3. Security Services and Police

Security services and the police possess the authority and resources to protect the state and its citizens, but those same powers can severely restrict individual freedoms when abused. The Security and Intelligence Agency performs civil intelligence and security tasks, the Military Security Agency protects the defense system, while the police enforce the law and have immediate coercive force at their disposal. Their responsibilities differ, but political control over their leadership provides access to confidential information, surveillance capabilities, and operational resources unavailable to other political actors.

The political significance of controlling these institutions is particularly evident in the way Aleksandar Vučić maintains influence over the state security apparatus. Having served as Minister of Information under Slobodan Milošević, Vučić was familiar with the events of October 5, 2000, when the police and military did not provide the support Milošević needed to remain in power after his electoral defeat. Vučić has since spoken publicly about Milošević's mistakes, which he does not intend to repeat. This historical experience helps explain the importance of appointing politically loyal officials to leadership positions within the security apparatus. Control over these institutions is particularly important in circumstances where citizens challenge the legitimacy of the government and demand democratic change.

Another important dimension is how Russia's security establishment interprets so-called "color revolutions." The term was originally used to describe mass political changes in certain post-socialist states, but in Russian political and intelligence discourse, it has taken on the meaning of alleged Western state operations aimed at destabilizing sovereign countries and overthrowing their governments. In December 2021, then-Serbian Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin met in Moscow with Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Both publicly promoted the view that "color revolutions" are instruments used by foreign powers to destabilize governments. Vulin was heading the Ministry of Internal Affairs at that time, and became the director of the civil security service a year later, in December 2022. Aleksandar Vučić later used the same narrative during the civil protests and cited the public assessments of Russian intelligence structures.

When the preservation of political power is equated with protecting the state, citizens who demand free elections, accountability for corruption, respect for human rights, and democratic succession of power can be portrayed as participants in hostile activities. Such a portrayal creates a political framework for justifying surveillance, intimidation, and the use of force against political dissenters. Control over the security services and police matters not only because it can create an electoral advantage, but also because of the role these institutions play when citizens confront electoral irregularities, lack institutional protection, and demand that their votes be respected. The crucial question is whether these institutions will act in accordance with the Constitution and the law, or whether their powers will be used to preserve political power.

3.1. Security and Intelligence Agency

The Security and Intelligence Agency (BIA) is Serbia's civilian intelligence and security agency, responsible for collecting and assessing information important for national security, protecting the constitutional order, and countering security threats. It is organized as a special government organization within the executive branch. Its political significance lies partly in its ability to collect information covertly, monitor communications, and employ other intelligence methods whose use citizens cannot directly see or easily verify.

The institutional roots of today's agency date back to 1944, when state security services were established under the communist leadership of Yugoslavia. Under the one-party system of that era, the security services were responsible not only for protecting the state from real security threats, but also for monitoring and suppressing political opponents, labeled as "internal enemies." Today's BIA presents this institutional development as part of its own historical legacy. After the democratic changes in 2000, Serbia did not undertake a comprehensive, legally mandated opening of secret police files or implement a lustration law intended to hold individuals accountable for past abuses of public office. The agency has therefore maintained institutional continuity without a full public accounting of its past conduct.

Vladimir Orlić has served as director of the BIA since June 2024. He previously served as Speaker of Serbia’s National Assembly from 2022 to 2024 and was a senior official of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). In 2021, Orlić was elected vice president of the party's Main Board. Aleksandar Vučić, who served as Serbia's president until September 2026, remains the party's dominant political figure. By appointing Orlić to lead the agency, the government placed a prominent party official at the head of an institution expected to operate professionally and independently of party interests.

His predecessor, Aleksandar Vulin, served as the director of the BIA from December 2022 to November 2023. On July 11, 2023, the United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned him for corruption related to the Western Balkans. The U.S. Department of the Treasury cited his involvement in transnational organized crime, illicit narcotics-related operations, and abuse of public office, as well as using his government position to enable harmful Russian activities in Serbia and the region. The sanctions were imposed while Vulin was heading Serbia's civilian intelligence service. This means the question of its leadership's accountability is no longer just a subject of domestic political debate, but is directly linked to official measures by the U.S. government.

There are substantial grounds for the political assessment that today's BIA operates to a significant extent in the interests of maintaining the Serbian Progressive Party's hold on power. Such a role is particularly problematic because Serbia's constitutional order formally guarantees multiparty democracy, political pluralism, equal rights for political participants, and free elections. Compared to the former one-party system, the political instrumentalization of the service today represents a particularly serious deviation from the constitutional principles on which its operations should be based.

