10. Voter Control and Manipulation of the Electoral Process

Free elections involve more than a citizen's right to enter a polling place and mark a ballot. They require that every citizen can freely decide whether to vote and who to support, without fear of job loss, denial of social assistance, economic consequences, or other forms of political pressure. The secret ballot is one of the fundamental democratic guarantees, but it loses much of its significance when the voter's political will is shaped under pressure long before they approach the ballot box.

The mechanisms of political and economic dependence described in the previous chapters serve a specific purpose during elections. Public sector employees, welfare recipients, and citizens whose livelihoods depend on the decisions of state or local institutions may be subjected to demands to secure a certain number of votes, register family members as party supporters, participate in organized political activities, or prove that they have fulfilled the expected electoral obligation. In this way, political loyalty ceases to be a matter of free choice and becomes a means of preserving employment, income, or access to public resources.

Such a system of control does not end with pre-election pressures. Compiling lists of so-called "sure votes," buying political support, photographing ballots, organizing voter relocation, monitoring turnout, and exerting pressure at polling stations are among the methods used to influence election outcomes. Irregularities in the voter list, violations of the secret ballot, and ineffective legal remedies further undermine confidence in the electoral process. Examples documented during the 2023 parliamentary and local elections, as well as the 2025 local elections, show how different forms of political pressure can be linked into an organized system of electoral control.

The essence of such a system lies not only in the ability to buy votes, make political support a condition for receiving benefits, or control individual voters. Its greatest strength lies in creating the belief that those in power can monitor citizens' political behavior and impose consequences for disobedience in their everyday lives. When a voter believes that their job, livelihood, or family's safety depends on political loyalty, freedom of choice can be seriously undermined even before Election Day begins.

10.1. Lists of "sure votes" and voter surveillance

One of the most widespread mechanisms of political control within the Serbian Progressive Party is the collection of so-called “capillary votes,” the party’s term for what has traditionally been known as “sure votes.” Both terms refer to the practice of compiling lists of voters expected to support the party in elections. Particularly vulnerable are members and supporters of the ruling party who secured employment or other benefits through party connections. Before elections, they are required to secure a certain number of people from their circle and provide their information to party coordinators. Particularly vulnerable are temporary employees, whose contracts are repeatedly renewed, thereby maintaining their dependence on the people who decide their employment.

In Serbia, approximately 6.5 million citizens are registered on the electoral roll. According to some estimates, the party’s lists of expected supporters may contain approximately 700,000 names before an election, equivalent to roughly 11 percent of Serbia’s registered voters. For each registered person, their first and last name, address, and phone number are collected so that the party organization can contact them directly. These lists are compiled through local committees and coordinators and then consolidated at the party's headquarters in Belgrade.

Data collection is only the first part of the mechanism. Shortly before the election, registered citizens receive phone calls to verify their support and remind them to vote. On election day itself, party operatives contact them again, ask if they have gone to the polling place, and record their answers. This information allows local coordinators to track the follow-through on previously secured votes and to make additional contact with those who have not yet confirmed they will vote. A special pressure is placed on the people who originally secured these votes, as they are expected to ensure the turnout of the individuals they reported.

The defining feature of this system is not the phone calls themselves, which are a routine part of political campaigns, but the connection between party voter lists, economic dependence, employment, and the obligation to demonstrate political loyalty. The pressure is primarily directed at the party’s own members and supporters, who are expected to continually reaffirm their political loyalty by fulfilling new obligations to the party.

Testimonies from local governments and public enterprises reveal the extent of political coercion against employees. In one documented case from 2022, a city government employee was instructed by a supervisor to secure 20 so-called “sure votes,” including the personal data of citizens who would then confirm their support for the party in a subsequent phone call. When she refused, she faced pressure from another supervisor who made it clear she had no choice. Her testimony shows how party tasks are passed down through the official hierarchy, from managers to employees, and then from employees to their family members and acquaintances.

