4. MEDIA

Control over the media, alongside control of the security services, has been Aleksandar Vučić's greatest political obsession. Throughout his political career spanning more than three decades, he has devoted extraordinary attention, time, energy, and personal involvement to controlling the media. His relationship with them did not begin when he came to power in 2012. Vučić developed politically under Vojislav Šešelj and served as secretary-general of the Serbian Radical Party. From 1998 to 2000, he was Minister of Information in Slobodan Milošević's regime. That period was marked by the repressive Public Information Law, draconian penalties, and systematic pressure on independent media.

In February 1998, in an interview with "Argument" magazine, Aleksandar Vučić publicly stated that he would "get revenge on Slavko Ćuruvija someday" for the articles the "Dnevni telegraf" had published about him. A year later, on April 11, 1999, Ćuruvija was murdered in front of his building in Belgrade, while Vučić was Minister of Information in Slobodan Milošević's regime. After returning to power, Vučić publicly stated in December 2013 that Ćuruvija was killed by the state, of which he himself was a part, and announced that this would soon be proven. However, 25 years after the murder, during a period of his greatest political power, a final acquittal was announced in 2024 for four former members of State Security who had previously been convicted twice at the trial level. The Supreme Court later found legal violations in the proceedings that led to the acquittal, but the final ruling remained in effect. Thus, even after more than a quarter of a century, there are still no legally convicted individuals responsible for the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija.

The overthrow of Slobodan Milošević's regime on October 5, 2000, is essential to understanding Vučić's subsequent political behavior. His almost obsessive need to control the media and security services can also be seen as an effort to prevent a repeat of the political collapse he witnessed as a high-ranking official of the defeated regime. After Vučić returned to power in 2012, a far more sophisticated system of political control emerged, relying on institutional authority, financial dependence, editorial influence, and the loyalty of media executives rather than primarily on overt repression. In this system, the media have become one of the central instruments for maintaining personal political dominance.

Media control in such a system goes far beyond the daily promotion of the government. It includes pressure on independent journalists, direct management of political information, the use of public service authority, control over television distribution, the financing of pro-government media, and the organized spread of propaganda. At the same time, ineffective regulatory oversight allows such a system to be maintained without appropriate institutional consequences. The continuous discrediting of dissenters, the normalization of public insults and aggression, as well as the portrayal of a single individual as an irreplaceable state authority, leave deep consequences on political culture and social relations.

Serbia's media landscape is far more complex than this report can fully examine. Therefore, seven areas have been identified that most clearly show how political control is exercised through interconnected institutional, economic, and propaganda mechanisms. Their influence does not end at Serbia's borders, as the same information and political messages also reach citizens in the diaspora. The common consequence is a long-term inequality in access to information and the presentation of political alternatives. In such a system, an electoral advantage is not created on election day.

That advantage is built over years through control of information, the shaping of public opinion, and the systematic suppression of political opponents, which seriously undermines the conditions for a free and fair political choice.

4.1. The authorities' attitude toward journalists

Since the Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012, independent journalists in Serbia have faced increasing political pressure, public discrediting, and threats to their professional independence. This attitude of the Vučić regime particularly affects those who investigate corruption, organized crime, abuse of state institutions, misuse of public funds, and electoral irregularities. Rather than addressing the findings journalists publish, government officials often attack their motives and professional integrity, portraying critical reporting as an act against the state.

Political discrediting of independent journalists

In 2015, Aleksandar Vučić publicly called journalists from the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network liars and questioned their independence because their organization received foreign funding. Instead of debating their investigative findings, public attention was redirected to the journalists' alleged political motives and their loyalty to the state.

In the following years, this approach evolved into a frequent public labeling of critical journalists and newsrooms as foreign agents, traitors, collaborators with criminal organizations, terrorists, and participants in political conspiracies. These accusations did not come only from media outlets close to the government, but also from high-ranking state officials, including the President of the Republic. By repeating them, professional investigations into the government's accountability were portrayed as hostile activity, and journalists' credibility was challenged before the public could consider the results of their work.

Among the outlets subjected to such pressure are investigative newsrooms including KRIK, CINS, BIRN, and Insajder, television stations N1 and Nova S, the daily newspaper Danas, the weeklies Vreme and Radar, as well as local media such as Južne Vesti, KTV television, and the news portal 021. Their varying size, editorial policies, and geographic distribution show that the pressures are not limited to a single newsroom or a specific area of journalism.

The scale of public discrediting is confirmed by a study from the Slavko Ćuruvija Foundation, which recorded at least 834 verbal attacks by state and party officials on critical journalists and media from August 2025 to January 2026. At least 64 officials participated in them, including the President of the Republic. Accusations of collaboration with foreign services, criminal organizations, and participation in the violent overthrow of the government show how political hostility towards independent media is transferred to the public sphere from the highest levels of power.

From political pressure to physical violence

Political pressure also extended to editorial independence, the operations of newsrooms, and the exercise of state authority. The cancellation of the long-running political program "Utisak nedelje" on B92 in 2014, together with host Olja Bećković's public allegations of political pressure, which the station's management denied, raised questions about the government's influence on the editorial decisions of private media.

Local newsrooms also faced administrative pressure. Repeated tax audits of the independent news outlet Južne vesti, along with the newsroom's warnings of pressure being exerted on advertisers and business partners, demonstrated how state control mechanisms can make it difficult for media to operate, even without issuing fines. For smaller newsrooms with limited revenue and staff, such actions can have serious financial consequences.

One of the most severe cases occurred in December 2018, when the house of journalist Milan Jovanović was set on fire. Jovanović had been investigating abuses of power by the local authorities in a Belgrade municipality. Jovanović and his wife were in the house and managed to escape. After years of legal proceedings, Dragoljub Simonović, a former municipal president and ruling party official, was sentenced to four years in prison in a final court ruling for inciting the attack. This verdict represents a judicially confirmed case of organized physical violence against a journalist linked to a political officeholder.

In April 2020, journalist Ana Lalić was arrested after publishing information about the lack of protective equipment and the working conditions of medical staff during the pandemic. She spent the night in police custody, and the criminal complaint against her was later dismissed. The case raised serious questions about the use of criminal law enforcement powers against journalists reporting on matters of immediate public interest.

