9. Sports

Sports in Serbia have a social significance that goes far beyond competitions and athletic results. The success of Serbian athletes and clubs is an important source of the country's international prestige and national pride, while belonging to major clubs is often an integral part of family heritage and personal identity. Sports organizations bring together people of different generations, social classes, and political beliefs, and the prestige of prominent athletes and the influence of fan communities extend far beyond the sports field.

This prominent role in society also makes sports an attractive arena for political influence. Government involvement in sports extends beyond financial support and infrastructure development. It also includes influencing leadership elections, the distribution of public funds, sponsorships from state-owned enterprises, and presenting sporting achievements as the merit of political officials. At the same time, the independent views of prominent athletes and public expressions of discontent in the stands can become subject to political pressure and attacks. A particularly serious dimension is the connection of certain violent fan groups with political and state structures and their deployment outside of sporting events.

The political significance of such relationships does not end with election campaigns. The financial dependence of clubs, the expectation of loyalty from their leadership, attempts to appropriate sporting prestige, and the intimidation of those who publicly express different views can influence the freedom of political choice long before the vote itself. Sport, which should be a space for community, competition, and the free expression of affiliation, thus becomes a space for conflict between social autonomy and political power.

9.1. The Social Significance of Clubs and Fan Loyalties

Red Star and Partizan, Belgrade's two largest multisport organizations, have held a special place in the social life of Serbia for decades. Their rivalry, known as the "Eternal Derby," far exceeds the borders of Belgrade and is not limited to soccer. It is particularly pronounced in basketball, handball, and water polo, while both sports societies bring together clubs from numerous other disciplines. Fan loyalty is passed down through generations, often becoming part of the family legacy, and remains strong even when sporting results, club leadership, and social circumstances change.

An Ipsos survey presented in February 2025 illustrates the strength of that loyalty. In the survey, 43 percent of respondents chose Red Star and 28 percent chose Partizan. These figures do not speak to the political beliefs of the fans, but to the social power of two sports entities whose popularity reaches a large part of the population. Their coaches, players, and executives often have a public influence that transcends their formal sporting roles, while the mood in the stands can become a visible expression of broader social discontent.

Sports stands are among the few places where large numbers of people regularly gather independently of political parties and organized civic initiatives. In such an environment, support for the club can exist alongside public expressions of views on events in society. During the 2025 student protests, Partizan fans at basketball games expressed support for the students and chanted against Aleksandar Vučić. This sentiment put club president Ostoja Mijailović, a member of the Main Board of the Serbian Progressive Party, in a politically awkward position. He found himself caught between the political authorities with which he was associated and a portion of the fans who openly opposed them. When Željko Obradović, who had also publicly supported the students, left his position as Partizan's coach in November of the same year, some fans did not see his departure as a result of solely sporting issues, but also as a result of political pressure, believing that the club's management was acting in line with the interests of Aleksandar Vučić. This distrust grew into open demands for the president of the club to resign, showing that formal control over a sports organization does not necessarily mean control over its fans.

It is precisely because of this social significance that the popularity of major clubs represents a value that political power seeks to associate with its own authority. Endorsing their successes, the presence of political officials, and publicly taking credit for the clubs' development can serve to create an image of the government as the protector of the national sport. However, attachment to a club does not necessarily mean political loyalty to those who manage or finance it. Fans are not a unified political bloc, nor can their broad community be identified with individual organized groups that use violence or maintain ties with political structures.

Therefore, the social power of sports clubs does not exclusively belong to their management, sponsors, or government officials. It primarily stems from the attachment of people who see the clubs as part of their own identity. It is precisely this autonomous affiliation that can become an obstacle to attempts to convert sporting popularity into political obedience.

9.2. The Football Association of Serbia, Political Influence, and Control of Soccer Institutions

The Football Association of Serbia (FSS), the country's national soccer federation, oversees Serbia's most popular sport. Its jurisdiction includes the national team, the competition system, regional and local associations, the referees' organization, and other key issues of soccer's functioning. The Basketball, Volleyball, Handball, and Water Polo Associations of Serbia operate on a similar principle, as do the associations for other sports, connecting clubs and local organizations with national leadership and adhering to the rules of the respective European and world federations. Their social and institutional weight depends on the number of clubs and registered athletes, as well as public interest, with soccer and basketball having a particularly strong influence in Serbia. Such a structure allows influence over the national leadership to be exerted through a network of territorial organizations, whose representatives participate in the election of the association’s leadership. This is precisely why political control over soccer does not have to begin at the top. It can be built through relationships with local officials, club executives, businesspeople, and the people who decide on the composition of soccer institutions.