During the 2023 election campaign, testimonies were publicly shared about employees of public and municipal enterprises who were required to secure as many as 40 “sure votes” to obtain permanent employment. Similar pressures were reported in municipal services, healthcare institutions, and other public systems. In some cases, workers, in addition to collecting votes, were involved in organizing party rallies and other political activities. Particularly significant is the case of an employee of Belgrade’s municipal sanitation service who spoke publicly about years of pressure to secure votes and organize employees for party activities, after which, according to the union, he was left without a job.

That this practice was not limited to previous election cycles is also shown by a case from September 2026, when a form bearing the Serbian Progressive Party’s insignia and intended for collecting lists of so-called “sure votes” was found on the reception desk of a clinic at the University Clinical Center Niš. The form included fields for first and last name, date of birth, place of residence, address, and contact phone number, while the field for the person submitting the list was filled in with the name of the institution's director. This case shows how party documentation for voter registration appears even in a public health institution, whose primary activity has nothing to do with a political campaign.

These examples show how the gathering of "sure votes" can be transformed from a simple party activity into a mechanism of political coercion. What makes this system distinctive is that much of the pressure is exerted through the party’s own network of members, supporters, and employees whose livelihoods depend on political decisions. They are not only expected to vote, but also to secure the support of others, provide their contact information, and participate in verifying turnout. In this way, political loyalty is transformed into an obligation that is renewed before each election cycle, while job insecurity and dependence on party officials make it possible to maintain such a system.

10.2. Vote Buying and Ballot Photographing

Vote buying is one of the most direct forms of influencing citizens' free electoral choice. It is not limited to the transfer of money in exchange for a vote but also includes giving food packages, household appliances, paying bills, or promising employment or other material benefits. Low-income citizens are particularly vulnerable because even a relatively small amount of financial assistance can be significant to them. When such assistance is conditioned on supporting a specific political party, material need becomes a tool to influence the will of the voter.

This mechanism often relies on pre-existing relationships of dependency between citizens, local party officials, and public institutions. Individuals who are familiar with the social and economic circumstances of particular families can identify the citizens most in need of assistance and offer them money or other benefits in exchange for political support. A particularly serious problem arises when the data, resources, or authority of institutions whose legal obligation is to treat all citizens equally, regardless of their political affiliation, are used in such activities.

One example of this overlap between local party structures and public institutions was documented in the municipality of Žitište. A criminal complaint filed on February 12, 2024, described a network of local coordinators responsible for individual local communities. According to the complaint, data from the Social Welfare Center and the municipal Office for the Poor were used to identify socially vulnerable citizens and organize political support. This case is particularly significant because it indicates the possibility that information collected for the purpose of providing social assistance could be used for party purposes, thereby undermining citizens' trust in the institutions on which their livelihoods depend.

The events surrounding the June 8, 2025, local elections in Zaječar also show that vote buying was not limited to a single community. Citizens publicly testified that they were offered between 3,000 and 4,000 dinars, approximately 25 to 35 US dollars, for their vote. Some individuals said after the election that they did not receive the promised money. In villages in the Zajecar area, there were also reports of food packages, flour, and household appliances being distributed in exchange for expected support for the ruling party. Criminal complaints were filed over suspected vote buying, and the prosecutor’s office opened a case and requested police inquiries. These cases show how various forms of material benefit can be used to sway voters, especially in environments where economic insecurity increases their vulnerability to political coercion.

A particular mechanism is the photographing of completed ballots. The secrecy of the ballot allows a citizen to freely decide who to support, even when they have previously been subjected to pressure or accepted a certain material benefit. Requiring voters to photograph their completed ballots and send the images to the person who recruited them is an attempt to circumvent this protection. The photograph can then serve as proof that the voter has fulfilled the expected political task, thereby extending the relationship between the voter and the pressure organizer into the voting booth itself.

Problems with the secrecy of the ballot were also documented in reports from international observers. During the parliamentary elections in December 2023, ODIHR observers documented the photographing of ballots, group voting, unauthorized escorting of voters, and other irregularities that compromised the secrecy of the ballot. The final report on the local elections held on June 2, 2024, again highlighted problems with voter pressure, misuse of public resources, and the application of election rules. The recurrence of such findings across different election cycles underscores the importance of consistently protecting the secrecy of the ballot and the independent oversight of polling station procedures.