Campaigns against investigative journalism

One particularly serious form of pressure involves portraying investigative journalists as connected to criminal activity immediately after they publish investigations into organized crime and corruption. During 2021, KRIK journalists became the targets of a campaign in which pro-government media linked them to the criminal organizations they had investigated. Accusations were published that the editorial office was collaborating with criminals and participating in endangering the president of the country. Thus, the public debate on the responsibility of state officials was redirected to the alleged criminal connections of the journalists themselves.

Public campaigns were also accompanied by numerous lawsuits against investigative newsrooms. KRIK faced lawsuits filed by political officials, representatives of institutions, and the very individuals it reported on. International press freedom organizations have identified some of these cases as strategic lawsuits intended to intimidate journalists and drain their financial and professional resources. Regardless of the final outcome, lengthy legal proceedings require significant financial resources, legal representation, and time that newsrooms could otherwise dedicate to new investigations.

Institutional pressures have also included the use of state financial mechanisms. In 2020, Serbia's Anti-Money Laundering Administration requested banking transaction records of 37 organizations and 20 individuals, including investigative media, journalists, and representatives of civil society organizations. This action drew serious international criticism over questions of its justification and a possible chilling effect on independent organizations.

Police pressure and violence during the political crisis

Since late 2024, during mass civil and student protests following the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad, there has been a sharp increase in threats to journalists' safety. Physical assaults, threats, obstruction of filming, destruction of equipment, detentions, and the use of police force against journalists reporting from public gatherings were documented. International press organizations also warned about cases in which the police failed to protect journalists from attacks.

In December 2025, Aleksandar Dikić, a journalist and host for the local television station KTV, was arrested on suspicion of calling for a violent change of the constitutional order in a public statement. After being questioned by prosecutors the following day, he was released, while journalists' associations condemned the arrest as an attempt to intimidate critical voices. His case raised the question of the proportionality of the use of police and criminal law authorities against journalists and public critics of the government.

A particularly revealing example of public discrediting is the campaign against Veran Matić, a veteran journalist and chairman of the board of the Association of Independent Electronic Media, an organization that works to protect journalists. In early 2026, after a television broadcast portrayed him as a collaborator with foreign interests and an opponent of the state, nearly identical accusations appeared across 26 media outlets within just a few days. The Press Council assessed it as a smear campaign and found violations of the journalists' code of conduct in the publications reviewed. A few months later, Matić was attacked while filming a public gathering in front of the National Assembly, and his phone was confiscated. His case shows that those who professionally protect other journalists are also subjected to pressure.

Particularly dangerous is the secret surveillance of journalists' communications and the use of spyware, which is discussed in more detail in the chapter on security services. Such actions jeopardize the confidentiality of journalistic sources and deter citizens and public officials from reporting corruption and other abuses.

According to international monitoring of media freedom, 84 cases of threats to these freedoms were recorded in Serbia in 2024, and 209 in 2025. By mid-June 2026, another 100 cases had been recorded. The data cover various forms of pressure and attacks, but show an increase in the number of documented incidents during the political crisis.

Psychological and health consequences of pressure on journalists

Years of exposure to threats, public discrediting, professional uncertainty, and fear for personal safety can seriously jeopardize a journalist's psychological and physical health. Chronic stress, professional burnout, and other health problems may not appear in statistics on physical attacks, but they can permanently affect a journalist's ability to continue their work.

One documented example of long-term pressure is Branko Čečen, a prominent investigative journalist and director of the Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia from 2010 to 2022. During that period, he was exposed to public discrediting campaigns, threats, and institutional pressure.

After stepping down as director of CINS, he devoted much of his professional work to training and protecting other journalists, including programs on physical and digital security, risk assessment, and the effects of professional stress.

In 2026, Čečen, along with four experts in psychology, journalism, and media freedom, participated in developing a mental health study for journalists, with the support of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Mission in Serbia. The study, which surveyed 218 journalists, found that 47.2 percent identified external pressure and threats as sources of stress, 82.1 percent experienced professional burnout, while 37.1 percent reported diagnosed or self-recognized psychological difficulties. It is particularly concerning that prolonged exposure to stress is often accepted as an inherent part of the journalism profession, while adequate institutional and professional support remains insufficient.

Over fourteen years, independent journalism has faced a wide range of documented pressures. These include political labeling, coordinated smear campaigns, unfounded accusations, restricted access to information, pressure on advertisers and media owners, administrative investigations, financially draining lawsuits, arrests, secret surveillance of communications, attempts to uncover journalistic sources, threats against families, physical violence, and ineffective institutional protection. These actions do not always have the same perpetrators, nor can each individual case be directly attributed to the political authorities, but their combined effect seriously hinders independent journalistic work.

The consequences go beyond the situation of journalists themselves. When corruption investigations are discredited, newsrooms are exhausted by legal battles, and journalists and their sources face threats, it becomes more difficult for citizens to access information about the work of the government, abuses of state institutions, and electoral irregularities.

Freedom of political choice requires more than the right to vote. Citizens must also have access to reliable information that allows them to independently evaluate political alternatives and hold those in power accountable. Restricting independent journalism directly threatens this prerequisite for free political decision-making.

4.2. Political Management of the Media

Political control of the media in Serbia is not limited to ownership structures, state funding, and pressure on independent newsrooms. One of its key mechanisms is the direct coordination of political messaging by members of Aleksandar Vučić's inner circle. Suzana Vasiljević, Vučić's longtime media adviser, plays a central operational role in this system, serving as a direct link between the president and the editors, owners, and executives of major media companies. Her responsibilities extend far beyond conventional public relations and arranging the president's media appearances.

Vasiljević has publicly confirmed that she personally edits Vučić's social media accounts, prepares his media communications, and directly contacts leading television stations when she wants certain information to be published. She has publicly stated that she contacts Pink and Prva TV directly when seeking coverage of particular information. She also acknowledged asking an editor at the independent television channel N1 to delay airing footage showing police violence against a member of Vučić's family. She called that action a friendly request. But a request from someone working directly alongside the president cannot reasonably be treated as an ordinary private conversation. It represents a direct attempt to influence an independent editorial decision.

