11. Irregularities and Lack of Accountability

Uncovering electoral irregularities is the first step in protecting voting rights, but it does not, by itself, guarantee that the abuses will stop or that those responsible will be held accountable. Photographs, recordings, documents, and witness testimony acquire real significance only when the responsible authorities promptly examine the allegations, preserve evidence, and take action within their legal authority. Protecting the electoral process involves various procedures, from identifying and correcting irregularities to investigating potential criminal liability. When institutions fail to respond effectively, the consequences of electoral abuse may remain reflected in the election results, while those who organized it retain the ability to use the same methods in future elections.

In Serbia's political system, prolonged inaction by the responsible authorities has consequences that extend beyond individual electoral irregularities. When complaints go unanswered, proceedings are delayed for years, and those who expose abuses face threats, intimidation, or professional repercussions, impunity becomes one of the mechanisms for preserving political power. Such an environment discourages citizens from reporting irregularities, undermines public trust in institutions, and allows experience gained in previous election cycles to be used to further refine methods of political control. A system in which the exposure of abuse does not lead to accountability not only fails to prevent its recurrence, but creates the conditions for it to become a permanent part of the electoral process.

11.1. Detection and Documentation of Irregularities

Electoral irregularities are uncovered by citizens, members of polling boards, election observers, journalists, and employees with access to relevant documentation. The information they obtain may include firsthand observations, official records, financial documents, and witness testimony that help connect individual incidents to organized mechanisms of electoral abuse. Cases in which different sources of evidence reinforce one another are particularly important because they help establish how electoral irregularities were financed, organized, and carried out.

Irregularities of this kind are neither confined to individual municipalities nor isolated incidents. Across successive election cycles in Serbia, recurring patterns have included the misuse of public funds, the distribution of material assistance, pressure on employees and economically vulnerable citizens, and organized efforts to influence voters. The methods used vary from one community to another, depending on local circumstances, available resources, and the structure of the party network. What these practices have in common, however, is the use of public resources in coordination with party organizations to secure an electoral advantage. Individual documented cases are therefore important not only for the events they describe, but also because they allow for an understanding of a broader pattern that repeats itself across Serbia.

Connecting Different Pieces of Evidence

A photograph or video can document the handing over of money, the distribution of aid packages, or a request that a voter photograph their ballot. Invoices, delivery records, and budget documents can reveal the source of funds, who ordered the goods, and how they were financed, while witness testimony can explain who the money or goods were intended for and under what conditions they were distributed. Connecting these pieces of evidence makes it possible to determine whether an individual act was an isolated incident or part of a broader organized effort.

One documented example of how different forms of evidence can be connected comes from the municipality of Žitište, following the December 17, 2023 elections. Election monitors, observers, and representatives of the opposition coalition Serbia Against Violence gathered evidence and filed a 17-page criminal complaint alleging the organized misuse of municipal funds to influence voters.

According to the criminal complaint, approximately 10.5 million Serbian dinars in municipal funds were used to purchase food, hygiene supplies, and other aid packages distributed to residents by representatives of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party during the election campaign. The published documents included invoices and delivery records, while those who filed the complaint identified links between the purchases, amendments to the municipal budget, and the organized distribution of aid to voters.

The municipal budget amendments were particularly significant. According to the documents described in the complaint, the budget was amended on November 30, 2023, shortly before the election, and again on December 22, five days after the vote. Those who filed the complaint alleged that these amendments were connected to financing the purchases made during the election campaign and subsequently covering their costs.

The complaint also alleged that information about socially vulnerable residents, including records held by local public agencies, was used to identify voters who were offered aid packages, firewood, or money. This raised questions not only about possible vote buying but also about the potential use of public funds, official records, and public sector employees for partisan election activities.

The Žitište case illustrates how combining financial records, budget decisions, witness testimony, and information gathered in the field can reveal an organizational structure that would not be apparent from an individual voter's complaint. At the same time, the allegations in the criminal complaint require examination by the responsible authorities, including tracing the flow of funds, determining the actual purpose of the purchased goods, examining how they were distributed, and assessing the potential liability of those involved.

From an Individual Act to an Organized Mechanism

Identifying the person who directly carried out an act of electoral abuse does not necessarily reveal the organization behind it. The person who hands over money, distributes an aid package, or demands proof of how someone voted may be only the final link in a chain involving financing, access to voter information, assignment of tasks, and coordination of activities.

The recurrence of similar practices across Serbia underscores the importance of investigating them systematically. In some communities, food and hygiene packages are distributed, while in others, voters receive cash assistance, firewood, or other forms of material support. In some communities, local officials and public institutions play a central role, while elsewhere, activities are organized through party activists and networks responsible for direct contact with voters. These local variations do not alter the underlying pattern. Citizens' economic dependence and access to public resources are exploited to secure a political advantage, while the organization of these activities is adapted to local circumstances.