Vote buying and ballot photographing are distinct but potentially linked mechanisms of electoral manipulation. The former seeks to secure political support through material benefits, while the latter attempts to verify whether the voter has fulfilled their obligation. When economic dependence, local party networks, and ineffective institutional responses are added to this, the freedom to vote can be undermined long before a voter approaches the ballot box. A particular danger of this system is that it turns what should be a free and secret electoral choice into a matter of political and material obligation.

10.3. Voter Rolls, Fictitious Residences, and Organized Voter Relocation

Serbia's Unified Voter Register is the official record of citizens eligible to vote. Its accuracy is particularly important for local elections, as the reported residence determines in which municipality or city a citizen can vote for local authorities. When voters are organized to register at addresses where they do not actually live, the electorate of a particular community can be artificially inflated, creating the possibility that people who do not belong to that community can decide on the local government.

One of the most serious examples of suspected organized manipulation of residency was recorded during the elections for the Assembly of the City of Belgrade on December 17, 2023. On Election Day, observers documented groups of voters arriving from other parts of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, gathering at designated locations, and being directed to polling stations. Particular attention was drawn to the Belgrade Arena, which was used as a logistical hub for receiving and deploying some of the arriving voters. These events raised serious questions about the actual residence of the voters brought in through organized transportation and the legality of their participation in Belgrade’s local elections.

Domestic election observers documented indications of organized voter relocation at 71 polling stations, representing approximately 14 percent of Belgrade's polling stations. Irregularities were recorded in several city municipalities, including Čukarica, Novi Beograd, Vračar, Voždovac, and Zemun. Observers documented organized arrivals, coordination of voter movements, and circumstances that indicated the possibility that some citizens were registered at addresses where they did not actually live.

Further analysis of voter records revealed unusual patterns of residency registration. A comparison of available data from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina identified voters associated with more than 1,400 addresses in Belgrade, raising questions about how their residences were registered and how their actual places of residence were verified. Particularly problematic are cases in which multiple individuals are registered at the same address without evidence that they actually live there. Such patterns provide grounds for verifying the legality of the registrations, especially when they appear in the immediate run-up to local elections.

Organized voter relocation is not limited to the physical transport of people on election day. A key part of this process can take place months in advance through residence registrations, changes to voter records, and administrative procedures that enable people to vote in communities where they do not actually live. The organized transportation of voters itself is not illegal, just as possessing Serbian citizenship while living in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not constitute an irregularity. The problem arises when the right to vote in local elections is exercised based on a residence that does not reflect the voter's actual living situation.

The consequences of this practice are particularly serious in electoral districts where a small number of votes can determine who holds power. In Belgrade in 2023, domestic election observers assessed that there were serious grounds to suspect that the organized relocation of voters could have decisively influenced the election results. According to estimates by opposition parties at the time, more than 40,000 people who did not actually live in Belgrade were brought into the city through organized transportation. The exact number has not been independently verified, but documented patterns of organized voter transport and suspicious residency registrations pointed to a problem that goes beyond individual administrative irregularities.

The reliability of the voter register depends on the ability of the responsible institutions to verify reported residences, detect irregularities promptly, and ensure that citizens exercise their voting rights in accordance with the law. When such checks are absent or are not effective enough, administrative records can become a tool for political influence over the composition of the electorate. This undermines a fundamental principle of local democracy: that the citizens who actually live in a given city or municipality should decide on its governance.

10.4. Voting on Behalf of Others and Violations of Ballot Secrecy

One of the serious problems in Serbia’s electoral process is the widespread occurrence of irregularities that undermine the right to vote freely and in secret. Family and group voting, unauthorized assistance to voters, inconsistent identity verification, and abuses of voting outside polling stations have recurred across multiple election cycles. Their frequency shows that this is not just about isolated incidents, but a broader problem in the implementation of basic electoral procedures. Of particular concern is the possibility that such irregularities are used in an organized manner to control the voting of elderly, sick, and other citizens who require assistance.