The political weight of her calls does not stem from her formal title, but from the fact that she represents a direct communication link with Aleksandar Vučić. It is precisely this closeness that gives her suggestions a significance that an ordinary public relations representative does not have. In this relationship, editors do not need explicit orders to understand what is politically expected of them or the potential consequences of refusing to comply.

Journalists and editors with years of experience covering Vučić or working at major media organizations have publicly described how these relationships operate. Their testimonies describe suggestions for questions at press conferences, the delivery of pre-prepared television segments, interventions due to unsatisfactory reporting, and direct contact with editors. Some journalists have also alleged that proposed front pages of pro-government tabloids are sent to Vučić through Suzana Vasiljević for approval. Such testimonies document journalists' experiences with political influence, although they do not conclusively prove that she personally determines the content of every single cover page in Serbia.

This system allows political leaders to influence editorial decisions without directly managing individual newsrooms. It is enough to have reliable channels between the political leadership, editors, and owners, along with constant monitoring of published content and reacting to undesirable reporting. A media company may remain privately owned and maintain its own editorial staff while adjusting its daily editorial decisions to meet the expectations of those in power.

The extent of the personalization of political news is confirmed by independent research. In 2025, Aleksandar Vučić appeared 1,172 times on the front pages of six pro-government daily newspapers. He was portrayed positively in 88 percent of those appearances and was never portrayed negatively. More than 1,800 manipulative items were recorded on the front pages of the same papers. At the same time, television monitoring documented 411 live appearances by Vučić over the course of one year. This level of coverage exceeds the typical media visibility of a government official and represents an extreme concentration of political news coverage around a single individual.

In this system, the president becomes the dominant voice explaining nearly every major issue facing the country. The activities of the government, the work of institutions, economic projects, international relations, security crises, and everyday events are presented primarily through his statements and decisions. A media image is constructed in which the state is identified with the president, while institutions and their leaders remain in his shadow. Such a personalization of power lays the foundation for the creation of a cult of personality.

A particularly significant mechanism is the repetition of the same political messages across formally different media. During the civil and student protests, a large number of pro-government television stations, daily newspapers, and news portals used almost identical interpretations of the events, portraying the protests as an attempt at a violent takeover of power, the work of foreign intelligence services, or an organized threat to the state. Repeating the same political characterization across multiple media outlets can make it appear as though independent sources are confirming it. The consistency of messages across most media in Serbia raises the question of how political narratives are coordinated from a single center and by one person, in this case Suzana Vasiljević.

The significance of her position is further confirmed by her direct involvement in talks with media companies about entering the Serbian market, which she herself has publicly confirmed. Her professional contacts thus encompass not only the daily transmission of political messages but also communication with the leadership of major media systems. This also raises the question of the intertwining of political influence, business interests, and media management, which goes beyond individual editorial interventions.

At the same time, the president's social media accounts represent an additional channel of political communication that is under the direct control of his media team. Messages posted on these accounts are picked up by television, the press, and news portals, often turning them into the top stories of the day. Thus, content produced by the political authority itself is fed back to citizens through various media, taking the form of regular news coverage. The president can thus directly shape the public message, without being obligated to answer questions from independent journalists.

The essence of this system is not just that Aleksandar Vučić receives disproportionate media coverage, but that the political communication from his immediate circle is transmitted through a large number of formally diverse media outlets and transformed into the dominant image of political reality. In this process, Suzana Vasiljević occupies an important operational position, linking the president's personal communication with the media structures that convey his messages to the public.

Such a concentration of influence allows political advantage to be built on a daily basis, long before the start of an election campaign. Citizens are faced with a large number of media outlets, but often with the same political messages, the same portrayal of the president, and similar discrediting of his opponents. The appearance of media diversity conceals serious limitations on genuine political pluralism, while control over information becomes one of the principal tools for maintaining power.

4.3. Radio Television of Serbia (RTS)

Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) is Serbia's national public broadcaster, funded by citizens and legally required to provide impartial, professional reporting that reflects a diversity of political views. In addition to other funding sources, RTS receives revenue from a mandatory monthly fee of approximately $3.35, collected through household electricity bills. Unlike private television stations, RTS has public funding, national coverage, and institutional authority that entail a responsibility to all citizens, not to the political authorities. For this very reason, its long-standing political bias represents a particularly serious deviation from the legal and societal role of a public broadcaster.

The extent of the political imbalance is confirmed by years of independent research. The Bureau for Social Research found that during one month in 2021, as much as 86 percent of the coverage of Aleksandar Vučić in RTS's main newscasts was positive. Monitoring conducted between April and August 2026 found that Serbia's ruling coalition received 96 percent of the airtime devoted to domestic political figures on RTS's main evening newscast, while the opposition received just four percent. Vučić himself accounted for 58 percent of the time allotted to representatives of the government. Such a ratio does not represent a temporary editorial imbalance, but rather the long-term domination of a single political party on the most important news program of the national public broadcaster.

RTS's favorable treatment of Vučić extends beyond the amount of airtime he receives. By continuously presenting him as the central actor in almost all state affairs, it blurs the line between the president's constitutional function, the government's authority, and the political leadership of the ruling party. Vučić speaks on economic measures, state investments, social benefits, the work of ministries, and electoral issues, while appropriate journalistic scrutiny of his powers and responsibilities is absent. In March 2026, BIRODI specifically documented such an intertwining of the presidential, executive, and party roles during one of his appearances on RTS. In this way, the public broadcaster contributes to creating an image of a state whose institutions operate through a single man.

One of the most consequential forms of RTS's political influence lies not in what it reports, but in what it leaves unreported. Manipulation of information does not require stating falsehoods. It is enough to omit an event, ignore an investigation into corruption, deny space to critical experts, downplay the significance of a civil protest, or present a specific topic exclusively through the government's response. For a large part of the population for whom public service broadcasting is the primary source of political information, an event not shown on RTS is as if it never happened. Thus, editorial selection determines not only how citizens will understand political reality, but also which events they will be informed about at all.