Political influence over the management of Serbian soccer was particularly evident during the 2023 election for the president of the Football Association of Serbia. Nemanja Vidić, the former captain of Manchester United and one of Serbia's most respected soccer players, ran for office with the intention of reforming domestic soccer. During his candidacy, he spoke publicly about pressure on delegates and people who supported him, and just a day before the vote, he withdrew his candidacy, stating that his team was not given a real opportunity to present its platform and participate in the election on equal terms. Dragan Džajić was then elected president, the only remaining candidate, with the support of almost all the delegates present. An election that was supposed to represent a contest of different programs ended without an opposing candidate, leaving a serious question about the actual independence of the decision-making process within the national soccer association.

Dragan Džajić assumed the presidency of the Football Association of Serbia with an undisputed sporting reputation, but also a past that raises further questions about the relationship between soccer and politics. In November 2012, then-President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolić granted him a pardon that ended further criminal prosecution in a case involving allegations of abuse during soccer player transfers, allowing the proceedings to be halted without a court ruling on his guilt. After his election as president of the FSS, Džajić openly expressed political support for Aleksandar Vučić, attributing the crucial credit for the construction of new stadiums to him and publicly calling on soccer players and fans to be grateful to him. State investments in sports were thus presented in the statements of the national association's president not only as the result of the work of state institutions, but as the personal achievement of the president of Serbia. In circumstances where his opponent withdrew from the election due to reported pressure, such a public connection between the sports leadership and the political authorities further raised the question of the actual independence of the Football Association of Serbia.

The period when it was led by Slaviša Kokeza, a former official of the Serbian Progressive Party and a close associate of Aleksandar Vučić, paints an even more serious picture of the relationships within the Football Association of Serbia. After Nemanja Vidić publicly criticized the state of Serbian soccer in 2020, messages exchanged through the encrypted Sky app and linked to Kokeza discussed hiring people from the criminal underworld to intimidate Vidić and physically attack other former national team players who supported him. Messages published in 2026, which became the subject of an investigation by the competent prosecutor's office, also revealed Kokeza's belief that his survival as head of the Federation did not depend primarily on the support of its bodies, but on the political will of Aleksandar Vučić. Although it was not established that the planned attacks were carried out, the very fact that communication about such intimidation was linked to the then-president of the national association raises a serious question of institutional responsibility. It is even more striking that the man who formally headed Serbian soccer believed that his fate could be decided by a political official outside of soccer institutions.

The impact on Serbian soccer does not end with the election of the Federation's president. Regional and local soccer associations, club management, and refereeing organizations form a connected structure where competitions are decided, the advancement of sports officials is determined, and influence is distributed. In smaller communities, where public funds, local business leaders, and political officials often intersect around the same clubs, the line between supporting sports and political management can become very thin. A particularly sensitive part of the system is the referees' organization, whose work directly affects the integrity of competitions, while documented cases of match-fixing further undermine trust in domestic soccer. Since 2025, the Football Association of Serbia has entrusted the management of the Refereeing Commission to two foreign experts, first an Italian, Domenico Messina, and then a Belgian, Frank de Bleker. However, the engagement of international experts alone cannot guarantee the independence of the system if the selection, advancement, and oversight of referees are not protected from political and financial pressures.

Aleksandar Vučić's close ties with European soccer officials add another dimension to political influence over Serbian soccer, particularly his relationships with UEFA president Aleksander Čeferin and Zoran Laković, the former general secretary of the Football Association of Serbia, who in 2025 became UEFA's deputy general secretary. Their cooperation is particularly visible through large-scale state investments in soccer infrastructure. In 2023, Vučić, Čeferin, and Laković jointly attended the opening of a new stadium in Zaječar, one of the facilities built with public funds in several Serbian cities. In 2025, Belgrade hosted the UEFA Congress, where Vučić also spoke, while in September 2026, the European soccer organization decided that the 2029 Europa League final would be held at the National Stadium in Belgrade, which was still under construction at the time the decision was made. Such cooperation brings international prestige to Serbian soccer and political promotion to the country's president, but at the same time, it raises the question of the European soccer organization's stance on political influence over the national association. The closeness between the political and European soccer leadership does not in itself prove improper interference, but it takes on a different meaning when viewed in conjunction with documented allegations of pressure on people who tried to change the leadership of Serbian soccer.

UEFA requires national soccer associations to be independent from undue political influence, but its handling of the Slaviša Kokeza case has raised serious questions about the consistency of these principles. When messages about the planned intimidation of Nemanja Vidić from the time of Kokeza's leadership of the Football Association of Serbia were published in 2026, UEFA stated that it did not intend to request additional information from the Association, reasoning that Kokeza was no longer active in soccer. Such a response left serious allegations about the conduct of the man who had managed the national federation for years without European institutional scrutiny. While cooperation with the Serbian authorities on stadium construction and the organization of international events was intense, UEFA's willingness to further address possible abuses within the Football Association of Serbia proved to be significantly more limited. This raises the question of how much international standards of independence truly protect national sports institutions when their work intertwines with the interests of political power.