An effective examination must therefore cover the entire chain of events. Authorities must establish who provided the funds, who decided how they would be used, who compiled the voter lists, who organized those carrying out the activities, and how the participants were connected.

If the authorities examine only the person directly involved in the suspected misconduct, the organizers, financiers, and those who may have directed the operation can remain outside the scope of the inquiry. This neither clarifies the mechanism that enabled the abuse nor creates the conditions for preventing its recurrence.

Documenting electoral irregularities is therefore about more than collecting evidence of individual incidents. Its fundamental importance lies in exposing recurring patterns across Serbia that link public resources, party organizations, and direct efforts to influence voters. Differences in how these practices are carried out do not change their common objective. Establishing accountability requires examining the entire organizational structure, not merely the individuals who carry out specific tasks.

11.2. Complaints and Lack of Effective Action

Reporting electoral irregularities sets in motion procedures intended to protect voting rights, establish the facts, and determine accountability. Election commissions address matters concerning electoral procedures within their statutory authority, while the police and public prosecutors handle allegations of possible criminal offenses. Other oversight bodies have jurisdiction over political financing, the use of public funds, personal data protection, and other areas in which electoral abuses may occur. These distinct responsibilities require coordination among institutions and the timely sharing of evidence. However, when cases are transferred between authorities, essential information goes uncollected for months or years, and proceedings remain unresolved, simply registering a complaint does not mean that the state has provided effective protection.

Individuals who report suspected electoral abuses cannot be expected to perform the investigative work of the police and prosecutors. Their responsibility is to report possible misconduct and provide the information available to them. When the information warrants further examination, the responsible authorities must take the necessary steps, secure relevant records, and determine whether there are grounds for further action. The information needed to justify an initial inquiry is not the same as the evidence required to secure a criminal conviction.

A Case That Exists but Goes Nowhere

One of the clearest documented examples concerns the handling of a criminal complaint involving a Serbian Progressive Party call center whose operations were exposed during the December 2023 election campaign. Investigative journalists documented organized calls to voters, daily payments to people working at the call center, and a requirement that one of those workers vote for the ruling party and submit a photograph of their ballot. After the journalists published their findings, a criminal complaint was filed with the First Basic Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade. In December 2023, the prosecutor's office asked the police to collect the information needed to assess the allegations. The complaint raised suspicions of several criminal offenses related to the electoral process, including the possible unlawful use of personal data and organized efforts to influence voters.

Nearly three years later, the case had made no discernible progress. According to an August 2026 response from the First Basic Public Prosecutor's Office, the police had not interviewed a single citizen as part of their preliminary inquiries, despite three requests from the prosecutor's office to obtain the necessary information. In July 2026, the case was transferred within Serbia's Ministry of Internal Affairs from the department responsible for combating economic crime to the department responsible for combating corruption. Legal experts noted that prosecutors were not required to wait for the police throughout this period. Within their legal authority, they could have obtained certain information and documents independently or taken other steps permitted by law. This case illustrates how a complaint can remain formally on record for nearly three years without basic inquiries being completed, while institutional activity consists largely of correspondence, repeated requests, and administrative transfers.

Shifting Responsibility and Unresolved Cases

The problem is not limited to a single case. CRTA, together with citizens and election observers, filed 11 criminal complaints concerning the December 17, 2023 elections. The complaints included suspicions of voter list manipulation, falsification of official documents, illegal changes to polling places, and attacks on observers. According to the organization's published review, none of these cases had resulted in an indictment as of the reporting date. Some cases remained in the pre-investigation stage, while other complaints were dismissed or referred to different prosecutors' offices based on their jurisdiction.

A particularly revealing example involves four criminal complaints filed in January 2024 concerning suspected forgery of citizens' signatures on applications to vote abroad. Citizens who had previously voted in Banja Luka discovered that they had again been listed as voting there in the 2023 elections, even though they had submitted no new applications. A subsequent forensic examination found that the signatures on the disputed applications were not genuine. Nevertheless, according to the published review, the cases had not been resolved as of the reporting date. This has raised questions about the effectiveness of institutional procedures, even in cases where there is concrete documentation and expert findings.

Another example involves criminal complaints concerning suspected manipulation of registered residential addresses in Belgrade. An unusually large number of voters were registered at certain addresses, including 40 voters listed at a house measuring just 58 square meters. In one case, the prosecutor's office dismissed the criminal complaint after accepting an internal police review that found the officers had acted lawfully. At the same time, the prosecutor's office acknowledged obvious discrepancies in the number of voters registered at the addresses in question. These cases illustrate different forms of institutional inaction, from prolonged preliminary inquiries to the dismissal of criminal complaints despite circumstances warranting further examination.