This problem was particularly evident during the student and civil protests that began in late 2024. Even RTS's own Program Council publicly acknowledged that the broadcaster had failed to provide timely and adequate coverage of major events during the early stages of the protests, although it noted that reporting later improved. This confirmed the problem of selective reporting even within the institution itself. Silencing or suppressing important events is not a neutral editorial decision when the public service broadcaster has a legal obligation to inform citizens fully and in a timely manner.

The seriousness of the problem was also confirmed by RTS employees. In March 2025, approximately 200 RTS journalists and staff members publicly accused the broadcaster's editorial leadership of censorship, self-censorship, biased coverage, and withholding information of public interest. They demanded professional independence and respect for the public service's legal obligations. Their open opposition is particularly significant because it shows that criticism of the editorial policy does not come only from the opposition and independent observers, but also from the people who are involved in program production on a daily basis.

The political advantage that RTS provides to the government is further significant because of the institutional trust that the public service broadcaster enjoys. Unlike openly politically aligned private television stations, RTS presents its news with the authority of a national public institution. A professional television format, a serious tone, and the absence of overtly propagandistic rhetoric can conceal the underlying one-sidedness of the content. This is precisely why the public broadcaster's political bias is particularly effective. It gives political promotion the appearance of institutional impartiality.

Such influence does not begin when an election is called and does not end when the polls close. It is exerted daily, through the selection of news, the length of segments, the portrayal of the president, the suppression of critical views, and the denial of space to political alternatives. The occasional appearance of an opposition representative cannot make up for years of unequal coverage. By the time the election campaign officially begins, the ruling party's political advantage is already deeply embedded in the way a large part of the population understands political life.

Thus, Radio Television of Serbia becomes one of the most significant institutional pillars of Aleksandar Vučić's political advantage. Citizens with different political beliefs fund the public broadcaster, while its news program distinctly favors one political side. This uses citizens' funds and the authority of a public institution in a way that undermines electoral equality. Citizens retain the formal right to vote, but they are denied equal access to the information they need to independently evaluate those in power and make an informed political choice.

4.4. Telekom Srbija (MTS)

Telekom Srbija is a state-controlled telecommunications company that has become one of the most powerful players in Serbia's media market under Aleksandar Vučić's rule. Its role is no longer limited to providing telephone, internet, and television services. Through acquisitions of distribution networks and media companies, along with investments in television production, Telekom has gained influence over both the content audiences can access and the programming that gets produced. Such a concentration of infrastructural, financial, and media power is particularly significant when it is under the control of a state-majority-owned company.

The scale of this concentration is confirmed by data from the national regulator for the first quarter of 2026. Telekom Srbija accounted for 62.3 percent of Serbia's television and media distribution market, measured by subscriber numbers. Its biggest competitor, the company Yettel, further concentrated the distribution market after acquiring the cable operator SBB. As a result, just two corporate groups controlled more than 96 percent of the television distribution market by subscriber count. Therefore, the decisions made by their management directly determine which television channels and news content the majority of the population will be able to watch on a daily basis.

Telekom's expansion was accompanied by major financial transactions that simultaneously changed the relationships in the media market. In 2018, Telekom acquired the cable operator Kopernikus for approximately $219 million. Shortly afterward, Kopernikus's former owner acquired two national television broadcasters, Prva and O2, for approximately $202 million. These two transactions demonstrated how the business of the state telecommunications company and the ownership changes in large private media had become interconnected. These transactions raised serious questions about the transparency of company valuations, the sources of the investment funds, and their impact on competition in Serbia's media market.

In 2025, Telekom Srbija entered a new phase of expansion by acquiring satellite and international television distribution businesses from United Group, along with certain television and sports broadcasting rights, in a transaction valued at approximately $733 million. This further expanded its distribution and programming power. By early 2026, Telekom had acquired a majority stake in Mondo, the company behind the daily newspaper Kurir, its news website, and its television channel. The acquisition also brought Firefly Productions and its film and television studio facilities under Telekom's control. The state-controlled company was thus expanding its position from a distributor of media content to its owner, financier, and producer.

By expanding into the production of television series and films, Telekom Srbija also gained significant influence over the domestic film industry. Its investments further concentrated financial control over television production. This position gives Telekom influence not only over which projects receive funding, but also over decisions about hiring actors, directors, and screenwriters. Numerous artists have publicly warned about the political conditioning of these decisions.

Among them is Dragan Bjelogrlić, one of Serbia’s internationally recognized actors, directors, and producers. Bjelogrlić has publicly described political blacklists at Telekom Srbija and Radio Television of Serbia (RTS). He stated that some directors were required to change their casts because certain actors were considered politically unacceptable. In March 2026, he cited two television series produced by Telekom Srbija in which a director’s proposed cast was reportedly rejected as many as three times because of the actors’ political views.

The testimonies of Bjelogrlić and other artists raise a serious question about using the economic dependence of the film industry for political discipline. When the hiring of actors, directors, and screenwriters depends on their political suitability, the funding of cultural production becomes a tool for limiting professional freedom and public expression.

The consequences of concentrated media ownership are particularly evident in the restricted availability of independent television channels N1 and Nova S. These channels, which regularly publish critical investigations and report on the political accountability of the authorities, are not included in the regular lineup of Telekom's main television platforms. Following Telekom's acquisition of the Total TV satellite platform in 2025, N1 and Nova S were removed from the channel lineup. This denied a portion of its existing subscribers access to channels they had previously been able to watch as part of their paid service.

Restrictions on access to N1 and Nova S were not limited to Telekom. According to the account described in this report, Yettel customers experienced repeated changes in the availability of these channels. After the channels became available, they were removed again from certain television packages. Customers seeking to restore access were required to contact the operator, arrange changes to their subscriptions, and pay additional fees. These additional steps created administrative and financial barriers to independent news coverage, particularly in a television distribution market dominated by two major operators.