The management of Serbian soccer, therefore, is not just a matter of sporting results or the selection of individual officials. Behind the formal bodies of the Football Association of Serbia is a broad network of regional and local organizations, clubs, and refereeing bodies, in which political, financial, and sporting interests intertwine. When even internationally recognized sports authorities face pressure for trying to change the existing system, it is reasonable to question how much room for independent action less-known coaches, referees, and local sports workers have. In such circumstances, political power is not necessarily exercised through direct orders, but also through dependency, the expectation of loyalty, and the fear of repercussions for defiance. Soccer institutions can have all the formal mechanisms for autonomous decision-making, but their true independence exists only if they are able to make decisions even when they go against the interests of the most politically powerful people in the country.

9.3. Financial Dependence and Political Control of Clubs

The financing of sports clubs in Serbia is one of the key issues concerning their institutional independence. In addition to revenue from competitions, membership fees, and private sponsorships, many clubs rely on funds from state and local budgets, as well as support from public enterprises. Such assistance is particularly significant for smaller sports organizations, as it enables them to survive and compete regularly. However, when the distribution of funds depends on political relationships, financial support can become a tool to influence the election of leadership, business decisions, and the public conduct of the clubs. The line between legitimate state support for sports and political pressure tied to funding then becomes a question of the actual independence of sports organizations.

The scale of public funding shows that government support for sports is far from insignificant. From 2021 to 2023, cities and municipalities in Serbia allocated an average of approximately $167 million annually for sports, of which 53 percent went to local sports associations and federations, while only 4.1 percent was allocated for preschool and school sports. An audit of funding in Novi Sad, Surdulica, and Stara Pazova revealed serious shortcomings in the transparency of resource allocation, priority setting, and monitoring the results of funded programs. Under these circumstances, the decision about which club will receive money and which will be left without support can depend much more on the assessment of local officials than on the clearly established needs of the sports community.

The problem also exists at the national level. During 2023 and 2024, approximately $60 million was allocated to sports associations outside the procedure provided for by the Sports Law. Instead of through the regular procedure of the Ministry of Sports, the money was distributed by decisions of the Government of Serbia from the current budget reserve. At the same time, deficiencies were identified in the control of spending, reporting, and the evaluation of results achieved. This method of financing gives the executive branch significantly more discretion in allocating public funds, while placing sports organizations in a position where additional support depends on the individual decisions of government officials.

In addition to budget allocations, an important source of funding is sponsorship by state-controlled companies. For example, in 2024, Telekom Srbija sponsored FK Crvena Zvezda with approximately $3.15 million, while in 2025 it provided about $2.02 million to FK Partizan and about $1.57 million to FK Radnički 1923 from Kragujevac, with the Kragujevac club also receiving approximately $168,500 from the state-owned Dunav Insurance in the same year. However, such sponsorships represent only one part of a much broader system of financial support, which includes direct budget transfers, loans, state guarantees, the restructuring of tax debts, and preferential use of public sports infrastructure.

The extent to which the political authorities are involved in securing these funds is also shown by Aleksandar Vučić's public admission that the state asks companies, including private ones, to financially support sports clubs. When the head of state directly involves himself in securing sponsorships and other forms of support, the financial stability of sports organizations ceases to be an issue solely determined by their performance, operations, and market revenues. Such a system creates an environment where political favor becomes an unwritten condition for financial security.

The consequences of politically conditioned funding can be particularly pronounced in smaller communities. The support of cities and municipalities for local sports clubs is a legitimate obligation of public institutions, and its allocation should be based on established criteria, the needs of the sports community, and the level of competition. The problem arises when such rules are circumvented, and decisions about additional aid, the use of sports facilities, or the club's survival are left to the political will of local officials. A leadership that knows the club's financial stability depends on the favor of the authorities has a strong incentive to avoid public opposition, even when it disagrees with their actions. An explicit threat is not necessary to establish such a dependency. It is enough for the people who run the club to believe that losing political support could jeopardize the money on which coaches, staff, and young athletes depend.

Financial dependence can thus turn into political control. When funds are allocated without sufficiently clear and verifiable criteria, the leadership of sports organizations can become more accountable to the officials who decide on funding than to the people they represent. Politicians, in turn, get the opportunity to present public support for sports as their own achievement, even though it is provided with citizens' money or funds from state-owned companies. The problem is not that the state funds sports, but the possibility that the right to public support can be turned into a matter of political loyalty. Sports clubs need financial stability that does not depend on who is in power, whom their members support, or whether they are willing to publicly disagree with political officials.