Delays and the Erosion of Evidence

Timely action is essential to protecting voting rights. Evidence must be preserved while it remains available, witnesses must be interviewed while they can reliably recall events, and decisions must be made in time to have a meaningful effect on the electoral process. Prolonged delays can make it harder to establish the facts, increase the risk that documents will be lost, and undermine efforts to reconstruct organized electoral abuse. At the same time, the election result produces immediate political consequences. Legislative seats are allocated, institutions continue to function, and elected representatives make decisions and manage public resources.

When a criminal complaint is filed immediately after an election but basic inquiries remain incomplete for years, any potential accountability becomes increasingly disconnected from the political benefit that may have resulted from the alleged misconduct. This is where the broader consequences of institutional inaction become apparent. Electoral abuse does not have to remain completely undiscovered to serve its purpose. It is enough for its exposure to go without a timely and effective institutional response. When election results take effect and political benefits are realized, but efforts to establish accountability remain stalled between the police, prosecutors, and other responsible authorities, the passage of time becomes one of the factors that allows the consequences of possible electoral abuses to persist.

11.3. Pressure on People Who Report Irregularities

Exposing electoral abuses can have serious consequences for those who attempt to document and report them. Election observers, public sector employees, journalists, and other citizens may face threats, physical attacks, public attempts to discredit them, or professional retaliation. The effects of such pressure extend far beyond the individuals directly affected. When someone who reports an irregularity becomes a target of intimidation and the authorities fail to provide effective protection, it sends a warning to others who may have information about similar abuses.

The problem is particularly acute in communities where employment, professional standing, or access to public resources depends on local political power structures. The fear of job loss, disciplinary action, or threats to personal safety can be enough to deter employees or citizens from reporting irregularities. This not only puts individuals at risk but also limits the ability of competent authorities to obtain the evidence needed to hold those responsible accountable.

Attack Following the Reporting of Irregularities

During the December 17, 2023 elections in Odžaci, election observers reported suspicious activity involving ballots allegedly being taken from a polling station to a political party's offices. When they headed to the police station to report the irregularities, they noticed another vehicle following them. After the observers entered the police station courtyard, unidentified men got out of the vehicle that had followed them and smashed the observers' car with batons. The attack occurred right at the place where they had sought protection from state authorities.

Although authorities announced arrests shortly after the incident, the criminal complaint did not lead to prosecution of the suspect identified in the case. The Basic Public Prosecutor's Office in Sombor later dismissed the criminal complaint against a suspect, stating that there were no grounds for suspicion that a criminal offense subject to prosecution by the state had been committed. Concerns were raised about failures to obtain surveillance footage, examine phone communications, and identify everyone involved in the attack. More than two years later, the circumstances of the attack had not been fully clarified, and criminal responsibility had not been established.

The implications of this incident extend beyond the attack on the two election observers. Individuals attempting to report suspected electoral abuse were attacked at a police station, yet the authorities' subsequent response failed to establish accountability. Such an outcome sends a warning to other observers and citizens, especially in environments where reporting irregularities involves direct confrontation with organized local structures.

Professional Consequences of Reporting

A different form of pressure was documented in the case of Ana Lazarov, who headed a department at the Center for Social Work in New Belgrade. In December 2023, shortly before the parliamentary elections, she identified suspected irregularities in the issuance of decisions granting one-time financial assistance. According to her account, the center issued numerous decisions approving one-time assistance payments ranging from 15,000 to 60,000 Serbian dinars, without the customary professional and legal review. The documents were processed using outdated software, and individuals who were not employed by the center also participated in the process. Lazarov also described lists associated with polling stations, citizens' names, and monetary amounts, which led her to suspect that funds intended for social assistance were being used to secure political support.

On December 11, 2023, she provided police with documentation concerning 158 decisions she alleged were fraudulent. She received official acknowledgment that the police had received the documents. That same day, she also informed several government authorities, including the prosecutor's office and the responsible ministry. According to her account, rather than receiving institutional protection, she faced threats, lost access to her work phone and email, and became the subject of disciplinary proceedings initiated on December 27, 2023. The stated grounds for the disciplinary proceedings were that she had disclosed institutional information to unauthorized individuals, even though she had submitted the documents to police officers. Lazarov also reported that she was later suspended from her position.

This case illustrates how an employee who reports suspected misuse of public funds can become the target of disciplinary action. Instead of focusing primarily on verifying the reported documentation and how the money intended for socially vulnerable citizens was used, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the person who submitted the documentation to the police. Such treatment can discourage other employees from reporting irregularities, particularly when their employment and professional standing depend on the leadership of a public institution.