Having access to hundreds of television channels does not necessarily mean that viewers have a meaningful choice of news and information. A company that controls distribution can decide which channels will be included in basic packages, which will require an additional subscription, and which will be completely omitted from the lineup. The ability to watch certain content online does not remove such a barrier, especially for older citizens and households that use television as their primary source of information. When an independent news channel disappears from the daily television lineup, its formal survival does not mean it remains equally accessible to the public.

One of the clearest examples of political interests intersecting with media management emerged in August 2025, when a recording of a conversation between the chief executives of Telekom Srbija and United Group became public. They discussed removing the head of the media company that operated N1 and other independent media, as well as scaling back that company's operations in Serbia. During the conversation, Telekom's chief executive explicitly stated that Aleksandar Vučić had demanded the removal of the media company's executive, while United Group's chief executive discussed the need to substantially reduce the company's operations first. United Group confirmed the recording's authenticity but dismissed claims of political pressure, while Vučić's office denied interfering in editorial policy.

The conversation is particularly significant because it shows the head of a state-controlled company discussing personnel changes with the chief executive of an international media group while referring to demands from Serbia’s political leadership. This is not ordinary business competition between two telecommunications operators. The conversation directly raises the question of political influence on the leadership of the company managing major independent newsrooms, at a time when those newsrooms were reporting intensively on mass protests and the accountability of state institutions.

In 2026, an agreement to sell the media group that includes N1, Nova S, Danas, Radar, and Nova.rs to a Portuguese investment fund was followed by changes in its ownership and management. These changes have further raised questions about the future of the editorial independence of major media outlets that critically report on the government. They are taking place in an environment where direct communication between the state telecommunications company and the leadership of their previous ownership structure has already been documented.

Thus, Telekom Srbija represents much more than a major telecommunications operator. Its financial strength, media ownership, control of distribution infrastructure, and direct contacts with the leadership of other media companies make it one of the most significant instruments through which state economic power can influence media pluralism. When a state-controlled company simultaneously expands its own news channels, limits the availability of independent television, and participates in discussions about their management, the issue of media independence transcends the business policy of a single company.

The consequences of such a system are directly transferred to the electoral process. Citizens cannot evaluate the government and its political opponents on an equal footing if their access to critical information is limited by the decisions of companies that manage almost the entire television distribution. Control of the media infrastructure thus becomes control over the conditions under which information reaches voters, and the economic power of a state-controlled company is transformed into a means of political advantage.

4.5. Pink and Informer

Pink and Informer are two interconnected pillars of a media system that continuously promotes Aleksandar Vučić and his government while subjecting critics to public attacks and campaigns of discrediting. Pink cultivates a modern, urban television image through entertainment and popular culture, while Informer relies on more overt nationalist rhetoric and a more direct, aggressive communication style. Through their different formats, they reach different segments of the audience. Their political content repeats pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives, including a negative portrayal of the United States, with occasional tonal adjustments to political circumstances.

Their political role extends through morning programs, political talk shows, prime-time news, and other content. Hosts and carefully selected guests reinforce the same political messages, which are then amplified through tabloids, news websites, and digital platforms. The accusations thus gain the appearance of multiple confirmations, even though different media content may be based on the same unsubstantiated claim. The targets are not only opposition politicians, but also journalists, professors, artists, activists, and citizens who publicly express disagreement.

Pink is a private media conglomerate with dozens of television channels, large production capacities, and a wide range of news, entertainment, film, and music programming. Its reach allows political messages to reach even viewers who primarily watch entertainment, not political content.

Pink's development during the 1990s was closely tied to the political activities of its founder, Željko Mitrović, who was a member and official of the Yugoslav Left. That party was led by Mirjana "Mira" Marković, the wife of President Slobodan Milošević. While serving as the party's marketing director, Mitrović was also developing Pink television. In later decades, Pink became one of the most prominent media pillars of Aleksandar Vučić and his regime.

Željko Mitrović, the founder and owner of Pink, has publicly described his relationship with Aleksandar Vučić as friendly. This closeness, combined with the continuous political promotion of Vučić on his television station, raises questions about editorial independence and the intertwining of personal relationships with media power.

Political promotion on Pink is accompanied by personalized attacks on critics of the government. Rather than addressing their arguments, these campaigns focus on accusations of treason, alleged ties to foreign interests, personal characteristics, and details of their private lives. Such campaigns damage the reputations of individuals, while others may be discouraged from expressing dissent publicly.

The problem also extends to entertainment and reality content, where violence, threats, humiliation, and aggressive behavior are turned into a television spectacle. This is a matter of basic standards of human dignity, the protection of minors, and responsibility to the audience. Their repeated violations contribute to the normalization of violence and public humiliation, especially when there is no effective response from the competent regulator.

Pink's financial position was also supported by financial arrangements and benefits granted by the state. Pink benefited from multiple agreements allowing it to reschedule tax debts totaling millions of dollars, as well as substantial loans from a state agency.

A new repayment agreement was approved despite the non-compliance with the previous one. This action raises questions about equality before the law and the use of state financial powers to sustain a media outlet that provides continuous political support to the government. Records from Serbia’s Tax Administration also documented financial ties between Pink and Informer. According to those records, Pink paid Informer’s publisher more than $910,000 during just five months in 2014 for the production of a political television show and advertising. Pink also granted Informer’s publisher substantial advertising discounts of up to 90 percent. These transactions took place during a period when the state was allowing Pink to defer payment on large tax debts. This business connection further illuminates the shared political function of these two media outlets, which, through different programming formats, reach different segments of the population while simultaneously maintaining continuous promotion of Aleksandar Vučić and his government.

Informer has expanded from a daily tabloid newspaper into a news website and television channel, allowing it to distribute the same political messages across multiple platforms. Its operations are characterized by the intense promotion of the government, sensationalist coverage of events, and repeated campaigns against people labeled as political or social opponents.

Dragan J. Vučićević, the founder and editor-in-chief of Informer, publicly highlights his long-standing friendship with Aleksandar Vučić and his open support for his policies. This personal and political relationship is reflected in Informer’s editorial coverage, which consistently promotes Vučić while running campaigns against his critics.

