multiple election cycles. On February 10, 2022, approximately seven weeks before the presidential and parliamentary elections, pension beneficiaries were paid approximately $192 each. The same amount was paid on November 30, 2023, seventeen days before the snap parliamentary elections. Repeated payments shortly before elections created an expectation of additional financial support from public funds during election periods.

This pattern continued in September 2026, just over a month before the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 25. On September 14, the state began making one-time assistance payments to more than 1.6 million pensioners.

Pensioners receiving the lowest monthly benefits received approximately $335, those in the middle range received approximately $263, and those with higher pensions received approximately $192. Approximately $424 million in public funds was allocated to the program. The payments were previously announced and promoted by President Aleksandar Vučić, Finance Minister Siniša Mali, and the management of the PIO Fund, with messages about the government's concern for pensioners and their future financial security.

For a pensioner with a small monthly income, the additional payment can represent significant help in paying bills, buying medicine, or providing for basic necessities. One-time payments may be justified by the economic and social needs of citizens, but their political presentation raises a different question. When public funds are repeatedly associated with the president's personal promises or the ruling party's achievements, government assistance begins to appear as a political favor. The pensioner is encouraged to associate the funds received with a specific political leadership, rather than with the public system that finances the payment.

Retirees' associations, institutional forums, and local distribution of aid

At the local level, direct contact with pensioners is established through their associations, solidarity assistance programs, and organized gatherings. Retirees' associations are not organizational units of the PIO Fund, but they can participate in implementing publicly funded programs intended for its beneficiaries, including the distribution of food packages, other necessities, and various forms of material support. An opportunity for political abuse arises when such programs are linked to local party organizations, voter registries, and the expectation of political support. In smaller communities, party intermediaries may portray publicly funded assistance as something they personally secured or as an achievement of the ruling party, especially when packages are delivered just before elections according to pre-prepared lists. In this way, material support becomes a means of directly winning over pensioners for political purposes.

Another important form of institutional outreach involves public forums organized jointly by the PIO Fund and the Union of Pensioners of Serbia. During the campaign for the local elections on March 29, 2026, such events were held in municipalities where the upcoming vote had immediate political significance. At a forum held on March 16 in Sevojno, President Aleksandar Vučić also spoke before approximately 500 pensioners. The event was attended by the president of the Serbian Progressive Party, several ministers, and the director of the PIO Fund. Thus, the institutional event for pensioners became a venue for direct appeals from the highest state and party officials during the election campaign, featuring the presentation of future pension increases and additional financial support.

These gatherings continued throughout 2026. By mid-October, the PIO Fund and the Union of Pensioners of Serbia had organized more than seventy forums across the country. At the events, local officials and representatives of other state institutions participated alongside the Fund's leadership, presenting pension increases, one-time payments, and additional assistance programs. During one of the forums, the Fund's director publicly announced that he had been tasked by the President of the Republic with giving special attention to lower-income pensioners.

This direct connection between the president's political announcements, institutional activities, and contact with beneficiaries shows how the public pension system is being used to continuously promote the policies of those in power.

Media promotion and fear-mongering about political change

Efforts to gain political support from pensioners extend beyond pension increases and one-time government payments. These measures are accompanied by extensive media promotion that repeatedly portrays Aleksandar Vučić as their principal initiator and guarantor. The president's announcements are broadcast by television stations with national and local coverage, while news programs, morning shows, political commentary, online news outlets, and social media emphasize his personal role in securing pension increases. During the presentation of the large state aid package in June 2026, the president's address was broadcast by as many as 21 television stations, including public media outlets and numerous commercial and local stations. This gave the state's economic and social policy measures broad media promotion centered on the figure of the President of the Republic.

In such a media atmosphere, reports also appear in which pensioners publicly thank Aleksandar Vučić for the pension increases and additional state assistance. Their statements, accompanied by comments about the president's concern for the oldest citizens, further reinforce the notion that the money pensioners receive is the result of personal political favor, rather than the exercise of a legal right or the distribution of public funds. Repeating these messages across multiple media platforms cultivates a sense of political gratitude toward a single leader, while the institutional nature of the pension system is pushed into the background.

Presenting pension increases and one-time payments as the president's personal achievement carries special weight with low-income pensioners, for whom these funds are essential for daily life. The messages are simultaneously conveyed through state institutions, television, local organizations, and direct encounters with beneficiaries, making it increasingly difficult for beneficiaries to distinguish between a legal entitlement and a political favor. Such influence does not require an immediate threat or an explicit conditioning of the vote, as political allegiance is also shaped through the long-term creation of expectations about future material security.

The most serious consequence arises when pensioners begin to believe that a change in government could threaten their regular pension payments. A pension, which is a legal entitlement, comes to be seen as a privilege that depends on political loyalty. The long-term portrayal of public payments as the personal achievement of Aleksandar Vučić, coupled with institutional and media promotion, creates the space for such fear and its political exploitation. This transforms a citizen's legal entitlement into the illusion of a personal favor granted by a political leader, and the fear of losing financial security becomes a means of undermining voters' freedom to make their own political choices.

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6. SOCIAL PROTECTION AND THE PENSION FUND