9.4. Red Star Belgrade Football Club

Red Star Belgrade holds a special place in Serbian society, one that far exceeds its sporting role. By winning the European and World Champion titles in 1991, the club gained international prestige and the status of one of the most recognizable symbols of Serbian sport. However, over time, this position has also taken on a distinct political and national dimension. General Director Zvezdan Terzić has publicly spoken of Red Star as a "pillar of Serbianism," equating its significance with national identity. When a sports organization is presented as an almost indispensable part of national identity, criticism of its leadership can easily be perceived as an attack on the club itself, its fans, and the values they associate with it. Such a social position represents an extremely powerful source of influence, but at the same time, it can make it difficult to publicly question the way the club is managed.

The scale of Red Star's financial power is shown by data from 2025, when the club generated over $112 million in revenue. Of that amount, approximately $76.4 million came from player transfers, $22.5 million from European competitions, $11.2 million from sponsorships, and a mere $4.5 million from ticket sales. Thus, direct spending by the public accounted for less than five percent of total revenue. At the end of the same year, the club had approximately $96.6 million in total liabilities, including more than $22.5 million in loans, borrowings, and leases, as well as significant tax liabilities. This is an organization through which enormous financial resources pass, whose business depends on the transfer market, international competitions, creditors, sponsors, and its relationship with the state.

The political dimension of the club's management is particularly evident through the relationship between Zvezdan Terzić and Aleksandar Vučić. Terzić has publicly described how Vučić invited him in 2014 to take over the management of Red Star, even though he was planning to return to head the Football Association of Serbia at the time. In the following years, he attributed the key role in his appointment and survival in the position, as well as in the club's recovery, to Vučić. In doing so, the general director himself confirmed the direct involvement of the most powerful political official in the selection of the person who would manage one of the most significant sports organizations in the country. Such a relationship raises questions about the actual autonomy of the club's bodies, which formally make decisions, but whose leaders publicly acknowledge the decisive role of a political authority outside the club.

The financial support for Red Star is not limited to sponsorship from Telekom Srbija. In February 2026, Terzić himself announced that over the previous twelve years, the club had received approximately $19.1 million from Telekom and $21.3 million in direct state grants. At the same time, he emphasized that the largest part of the revenue comes from abroad and that the club operates independently. However, public support for major sports organizations also includes tax restructuring programs, loan arrangements, the use of public property, and other forms of assistance that cannot be reduced to direct budget payments. A separate issue is the way such decisions are made, as Vučić himself has publicly spoken about state intervention with companies that are asked to provide financial assistance to the clubs.

The Russian energy giant Gazprom plays a particularly important role in Red Star's financing. Its subsidiary, Gazprom Neft, has been the club's main sponsor since 2010. The value of the multi-year sponsorship reached approximately $5.6 million annually, and the cooperation continued even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, when UEFA terminated its own partnership with Gazprom. Even when the first contract was signed, the leadership of Red Star announced that the Russian partner would also participate in the work of the club's advisory body. Terzić later openly emphasized how significant the international promotion of Gazprom through Red Star's appearances was for the Russian sponsor. Such cooperation shows how a major sports club can become a space where financial interests, international political relations, and the promotion of state-owned companies intersect.

The club's economic significance does not end with its annual revenue. Zvezdan Terzić has publicly spoken about the possibility of renovating or building a new stadium and the commercial potential of the land around the existing complex, which he valued at approximately $112 million. However, cadastral data show that significant portions of that land belong to the state and the City of Belgrade, not the club itself. Thus, the question of the future use of one of the most valuable sports complexes in the capital also becomes a question of the disposal of public property, the attitude of state institutions toward the club, and the possibility of turning sporting authority into an advantage when accessing valuable real estate.

Particular attention is also warranted for the business environment of organized fan structures. The company Ultra kop, which research has linked to one of the leaders of Red Star's fans, was registered at the club's stadium address and received contracts from state-owned enterprises. These included contracts with the Electric Power of Serbia, including a contracted project worth approximately $944,000, carried out through a consortium with a company owned by the City of Belgrade. The business connection with people from the fan environment alone does not prove the club's management is responsible for their activities, but it clearly shows that the influence of certain fan groups can have a significant economic dimension, far beyond the sports stadium.