In these campaigns, critics of the government are portrayed as traitors, foreign mercenaries, or a threat to the state, and the attacks often delve into their private lives. The repetition of such accusations increases pressure on individuals and can encourage threats and harassment.

In July 2026, Dragan J. Vučićević publicly announced a campaign against companies that advertise in independent media but refuse to buy advertising space in Informer. He announced plans to publish information about these companies and their advertising expenditures, portraying their decisions to advertise in independent media as financial support for activities directed against the state. This extends political discrediting to advertisers, thereby creating additional room for economic pressure on independent media.

Years of monitoring of professional standards have documented numerous violations of the journalistic code in the daily newspaper Informer. Court decisions in individual cases have confirmed violations of citizens' honor and other rights. However, a damages award can hardly undo the consequences of a campaign that has already been carried out or remove content that continues to circulate in the public sphere.

A particularly serious example is the knife attack on Professor Natalija Jovanović, then the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Niš, the third-largest city in Serbia. The attack occurred on March 30, 2025, during a public gathering. According to courtroom reports, the defendant said that her fears and perception of events in Niš had been influenced by what she watched on Informer TV. This statement highlights the need to seriously consider how media-fueled hostility can influence individual behavior.

The reach of such messages is further amplified through the expansion of a network of local media outlets linked to the publishers of Informer and other pro-government tabloids. Content produced in Belgrade is transmitted to local media outlets, where public targeting can have particularly severe consequences due to the close-knit relationships among people and the limited space for response. During 2026, the publisher of Informer became a co-owner of a company that, together with the publisher of the tabloid Alo, acquired a number of local television stations, radio stations, and news portals. By October 2026, the network included more than ten local television, radio, and online outlets, extending the reach of the same political messages across Serbia.

Informer's financial strength is further sustained by public funds it receives through advertising, promotion, and media content co-financing contracts. Documented examples include cities, municipalities, and other public institutions, with funding that is repeated year after year. According to the results of the media content co-financing competition published as of September 2026, the publishers of Informer and the tabloid Alo, along with their affiliated companies, have been awarded more than $1.77 million in public funding. Such revenues can mitigate the financial consequences of awarded damages and weaken their deterrent effect, while the tarnished reputation, fear, and other consequences remain with the individuals who were targeted. Pink and Informer help build a political advantage day after day, long before voters go to the polls. The promotion of the government is linked to discrediting differing opinions and increasing the personal cost of public dissent. Therefore, their role also raises the question of the responsibility of institutions that are supposed to ensure compliance with media regulations and protect citizens' rights.

4.6. Tabloids, Portals, and the Digital Spread of Propaganda

Under Aleksandar Vučić’s rule, the tabloidization of Serbia’s media has gone far beyond conventional sensationalist journalism. A political propaganda system has taken hold across a significant portion of Serbia’s media landscape, linking the production, coordinated reproduction, and distribution of content through newspapers, news websites, television, and social media. Its function is not only to promote the government but also to discredit political opponents, independent journalists, professors, students, artists, and other citizens who publicly express dissent.

In this system, Informer, Alo, Srpski Telegraf, and Kurir play a significant role, while similar patterns of political reporting also appear in certain traditional daily newspapers, including Večernje novosti. Their owners, editorial policies, audiences, and business interests are not identical. Yet when an individual or social group becomes the target of a political campaign, editorial differences often disappear, replaced by nearly identical accusations, headlines, and interpretations of events. The Press Council documented the simultaneous publication of identical content in different media outlets and pointed to the influence of an external center on their editorial decisions.

Under such circumstances, a political campaign can begin by identifying a target and shaping the core accusation, after which the same message appears in a large number of media outlets. Individual newsrooms adapt the headlines, photos, and presentation to their own audience, but the basic political narrative remains unchanged. This creates the illusion of independent confirmation, even though multiple outlets are repeating the same politically framed narrative. It is precisely the ability to turn a single accusation into a national media campaign that represents the particular power of this system.

The extent of the departure from professional standards is confirmed by the findings of the Press Council. During a six-month period in 2025, the Press Council documented 7,346 violations of the journalistic code of ethics across 4,506 articles published in nine daily newspapers. The highest number of violations was recorded in the newspapers Alo, Informer, and Kurir. Almost half related to the truthfulness of reporting, including unverified information, presenting speculation as fact, and omitting circumstances important for understanding events. This frequency shows that the problem is not limited to individual editorial mistakes, but represents an established practice in a significant portion of the print media.

The political power of tabloids has been further increased by their expansion into internet portals, video production, and television programs. Some publishers, including Kurir, Informer, and Blic, have developed their own television channels, while others have internet television, digital platforms, and affiliated local media. Thus, the traditional model of daily newspapers has evolved into a system where the same content can simultaneously be a printed front page, an online news story, a television segment, and a video for social media. Different formats allow a political message to reach citizens regardless of whether they read newspapers, watch television, or get their information via mobile phone.

The development of such a system is demonstrated by a study from September 2026, which tracked the spread of 50 politically manipulative texts through internet media. The articles were republished by 47 news websites, primarily local and regional outlets. On average, each article appeared on approximately eight additional websites. Individual pieces were transmitted to as many as fourteen portals. The research examined a deliberately selected sample of articles but documented how a message originating in one newsroom can appear as independently produced reporting across numerous news websites.

This method of distribution is further amplified through social media and organized digital activities. In 2023, Meta removed 5,374 Facebook accounts, 12 Facebook groups, and 100 Instagram accounts linked to a coordinated network involving Serbian Progressive Party employees and certain government officials. According to the company's findings, the network was used to promote Aleksandar Vučić and the ruling party, attack political opponents, and create the illusion of spontaneous public support. Such activities are particularly significant in a society where, according to a 2025 Reuters Institute survey, 67 percent of respondents use social media for news.

The most serious immediate consequences of this system become apparent during coordinated campaigns targeting individuals. One person can become the subject of dozens of articles, television discussions, videos, and social media posts. Their actions are portrayed as treason, criminal activity, or collaboration with the state's enemies, while attacks often extend to their private life, family, and professional integrity. The repetition of such accusations creates a public image that an individual can hardly challenge. Not even a subsequent retraction or a court ruling can easily remove content that continues to circulate in the digital space. The damage to a person’s reputation, career, family life, and personal safety can persist for years.