The scale of the problem is confirmed by the findings of international election observers. During the parliamentary elections on December 17, 2023, family or group voting was recorded at approximately 19 percent of observed polling stations, while inconsistent voter identity verification was observed at about four percent. In the local elections on June 2, 2024, group voting was again recorded at 15 percent of observed polling stations, proxy voting at one percent, and irregularities in voter identity verification at four percent. These findings do not represent the percentage of illegally cast votes, but rather the frequency of irregularities observed at the monitored polling stations. However, their recurrence demonstrates the seriousness of the problem and the need for effective oversight of the electoral process.

A particularly sensitive part of the electoral process is voting outside the polling place, known in Serbia as home voting. This procedure allows citizens who, due to illness, disability, or other justified reasons, cannot go to the polling place to exercise their right to vote. However, opportunities for abuse arise when party networks organize requests for home voting, when voters' consent is not verified, or when political actors influence the composition of the election teams sent to voters' homes. Instead of independent oversight, a situation can be created in which multiple formally different representatives of electoral lists are actually acting in the interest of the same political organization.

One documented example of such suspicions comes from the municipality of Žitište, where a criminal complaint was filed after the December 2023 elections due to irregularities in organizing home voting. According to the complaint, approximately six percent of voters were registered for voting outside the polling place, with significant differences between individual polling stations. Where the process was monitored by independent opposition observers, only a few registered voters were recorded, while at other locations, their number reached several dozen. The report also described suspicions that field teams were formed to formally represent different electoral lists, even though some members were politically connected to the ruling party. Particular concern arose over allegations that election teams returned unusually large numbers of ballots in a very short period.

Problems with voting outside polling stations were not limited to Žitište. During the 2023 parliamentary elections, international observers documented cases in which citizens were registered to vote from home, even though they had not submitted such a request. During the 2025 local elections in Kosjerić and Zaječar, irregularities involving independent voting, voter identification, and compliance with election procedures were again reported. These cases, when viewed together with the findings from 2023 and 2024, show a recurrence of similar problems in different environments and across multiple election cycles.

Abuses of home voting are particularly serious because opportunities for direct, independent observation are limited. While voting at a polling place takes place in front of poll workers and accredited observers, the process in a private home depends on the proper functioning of a small field team. If the team’s composition is politically controlled and the voter depends on assistance from others, the risk increases that someone may influence the voter’s choice or cast a ballot on their behalf. When such a pattern repeats itself across a large number of polling places, the total number of possible irregularities can become significant, even if the number of votes at any single location is relatively small.

The secrecy of the ballot is not just a formal rule observed by putting up a booth or securing the ballot box. It implies that every citizen makes a decision independently, without supervision, pressure, or the possibility of another person taking control of their vote. When irregularities in voter identification, group voting, and possible abuses of home voting recur across multiple election cycles, they undermine public confidence that official results fully reflect voters’ freely expressed choices.

10.5. Parallel Party Organization and Pressure at Polling Stations

One of the recurring problems in Serbia’s electoral process is the presence of parallel party operations in the immediate vicinity of polling stations on Election Day. Alongside the official polling station committees responsible for administering voting, party activists, coordinators, and other individuals operate nearby, monitoring voter arrivals, maintaining separate records, and organizing additional activities. Such patterns have been observed during multiple election cycles and in different parts of Serbia, indicating a problem that goes beyond individual incidents.

This parallel organization typically operates through lists of voters compiled in advance, local coordinators, and designated locations near polling stations. Activists track the turnout of their supporters, contact citizens who have not yet voted, organize their arrival, and exchange information with party headquarters. Merely recording turnout or calling supporters does not automatically constitute an electoral irregularity. The problem arises when such activities are combined with pressure, intimidation, vote-buying, unauthorized data collection, or interfering with the work of election officials and independent observers.

A particularly serious form of pressure involves organized groups exerting control over the areas surrounding polling stations. Their actions can include following voters, taking photos and videos, verbal threats, preventing the documentation of irregularities, or physically obstructing observers. Under such circumstances, voting may continue inside the polling station while an atmosphere of surveillance and intimidation develops immediately outside, affecting both voters and election observers. This transfers political pressure from the pre-election campaign to Election Day itself.