Today, Red Star represents much more than a successful soccer team. Its international reputation, large fan community, financial transactions, and relationships with government institutions and foreign companies give it exceptional social and economic significance. For this very reason, the question of its management cannot be reduced to sports results or the personal merits of its leaders. In a society where the most politically powerful man directly participates in the election of the club's leadership, and public funds, state property, and major business interests intertwine with sports, the responsibility to the public must be as strong as the club's social influence.

9.5. Organized Fan Groups as a Means of Political Pressure

Organized fan groups in Serbia have long been much more than communities gathered around sports clubs. Their size, internal hierarchy, territorial organization, and ability to mobilize quickly give them a social power that can be used far beyond the stadium. Certain groups have become strongholds of organized crime, while their relationships with political officials, the police, and security structures have raised the question of whether their power was merely tolerated or was, at certain times, consciously used to advance political interests. A particularly serious problem arose when individuals connected to state institutions participated in establishing control over fan organizations, turning their capacity for intimidation and organized violence into a tool for influencing society.

One of the most striking examples is the takeover of the south stand of the Partizan Football Club, a traditional gathering place for fans known as the "Grobari." Their community was composed of numerous organized groups from Belgrade, other parts of Serbia, and the region, with their own hierarchy and long-standing relationships. During 2013 and 2014, control of the stand was violently seized by the group "Janjičari," led by Aleksandar Stanković, which also included Veljko Belivuk. It is particularly striking that among its leading members were former supporters of other clubs. The takeover was not limited to a change in leadership at the stadium; it was accompanied by conflicts, intimidation, and violence against other fans. At the same time, serious information emerged about the role of people from the state apparatus in establishing the new hierarchy.

At the center of these relationships was Novak Nedić, the longtime Secretary General of the Government of Serbia and a close associate of Aleksandar Vučić. The group was also connected to Nenad Vučković, then a member of the military and later a high-ranking member of the Žandarmerija. At Nedić's suggestion, Vučković and Goran Colić, an officer of the Security Information Agency (BIA), were elected as supporter representatives to the Partizan Assembly in 2014. Two years later, the interim management of Partizan publicly accused Nedić and Vučković of trying to influence the club's management and prevent the lawful decision-making of its bodies through violent fan groups. The former vice president of FK Partizan, Vladimir Vuletić, a respected professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Belgrade, later described in detail Nedić's role in the struggle for control over the club and the stands, as well as the pressure the management was subjected to from the police.

The connections with the state apparatus were not limited to public testimonies. From the communication between Veljko Belivuk and Nenad Vučković, it is clear that this police officer had a direct influence on the activities of the criminalized fan group. Their messages mentioned Dijana Hrkalović, then one of the most influential officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as officially unidentified superiors referred to as "the boss" and "the main boss," with serious public suspicions that the person behind the "main boss" title was Aleksandar Vučić. The Minister of Police at the time was Nebojša Stefanović. Dijana Hrkalović was later also accused of obstructing the timely submission of evidence from Belivuk's phone in proceedings concerning the murder of Vlastimir Milošević. Adding further weight to these connections is an official police memo from 2018, which describes Nedić's mediation after the Belivuk group's violent raid on a Belgrade club. Although the identity of all the mentioned superiors has not been established, the documented contacts show that the relationships between the criminalized hooligans and certain state representatives were not chance encounters in the stands.

The extent of institutional leniency is also demonstrated by the case of Aleksandar Stanković. Although he was convicted by a final court ruling to five years and ten months in prison for drug trafficking and weapons possession, his start of the sentence was repeatedly postponed for years. During that time, he continued to lead the fan group and participate in the club's public life. He was killed in 2016 without ever beginning his prison sentence. That same year, Aleksandar Vučić, then the Prime Minister of Serbia, publicly stated that the state lacked the strength to deal with hooligans because a social consensus for doing so was missing. In a state that has a police force, security services, and judicial institutions, such an explanation raises the question of why the enforcement of the law depends on a political assessment, rather than on the institutions' obligation to treat everyone equally.

After Stanković's murder, Belivuk and Marko Miljković took a leading role in the organization, which later operated under the name "Principi." Its members are accused of seven murders, kidnappings, torture, rape, drug trafficking, and illegal possession of weapons. According to the indictment, the victims were taken to a specially prepared facility, where they were abused and killed, and their bodies were destroyed. The trial continued into 2026. After his arrest, Belivuk claimed before the prosecution that he and his associates, at the behest of people in power, had prevented anti-Vučić chants at Partizan's stands, intimidated political opponents, and participated in organizing certain public gatherings. Vučić denied collaborating with Belivuk, but evidence of Belivuk's connections with certain police officers was published independently of his statement.