The Press Council has also recognized the seriousness of this practice, including a special provision in the journalistic code against the continuous and malicious violation of an individual's reputation and dignity. Its introduction stemmed from experiences with organized media campaigns whose purpose is not to inform the public, but to harm a specific person. However, professional condemnation of such practices alone does not prevent their recurrence, especially when the same content is simultaneously distributed across a large number of media and digital channels.

The way it is funded also contributes to the maintenance of such a system. Investigations into government advertising and public contracts have shown that media outlets with repeated violations of journalistic ethics also receive substantial public funding. Thus, professional violations, legal proceedings, and public condemnations do not necessarily seriously threaten their business, while independent newsrooms face financial insecurity. In this way, public money can maintain a media environment where political propaganda is financially encouraged and professional journalism is suppressed.

The long-term consequences of this system cannot be measured solely by the number of published falsehoods, violations of journalistic ethics, or individuals subjected to public attacks.

The constant presence of this propaganda gradually changes what society considers acceptable behavior. When insults, humiliation, threats, political labeling, and public persecution become commonplace media content, society gradually becomes accustomed to behavior that once provoked strong public condemnation. What was previously a serious deviation from social norms begins to be accepted as an integral part of political life. Such a normalization of aggression becomes the long-term social consequence of tabloid propaganda.

The repeated portrayal of political opponents as enemies of the state fosters fear, mistrust, and hostility between different social groups.

At the same time, among those who oppose such propaganda, resentment, a sense of powerlessness, and distrust in institutions accumulate. Long-term exposure to such an environment can foster increasingly harsh reactions and further deepen social divisions. Political disagreement gradually stops being treated as a normal part of democracy, while political opponents are increasingly portrayed and perceived as enemies of both individuals and society.

The consequences can be especially serious for generations growing up in this media environment. Children and young people are confronted daily with political insults, aggressive television content, public humiliation, and digital discrediting campaigns. Long-term exposure to such patterns can contribute to their acceptance as a common form of public communication. In this way, the consequences of propaganda are transferred from political information to broader social values, interpersonal relationships, and the understanding of democratic culture.

Long-term tabloid propaganda therefore does not just threaten citizens' right to reliable information and a free choice in elections. Its consequences affect social relations, political culture, and the citizens' ability to resolve conflicts through democratic institutions. Elections can replace those in power, but they cannot restore mutual trust, professional standards, or a culture of public dialogue overnight. Shifting the boundaries of socially acceptable behavior is a problem that Serbia will face even after the end of the current political crisis, regardless of the outcome of individual elections.

4.7. Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM)

Serbia’s Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM) is another institution whose legally guaranteed independence has come under serious scrutiny during Aleksandar Vučić’s rule. Its predecessor, the Republic Radio Broadcasting Agency, was established in 2002, following democratic changes in Serbia, with the task of providing independent oversight of radio and television broadcasting. The REM was established in 2014 as its legal successor. REM has the authority to grant and revoke broadcasting licenses, monitor compliance with media laws, address unlawful programming, and oversee election-related media coverage. It is precisely because of these responsibilities that its work directly affects the conditions under which citizens receive information and make political decisions.

Serbian law requires REM to operate autonomously and independently of political authorities and media companies. It is governed by a nine-member Council elected by the National Assembly on the proposal of various social and professional organizations. The regulator has the authority to issue reprimands, warnings, temporary bans on certain content, and, under statutory conditions, revoke licenses. However, years of practice show a significant gap between the REM's formal powers and their enforcement against television stations that play a significant role in the political promotion of the government.

Olivera Zekić became a member of the REM Council in 2015 and was elected its president in December 2020. Her tenure was marked by public confrontations with independent journalists and critics of the regulator, disputes over findings of unequal media coverage, and numerous controversies concerning professional and personal integrity. During her tenure, the REM continued to make decisions on the rights of nationally broadcast television stations, including broadcasters whose programs had for years been the subject of criticism for political bias and violations of legal and programming obligations.

Olivera Zekić drew the attention of the wider regional public in December 2023, when she sparked a scandal that resonated far beyond Serbia's borders. Her actions were reported by media across the region, including in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the case drew sharp condemnation from journalists' associations and Jewish organizations. On her Telegram account, she posted a manipulated image showing her face superimposed on the body of Reinhard Heydrich in his Nazi SS uniform. Heydrich was one of the highest-ranking Nazi officials, the head of Nazi Germany's security apparatus, and one of the main organizers of the Holocaust. He presided over the Wannsee Conference in 1942, where Nazi officials coordinated the implementation of the genocide against European Jews. Zekić personally confirmed that she posted the photo, explaining that she did it "out of pure provocation." Despite harsh public backlash and condemnation from Jewish organizations, she continued to defend her actions. Such behavior by the president of the institution responsible for overseeing electronic media raised serious questions about her professional integrity and her attitude toward the responsibilities of public office.

The institution's reaction to this event revealed an even more serious problem. At the REM Council meeting on December 22, 2023, Zekić participated in the decision-making on whether she had violated the Code of Conduct for Council members with her own action. She proposed a finding that she had committed no violation, and a majority of Council members supported it. The Anti-Corruption Agency later found that Zekić had violated the law by failing to disclose a potential conflict of interest while participating in a decision concerning her own conduct. The agency issued her a formal reprimand. Thus, the chairwoman of the independent regulator participated in her own exoneration, and the competent state institution subsequently found an irregularity in her conduct.

A joint investigation published in April 2025 by the Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia (CINS) and the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) raised even more serious questions about the relationship between private interests and regulatory authority. The investigation found that in May 2021, Olivera Zekić purchased an apartment and a garage from journalist Jovana Joksimović, editor-in-chief of Tanjug TV. On May 28, 2021, the REM Council, chaired by Zekić, unanimously approved a cable television broadcasting license for Tanjug TV. Among the owners of companies connected to Tanjug and K1 was Manja Grčić, who was appointed Director-General of Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) in February 2026.