The scale of this problem was demonstrated by the elections held on December 17, 2023. Domestic observers reported organized activities by party groups near polling stations, the keeping of parallel voter registers, and suspected vote-buying. During the local elections on June 2, 2024, cases of parallel voter rolls, organized voter transport, and pressure on observers were again documented. The repetition of similar patterns across different election cycles shows that activities around polling stations cannot be viewed as merely spontaneous gatherings of party supporters.

During the 2025 local elections in Mionica, the organized presence of groups of men near polling stations, intimidation of citizens, and attacks on individuals attempting to document electoral irregularities were reported. In some cases, physical clashes and obstruction of observers were recorded, which further hindered independent monitoring of the electoral process. Similar patterns of pressure, parallel party activities, and obstruction of observers were also documented during the local elections in Kosjerić and Zaječar in 2025, as well as in other locations during previous election cycles. The recurrence of such events shows that the problem is not limited to one municipality, but that similar mechanisms appear at various polling places across Serbia.

A particular institutional problem arises when the competent authorities do not respond in a timely manner to reported pressures and incidents. The police are responsible for protecting citizens and maintaining security during elections, while polling station committees are responsible for administering voting in accordance with the law. When parallel activities take place in their immediate vicinity, and reports do not lead to effective action, it weakens citizens' trust in the institutions' ability to protect the freedom to vote.

Parallel party operations around polling stations represent the final stage of the broader system of political control described in the preceding sections. Lists of so-called “sure votes,”, pressure on employees, material inducement, and the organized transportation of voters are then linked to the direct monitoring of election day. In such a system, the formal presence of polling station committees and legal procedures is not enough to ensure free elections when organized efforts to influence voters take place nearby and independent oversight is restricted.

10.6. Polling Station Records, Verification of Results, and Legal Remedies

The electoral process is not finished with the closing of polling stations. Vote counting, the preparation of official polling station records, and the determination of results constitute the final stage in which individual votes are translated into official election results. The reliability of this process depends on the accurate recording of the number of voters who cast ballots, the number of ballots issued and unused, valid and invalid votes, as well as on the ability of party representatives and independent observers to directly monitor the counting.

Official polling station records are particularly important because they provide the primary documentation of voting results at each polling station. The information they contain must be verifiable and consistent with the election materials. When discrepancies exist between the number of ballots issued, the number of registered voters, and the votes counted, it is necessary to determine the cause of the discrepancy and conduct the prescribed verification procedures. Improperly filled-out protocols, subsequent corrections without an adequate explanation, or restricted access to election documentation can complicate the independent verification of results and create doubt about their authenticity.

During parliamentary and local elections in Serbia, observers documented problems with the preparation of polling station records, access to election materials, and the handling of complaints. Observers identified inconsistent application of procedures, errors in polling station records, and cases in which representatives of electoral lists did not have equal opportunities to monitor certain stages of the results verification process. It is particularly important that such irregularities are not viewed merely as technical errors, but that their cause, frequency, and potential impact on the election results are determined.

Legal remedies represent the last institutional opportunity to correct irregularities. Election participants and other persons authorized by law must have a real opportunity to file objections, inspect relevant documentation, and receive timely, reasoned decisions from the competent election commissions and courts. When election complaints are dismissed without meaningful review, or when proceedings take so long that they can no longer provide effective protection of voting rights, the mere availability of legal remedies does not ensure that those remedies are effective in practice.

However, even a completely accurate vote count cannot, by itself, remedy the effects of pressures that preceded Election Day. The record may accurately reflect the number of ballots in the box, but it cannot show whether a voter cast their ballot under the threat of job loss, in exchange for a promised material benefit, or under the pressure of a person on whom their livelihood depends. Therefore, the legality of the electoral process cannot be reduced to the mathematical accuracy of the results, but must also encompass the conditions under which the will of the voter was formed and expressed.

A ballot can be counted correctly, yet the decision it represents may not have been made freely. This is precisely the essence of the problem of electoral control in Serbia. Voter lists, political coercion of employees, vote buying, manipulation of residency, violation of the secret ballot, and parallel party organizations can operate before the official count even begins. When such mechanisms are combined with insufficient institutional control, the election result can formally follow the prescribed procedures, while the freedom of political choice for a significant portion of the citizenry remains seriously compromised.