Cooperation with Russian security services

Cooperation between Serbian and Russian security services became particularly visible in 2025, during Vladimir Orlić's tenure as BIA director. After the mass protest in Belgrade on March 15, during which participants reported an unusual sound and a sudden movement of the crowd, accusations emerged of the use of an acoustic device against the demonstrators. Serbian authorities requested the involvement of experts from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) in examining the incident. In April, the BIA published a document presented as a report from an FSB expert group, concluding that the Serbian police's acoustic devices were not used.

The published document sparked further controversy due to spelling and linguistic inconsistencies in the Russian text, including the use of a letter that does not exist in the Russian alphabet. The FSB later confirmed that its experts participated in the investigation at the request of the Serbian government. That confirmation, however, does not establish that the findings were independently verified or clarify all the circumstances of the incident. What is particularly significant for this analysis is that the finding of a foreign security service was used in a domestic political debate about the possible responsibility of Serbian state authorities.

In September 2025, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) publicly accused the European Union of inciting protests in Serbia to change the government. Aleksandar Vučić thanked the Russian service for the information, announced additional contacts between Serbian and Russian security structures, and again spoke of an alleged "color revolution." In this way, assessments by a foreign intelligence service became part of the Serbian government's political narrative about the protests.

These events raise the question of the line between legitimate international security cooperation and relying on foreign intelligence assessments in a political dispute between the government and citizens. It is particularly important to distinguish between protecting national security and protecting the political position of the ruling party. Documented cooperation with Russian services does not in itself prove that they operationally manage Serbian security institutions, but it does show how their findings and interpretations can be used to shape the domestic authorities' response to civil discontent.

Political appointments and suppression of professional responsibility

The subordination of the security service to political interests begins with the way its leadership is selected, the setting of operational priorities, and the criteria for hiring and promotion. When political loyalty becomes more important than expertise, professional experience, and legality, employees get the message that their careers depend on their willingness to act according to the expectations of politically appointed superiors.

Interviews with current and former intelligence personnel revealed accounts of experienced operatives leaving the agency, politically motivated hiring, and the recruitment of individuals who, according to those interviewed, would not have passed the required security checks. The departure of experienced personnel and the weakening of hiring standards undermine the agency's professional competence, reduce its internal resistance to improper political orders, and make it more difficult to enforce professional accountability.

In such a system, it is possible for the surveillance of political opponents to be presented as the protection of national security, while the refusal of a politically motivated task is interpreted as a lack of loyalty. Professional accountability to the law and the institution gives way to loyalty to the political leadership. The security service can then effectively become an instrument of the ruling political establishment. The political leadership determines the interests it wants to protect, while the security apparatus has the personnel, information, surveillance methods, and operational means necessary to achieve them. The fundamental danger of such a relationship arises when the protection of the state is practically equated with the protection of the ruling party's political position.

A particular concern is the potential use of former security service members' experience, contacts, and professional methods in direct political party organizing. Publicly reported allegations about their involvement in operational centers linked to the SNS include vetting contacts, monitoring the activities of members and sympathizers, and organizing efforts to identify and secure support from voters considered reliable supporters of the ruling party. The formal status and responsibility of the individuals involved in the described activities have not been fully publicly clarified. Nevertheless, such allegations raise a serious question about the transfer of security methods to organizing political support and controlling voters.

When professional authority gained in public service is used to verify political loyalty, a citizen may get the impression that their political affiliation is known not only to party activists, but also to people with experience and contacts in the security apparatus. Such circumstances can increase pressure on citizens to publicly express support for the government, even when doing so does not reflect their free choice. The consequences for the electoral process can therefore emerge long before voters cast their ballots. Capabilities that are supposed to serve the protection of the state can be directed at identifying people who organize political opposition, uncovering their contacts and plans, and finding ways to weaken their actions. In this way, the ruling party can gain an advantage that its political competitors cannot achieve through regular democratic means.

Connections with criminal actors and abuse of official authority

Publicly available indictments and court proceedings have indicated possible links between certain members of the Serbian security apparatus and organized criminal groups. Such cases described the provision of confidential information, the use of official contacts, and the offering of protection to individuals whom state institutions should be prosecuting. In one such case, members of the civilian and military security services, as well as the police, were accused of assisting an organized crime group. Allegations in individual criminal cases do not, by themselves, establish systemic responsibility on the part of the BIA, but they illustrate the potentially serious consequences when state security capabilities intersect with private and criminal interests.