Property records listed the apartment’s value at no less than approximately $180,000 and also recorded a loan of approximately $135,000. Zekić did not disclose a potential conflict of interest before participating in the licensing decision, and the apartment and garage were absent from her publicly available asset declaration. When questioned about the transaction, Zekić initially said she could not remember whether she had purchased the property directly from Jovana Joksimović. She later confirmed that the purchase had been financed through a loan. When asked about the value of the apartment, she asked a reporter if she was a financial investigator, after which she ended the conversation. The circumstances of the financial arrangement have not been fully clarified publicly, and it has not been established that private relationships had no influence on the regulatory decision. Irregularities related to Olivera Zekić's employment status were also determined by the State Audit Institution. In December 2020, Zekić signed an employment contract with the REM, simultaneously as the institution's legal representative and as an employee. Auditors found that her employment arrangement as REM Council president did not comply with the law. They also identified irregularities in the calculation of her salary, taxes, and mandatory contributions. The contract was subsequently terminated, while Zekić disputed the auditors' conclusions.

The controversies surrounding Olivera Zekić are only part of the broader problems affecting REM. In July 2022, the REM Council renewed national broadcasting licenses for Pink, Happy, Prva, and B92, preserving the existing group of commercial television networks with nationwide coverage. Among the candidates that did not receive licenses were the television stations N1 and Nova S. REM justified its decision by stating that the four selected broadcasters were better positioned than the other applicants to provide objective and timely news coverage, quality programming, and media diversity. The decision was made despite long-standing complaints about the political bias of certain broadcasters and their failure to fulfill obligations regarding educational, cultural, and children's content.

REM’s approach to enforcing broadcasters’ programming requirements further exposed weaknesses in regulatory oversight. During the first three months of 2023, Happy TV counted a roughly 15-minute segment about a children’s book launch, aired at 5 a.m., as children’s programming. During the same period, Pink TV aired only about 18 minutes of children’s programming, consisting mainly of brief segments within its morning show. Nevertheless, a representative of REM’s technical department told a parliamentary committee that the broadcasters had met their programming requirements. In effect, a handful of brief television segments were treated as sufficient to meet requirements intended to ensure meaningful programming diversity and quality.

For more than a year, REM failed to file misdemeanor complaints against television broadcasters that exceeded the legal limits on advertising time. By March 2024, the statute of limitations had expired for many of these violations. Television stations thus retained the revenues generated from the additional advertising space, while the regulator's inaction prevented their sanctioning for the expired violations. The institution responsible for enforcing the law, through its inaction, allowed broadcasters to retain the economic benefit of violating it.

A particularly serious example of the REM's attitude toward electoral equality was revealed after the parliamentary elections in December 2023. REM’s publicly released report omitted data on election-related coverage by Pink, Happy, Prva, and B92. When asked for additional information, the REM responded that it did not possess any information beyond what had already been published. However, those data were available to REM’s professional staff. The previously undisclosed data showed that Pink devoted more than 18 hours of election-related coverage to the “Aleksandar Vučić – Serbia Must Not Stop” electoral list, compared with approximately five hours for all other electoral participants combined. Happy TV dedicated about twenty hours to the same list, B92 more than twelve, and Prva more than eight hours. At the same time, coverage of the opposition was predominantly negative, while the government and the ruling party were presented mostly positively. The REM had data on the highly unequal representation of election participants, but did not include it in the initially published report.

The handling of complaints during the election campaigns was also not timely. REM did not rule on certain complaints filed in December 2023 until late October and early November 2024, nearly a year after the election. By then, the disputed content had long been broadcast, and its potential political effect had been realized. A delayed regulatory decision cannot reverse the effects of unequal election coverage after voters have already been exposed to it. It is precisely because of such problems that the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has emphasized the need to strengthen the independence of the REM and its timely action during elections.

REM’s institutional crisis deepened after its Council’s term expired on November 4, 2024. For nearly two years, efforts to appoint and establish a new Council were marked by delays, disputed appointments, and resignations. In November 2025, eight of the Council’s nine seats were filled, but subsequent deadlock and resignations prevented the body from functioning normally. This situation limited the institution's ability to make decisions and exercise its most important regulatory powers, precisely during a period of intense political conflicts and major social protests.

After her term as REM Council president ended, Olivera Zekić remained employed by the regulator in a public relations role. She continued to speak publicly about the institution's work, challenging its critics and commenting on the election of new leadership. In July 2026, the Anti-Corruption Agency launched a procedure to examine the legality of her employment and a possible conflict of interest. A particular issue was the fact that Zekić had previously participated in the selection of the REM director, who later decided on her employment. Thus, questions of private interests, employment status, and institutional responsibility continued even after her public office ended.

Amid a prolonged institutional crisis and European Union demands for a transparent and lawful leadership selection process, the REM Council resumed operations in September 2026. A president of the Council was elected, but the institution still had only eight of the nine members provided for by law. Three days later, Olivera Zekić announced she was leaving the REM, where she had remained employed after her term as Council President expired. The formal resumption of work, however, did not mean a restoration of the regulator's independence, which can only be confirmed by its decisions and the consistent application of the law.

REM’s experience shows that an independent institution can be stripped of its effectiveness without being formally abolished. It is enough for the regulator to have the legal authority, but not use it in a timely and consistent manner for all broadcasters. National licenses are then renewed despite serious objections, irregularities go without appropriate consequences, data on electoral inequality does not reach the public, and proceedings are closed once the political benefit has already been achieved. The institution formally continues to exist, but its inaction can become an integral part of the system it was supposed to independently control.

Citizens of Serbia are formally guaranteed the right to freely choose their political representatives. However, the exercise of this right also depends on the conditions under which citizens inform themselves, learn about political alternatives, and form their own opinions. The REM's years-long inaction contributed to maintaining a media environment in which political participants did not have equal access to voters. Under such circumstances, an electoral advantage is not just created on election day, but is built over the entire period between elections, in the absence of effective institutional oversight. Through its inaction, an institution created to protect the public interest helped preserve the very system of political power it was supposed to oversee independently.