The political use of individuals connected to criminal networks and organized hooligan groups also became evident outside stadiums. During Aleksandar Vučić's presidential inauguration in 2017, men hired to provide security for the event violently removed journalists and citizens who expressed opposition. Among them, a man connected to Aleksandar Stanković's group was identified. The Serbian Progressive Party presented these men as its security stewards, while the prosecution dismissed the criminal complaints. A similar intertwining of the hooligan and political environments was also visible during the 2025 protests, when Đorđe Prelić, a former leader of the Partizan hooligan group "Alkatraz," who was convicted for his participation in the murder of French soccer fan Brice Taton, appeared among the pro-government supporters. His presence does not prove organized involvement by the authorities, but it shows that the political space was not separated from people with serious pasts in violent hooligan structures.

All these facts raise the question of the political responsibility of the very top of the government. Aleksandar Vučić was the Prime Minister of Serbia during the rise of the "Janjičari," while individuals from his closest political circle and state institutions maintained documented relationships with people who were violently taking control of the Partizan stand. A direct order from the president for such a takeover has not been established, but political responsibility is not limited to the existence of a written order. It also encompasses the question of how people connected to the state apparatus were able to operate in such an environment for years, why institutions did not prevent the violence, and how certain criminalized groups gained a position that allowed them to influence both sports organizations and public life. Attempts to control the fan stands take on a special political significance when considering that they were the very places that later remained hotbeds of vocal opposition to the government. In such a system, organized violence threatens not only the safety of citizens but also their freedom to publicly express political dissent.

The attempt to establish control over the Partizan stand also reflects Aleksandar Vučić's political interest in preventing public opposition to his rule and exerting influence over the large fan community, which brings together people from different social classes and political beliefs, and whose strength is felt far beyond the stadium, including public gatherings and protests. However, despite years of attempts to establish such control, a significant portion of Partizan's fans have remained among the most vocal opponents of Vučić's rule, showing that control over certain criminalized groups does not mean control over the entire fan community.

9.6. Partizan Basketball Club

Basketball is Serbia's most popular sport after soccer and one of the country's most important sources of international sporting prestige. Generations of Serbian basketball players and coaches have achieved outstanding results on the European and world stages, while the biggest clubs have built strong fan communities. A special place is held by the Partizan Basketball Club, a former European champion, whose social significance grew even more with the return of Željko Obradović in 2021. His international standing, his relationship with the club's politically connected leadership, and the fans’ public expressions of dissatisfaction have raised the question of how much autonomy a major sports organization can maintain in an environment of strong political influence.

The return of Željko Obradović, Europe's most decorated basketball coach with nine continental titles, was one of the most significant events in Partizan's recent history. Club president Ostoja Mijailović later publicly confirmed that in 2021, he requested a meeting with Aleksandar Vučić to secure financial support for Obradović's arrival. According to him, Vučić supported the plan, and the state helped make it a reality. Mijailović, a former member of parliament from the Serbian Progressive Party and a member of its Main Board, maintained close relations with the head of state, despite claiming to have frozen his party activities. Thus, one of the most respected coaches in world basketball began a new term at a club whose financial stability depended significantly on the political connections of its management.

This dependence was particularly evident through public debates about Partizan's funding and tax obligations. Aleksandar Vučić has repeatedly spoken publicly about state aid for the largest basketball clubs, their debts, and the need for them to settle their obligations to the state. At the same time, in 2023, Partizan fans organized the "We Have One Partizan" campaign, during which approximately $1.91 million was collected to settle the tax debt. During 2024, the club settled its remaining outstanding tax debts. However, the fact that the president of Serbia directly addressed the financial situation of individual sports clubs showed how much their operations depend on their relationship with the political leadership. Financial support, which should be based on clear institutional and business criteria, in such an environment easily takes on the character of political patronage and a means of influence.

The relationship between sports and politics took on a new dimension after the student protests began in late 2024. On December 26, Željko Obradović publicly supported the students, emphasizing the importance of young people and their right to fight for the society they want to live in. His statement was not a call to support a political party, nor did the coach get involved in party politics. On the contrary, he emphasized that he is not interested in politics, but that he has his own principles that he will not deviate from. Aleksandar Vučić reacted the same day, presenting Obradović's stance as a continuation of his earlier opposition to the government. Thus, public support for the students' demands gained political weight precisely because of the exceptional authority of the man who expressed it.

At the same time, Partizan's basketball games became a space for the open expression of dissatisfaction with the President of Serbia. Fans supported the students and chanted against Aleksandar Vučić, thereby putting the politically connected club leadership in an increasingly awkward position. Former Partizan coach Duško Vujošević had already publicly stated in February 2025 that the removal of Ostoja Mijailović from his position as president of the Yugoslav Sports Society Partizan was a political punishment because he had failed to prevent fans from chanting against Vučić and because Obradović had publicly supported the students. Mijailović continued to lead the Partizan Basketball Club, but he found himself caught between the political relationships on which the club's support depended and a fan base that was increasingly openly expressing opposition to the government. The crisis thus transcended the issue of the relationship between a coach and his president.