Intimidation as a Barrier to Institutional Oversight

The attack on election observers in Odžaci and the professional repercussions reported by an employee of the Center for Social Work illustrate two different forms of the same problem. In the first case, the physical safety of the people who tried to report an irregularity was threatened, while in the second, the reporting of a possible misuse of public funds was met with professional sanctions. These cases demonstrate how pressure on individuals can undermine institutional oversight by discouraging other citizens and employees from coming forward with evidence.

When people who expose electoral abuses risk their physical safety, their jobs, and their professional livelihoods, while accountability for the reported irregularities is lacking or remains unresolved, the system does more than discourage individual whistleblowers. This creates an environment in which remaining silent becomes safer than reporting misconduct, while those who may organize electoral abuses retain an advantage over those attempting to expose them.

11.4. Impunity and the Repetition of the Same Mechanisms

The consequences of failing to hold those responsible for electoral abuses accountable extend beyond a single election cycle. When documented irregularities do not lead to timely examination by the responsible authorities, identification of those responsible, and appropriate consequences, the organizational structures that enabled the abuses may remain intact. This allows the same practices to be repeated, adapted to changing circumstances, and employed in future elections. Impunity, therefore, is not just a question of accountability for past events, but also a condition that allows existing mechanisms of political control to be preserved.

Political Benefits Persist While Accountability Is Delayed

Elections have immediate political consequences. The seats won give elected officials influence over institutions, public budgets, and state-owned enterprises, while proceedings involving reported irregularities can take years. Even if responsibility for individual unlawful acts is eventually established, the political advantages gained in the meantime may remain intact. The gap between how quickly election results take effect and how slowly institutions investigate possible abuses is one of the fundamental weaknesses in the protection of voting rights.

The cases examined in the preceding sections show how criminal complaints, supporting documents, and publicly exposed irregularities can fail to receive a timely response from the responsible authorities. Meanwhile, those who expose abuses may face pressure, while proceedings involving suspected perpetrators are delayed or concluded without fully establishing the facts. The consequences extend beyond undermining public trust in institutions. Institutional inaction creates conditions in which those who may have organized electoral abuses can expect the political benefits of an election result to materialize long before their potential responsibility is examined.

From Exposed Abuses to Refined Methods

Since the Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012, successive elections in Serbia have been marked by recurring problems that domestic and international observers have warned about for years. Pressure on public sector employees and voters, misuse of public resources, unequal media conditions, and inadequate institutional oversight have persisted despite repeated recommendations to address these problems. Reports on the 2023 parliamentary elections and the 2024 local elections again highlighted the advantages enjoyed by the ruling party, the inadequate separation of state and party activities, and the need for stronger safeguards against pressure on voters. This confirmed that the problems are not limited to individual incidents but are repeated across different election cycles.

Particularly significant is the way electoral manipulation methods evolve in response to changing circumstances. Election monitoring during the 2025 local elections documented recurring pressure on voters, misuse of public resources, intimidation, and election-related violence. Findings from 2026 also pointed to increasingly sophisticated forms of electoral manipulation, alongside the continued use of previously documented practices. How these activities are organized and financed, how voter data is used, and how political influence is exerted may vary from one community to another. The underlying objective, however, remains the same. Securing an electoral advantage is the common goal.

The recurrence of these problems, despite their documentation and international recommendations, demonstrates that exposing electoral abuses alone is not enough to change how the electoral system operates. When institutions fail to address the conditions that enable irregularities, experience gained during previous election cycles can be used to adapt and refine existing methods. Each subsequent election cycle therefore becomes not only an opportunity for political competition but also a chance to reuse the organizational infrastructure that enabled abuses in previous elections.

The Cycle of Political Control

The mechanisms examined throughout this document do not operate independently of one another. Political control over institutions enables influence over their decisions. Public funds and services are used to create dependence and secure political support, while party networks turn that support into organized electoral activities. Media dominance undermines equal conditions for political competition, while pressure on citizens and employees restricts their ability to express their electoral preferences freely. When these practices are exposed, the failure of institutions to respond effectively allows their consequences to persist and the organizational structures behind them to remain in place.

This interconnectedness lies at the heart of the system of political control. An individual irregularity may be documented, a criminal complaint filed, and the public informed of the abuse. Yet without meaningful accountability, the underlying mechanism remains intact. Citizens who report irregularities face risks, while those who wield political power and command organizational resources retain the ability to use the same methods in future elections.

A system in which electoral abuses are exposed but accountability is not established effectively or in a timely manner becomes more than a system burdened by unresolved irregularities. Impunity allows the mechanisms of political control to be repeated, adapted, and refined. The result is a closed cycle in which state institutions, public resources, and the electoral process cease to serve as independent safeguards of democratic competition and instead become interconnected instruments for preserving political power.