During 2025, problems within the basketball team also deepened. Obradović later publicly described disagreements with the management over team composition, the signing of certain players, the organization of work, and the support he expected from the club. Serious problems with discipline and the attitude of some players toward the coach also emerged, which Mijailović himself confirmed, admitting that some players had shown disrespect toward Obradović. For a coach whose authority had been one of the cornerstones of European basketball for decades, such circumstances were particularly exhausting. In an atmosphere already fraught with political conflicts, the internal crisis further weakened his position, while the management failed to preserve the stability and mutual trust necessary for the club's functioning.

The crisis culminated in November 2025, when Obradović submitted his irrevocable resignation. His later public statement revealed seriously strained relations with the club president. Obradović described how Mijailović initially accepted his departure, but after a backlash from the fans, the management tried to keep him. The coach stood by his decision, stating he no longer had the strength to continue working under the existing circumstances, and explicitly attributed the responsibility for the situation to the club president. Mijailović dismissed his own responsibility for the team's sporting results and locker room problems, claiming he had given Obradović his full support and that Aleksandar Vučić did not influence his departure. However, for a large part of the Partizan fanbase, the explanation regarding the sporting issues was not enough. The belief that Obradović's departure was the culmination of long-standing political pressure became an integral part of the crisis of confidence between the fans and the management.

The fans' reaction showed the extent of that distrust. Thousands of people greeted Obradović at the Belgrade airport, trying to persuade him to stay, while protests against the club's management and Aleksandar Vučić continued at subsequent games. Demands for Mijailović's dismissal did not stop during 2026. Particularly striking was the fact that the president of one of Europe's most popular basketball clubs had not attended domestic games for months, while fans openly called for his departure. Obradović, by contrast, retained immense authority within the fan community. The man who formally ran the club had lost the trust of a large part of its fanbase, while the coach who had stepped down remained one of the most important symbols of Partizan's identity.

The case of Željko Obradović shows how in Serbia even simple civic support for the students can become a serious political problem when it comes from a man of exceptional international reputation. Obradović was not calling for a vote against the government, but was supporting the demands of young people for accountability and justice. Aleksandar Vučić interpreted such a stance as political opposition, because the word of a man of Obradović's authority can strongly influence public opinion and, indirectly, the political choices of voters. In this context, his departure from Partizan cannot be reduced to sports results and problems within the team. On the contrary, the entire course of events suggests the conclusion that Obradović was effectively driven out of the club because his independence and public support for the students did not sit well with Aleksandar Vučić and his government. However, the reaction of Partizan's fans showed the limits of political power. The authorities can establish control over a sports club's management, but they cannot thereby claim its reputation, history, and the loyalty of people who consider it a part of their own identity.

9.7. Novak Djokovic

Novak Djokovic is one of the most significant figures in the history of Serbian sport and one of the most successful tennis players of all time. His twenty-four Grand Slam trophies, international reputation, and decades at the very top of world tennis have made him one of Serbia's most recognizable representatives. Generations of citizens view his achievements as part of their national pride, while his humanitarian work has further solidified a social authority that extends far beyond sports. However, it was this man who became the target of political attacks when he began to publicly express views that did not align with the interests of Aleksandar Vučić's government. In Serbia, even an international reputation of such magnitude proved to be insufficient protection from attempts at political disciplining.

The attacks on Djokovic did not begin with his support for the student protests. During the 2018 World Cup, when he publicly expressed support for the Croatian national team, Vladimir Đukanović, an official of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, directed insults at him and said he should be ashamed of that stance. A few years later, during environmental protests against planned lithium mining, Djokovic posted a photo of the demonstrations and a message about the importance of clean air, water, and food. Following political reactions, he had to further explain that he supported neither the government nor the opposition, but rather the citizens' right to a healthy environment. Thus, it became apparent even then how much the space for independent public opinion had narrowed in Serbia. Even the most basic civic stances could be turned into a matter of political loyalty.

A new conflict arose after the tragedy in Novi Sad, when the collapse of a canopy at the train station on November 1, 2024, sparked massive student protests and demands for accountability. In December of the same year, Djokovic supported the right of young people to have their voices heard, emphasizing that an educated youth is Serbia's greatest strength. In the following months, new messages of solidarity, support for the injured student, and public gestures and posts on the occasion of major civic gatherings followed. After the demonstrations on March 15, 2025, which gathered a huge number of citizens, he described the gathering as magnificent. Djokovic did not call for voting for any political party nor did he get involved in organized opposition activities. He supported young people who were demanding accountability from institutions. However, in a political system where Aleksandar Vučić seeks to frame almost every social issue as a vote for or against him, such support became a reason for open hostility.

This was followed by a campaign in pro-government media portraying Djokovic as an opponent of national interests, a supporter of thugs, and a participant in alleged attempts to destabilize Serbia. The attacks also extended to his family members, while some government officials questioned his patriotism and his past relationship with the state. Particularly humiliating was the attempt to deny the man who had represented Serbia around the world for decades the right to speak independently about his own society. The political message of such a campaign was clear. National prestige, sporting achievements, and contributions to Serbia's international recognition are only worthy of respect as long as their bearer does not question the interests of the political authorities. The moment he does so, his past successes become insufficient to protect him from public humiliation.

The controversy also drew international attention. French, British, Italian, and other European media reported on Djokovic's conflict with the top Serbian political leadership, the attacks he was exposed to, and his growing estrangement from Serbia. The man whom the world had for decades recognized as a symbol of Serbian sporting success became part of an international story about political intolerance toward independent public figures. For Aleksandar Vučić, who often presents Serbia's sporting achievements and international reputation as a testament to the success of his own government, such damage apparently did not present an obstacle to a political reckoning. This is one of the most detrimental traits of a system that equates the national interest with the interests of a political leader. Even when such behavior harms the country's international reputation, political loyalty remains more important than the contributions an individual makes to Serbia.

The economic and social consequences of that conflict became particularly visible during 2025. The international professional tennis tournament that the Djokovic family had organized in Belgrade for years was moved to Athens. Novak publicly stated that his family did not want such an outcome and that his brother Đorđe, who was overseeing the tournament's organization, was put in a situation where the relocation became necessary. He also expressed hope that the tournament would one day return to Serbia. The relocation of the international tournament occurred in a political atmosphere marked by public attacks on Djokovic himself and his family.

While Serbia lost an international tennis event, Greece recognized an exceptional opportunity in its arrival. Athens hosted an ATP tournament in November 2025, giving Greek tennis a significant international boost. The Greek public and sports institutions welcomed Djokovic with great respect, and Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis met with Novak, his brother, and representatives of the Hellenic Tennis Federation to discuss the further development of tennis in the country. Meanwhile, Djokovic's family also organized their lives in Athens. Thus, one country gained an international sporting event, additional promotion, and the opportunity to collaborate with one of the world's greatest athletes, while the other was left to explain why such a man became the target of political attacks. The difference between these two attitudes toward the same athlete represents a particularly stark testament to the political climate in Serbia.

A similar pattern was already visible in culture, through the political conflicts that preceded the departure of the internationally renowned EXIT festival from Serbia. The circumstances are not identical, but both cases raise the question of what a country loses when its government perceives the independence of internationally recognized individuals and organizations as a political threat. Serbia has not lost Djokovic as a citizen or his sporting legacy, but it has lost an international tournament, part of his professional presence, and the opportunities his family has developed in Belgrade for years. Political responsibility for the atmosphere in which such decisions were made cannot be avoided with simple claims that they were exclusively private or business in nature.

Even after the move, Djokovic did not stop speaking about Serbia. In February 2026, after the Australian Open final, he sent a message to the citizens that justice and truth always prevail and that one must persevere. He did not name any political opponents or call for support for a particular party. Nevertheless, such words again resonated strongly with the public. This is precisely where the political significance of his authority lies. A man who has earned international respect through his own work can encourage citizens with a simple message about justice, responsibility, and freedom far more powerfully than politicians who have access to state institutions, public funds, and the media. That is why his independence is a problem for a government that expects political loyalty from people whose reputations it did not create and whose opinions it cannot control.

The treatment of Novak Djokovic is one of the most devastating examples of the political authorities' attitude toward people who have brought exceptional international prestige to Serbia. In an effort to preserve political control, Aleksandar Vučić's government has shown a willingness to subject even one of Serbia's most famous citizens to public attacks for views that were nothing more than an expression of his civic conscience. The shame of such treatment does not belong to Serbia as a nation, nor to its citizens who continued to support Djokovic. It belongs to a political system that expects obedience from national greats and perceives their independence as an immediate threat. If a man of such international renown, with an exceptional contribution to his country, is not spared from political attacks for his freely expressed opinion, what can an ordinary citizen expect, whose job, livelihood, and family's future depend on local authorities? A state in which patriotism is measured by obedience to one man ceases to be a community of free citizens and becomes a space where even the greatest national successes are subordinated to the interests of preserving political power.