A particular danger is the potential use of official authority to informally protect individuals or groups who employ intimidation and violence. A citizen facing such pressure cannot easily determine whether they are dealing with an individual abusing their position, a group of connected officials, or a person who enjoys broader political and institutional protection. Invoking one's service, access to confidential information, or the use of official resources can further heighten the sense of vulnerability.

In such circumstances, citizens' confidence in the state's ability to provide protection may depend on their belief in the political connections of their intimidators, rather than on the expectation that the law will be applied equally to all.

During elections, actual or perceived ties between violent groups and the security apparatus can make intimidation far more effective. Citizens who believe that the people pressuring them have protection within state institutions may refrain from reporting irregularities, testifying publicly, organizing politically, or supporting opposition candidates. For intimidation to have this effect, the perpetrators do not necessarily need to have actual protection within state institutions. Sometimes, it is enough to believe that state institutions will not respond or that reporting abuse could lead to additional consequences.

This weakens freedom of political choice. Fear of consequences can steer citizens' behavior even without an explicit demand to vote for the ruling Serbian Progressive Party.

Influence on other institutions and hindrance of control

A particularly serious form of possible political influence by the security service is its actions toward institutions that are supposed to investigate abuses of power and oversee the legality of state actions. During 2026, Serbian prosecutors examined allegations that some prosecutors had been summoned to BIA headquarters, where they were allegedly instructed on how to vote in elections for the High Council of Prosecutors. This is the institution responsible for the election, advancement, and disciplinary accountability of public prosecutors, which is supposed to ensure their professional independence and protection from undue influence. According to a publicly released response from the prosecution in September 2026, more than ten prosecutors and the Minister of Justice were heard as part of the review of these allegations, while the BIA did not provide the requested information despite repeated requests.

Pressure on the selection of members of such a prosecutorial body has consequences that extend beyond the internal organization of the prosecution service. Prosecutors are responsible for prosecuting perpetrators of crimes, including those related to vote-buying, voter intimidation, and the misuse of public funds. If their professional position or advancement depends on political influence, it weakens the ability of the entire system to investigate electoral abuses impartially.

Another obstacle to institutional oversight arose in a court proceeding in which the BIA failed to respond to repeated judicial requests to declassify information needed by an accused agency member to prepare a defense.

This left access to information crucial for clarifying an officer's conduct dependent on the very institution whose actions were to be scrutinized.

When a security service can influence the professional standing of prosecutors or hinder the scrutiny of its own conduct, the mechanisms of independent accountability are weakened. In the electoral process, the consequence can be a further entrenchment of the belief that certain abuses will not be investigated and that individuals who enjoy political protection can act without timely legal consequences. Such a state not only protects individual officials or political functionaries, but can also weaken the institutional conditions for a level playing field in political competition.

Covert Surveillance of Political Organizing and Public Discrediting

Forensic examinations of mobile phones belonging to journalists, activists, and other politically engaged citizens have documented the use of covert surveillance tools in cases involving the police and the BIA. In some cases, mobile phones were compromised while their owners were in meetings at government institutions or during police detention. The use of forensic tools to unlock phones and extract their content, as well as the installation of the spyware program NoviSpy, has been documented. Such programs allow secret access to data on the device, including private communications, contacts, and other content. The compromise of a single phone therefore not only endangers its owner, but can also expose an entire network of their associates, their relationships, plans, meetings, and activities.

During 2026, a new series of cases targeting students, civil activists, and opposition figures with advanced spyware was documented. At least 14 individuals received high-confidence alerts indicating possible targeting or were identified in cases documented through digital forensic analysis. At least one infection with the Pegasus spyware has been confirmed, while traces of the NoviSpy program were found in other cases. It is important to distinguish between warnings of surveillance attempts and technically confirmed infections, as well as to emphasize that the immediate perpetrator of each individual attack has not been publicly established. However, documented cases show the scale of the possibility of secret access to personal data and the potential consequences of its use against people engaged in public and political life.

For political organizations, student movements, and civic initiatives, information about internal meetings, collaborators, plans, task assignments, and future activities is particularly sensitive. Their secret acquisition can allow the activities of political opponents to be preemptively monitored, disrupted, or steered by exerting pressure on individual participants. This capability is particularly problematic during election campaigns, when information about the organization, political agreements, and planned public appearances can provide a significant advantage to the party that possesses it.

One particularly serious case involved months of audio surveillance of an opposition organization's offices, as documented in publicly available court records. Portions of the activists' private conversations were later broadcast in the media in the immediate lead-up to a major protest. The way the recordings became public is not entirely clear, but the material obtained through secret surveillance became a tool for public political discrediting. Selected excerpts of the conversations can be presented out of their original context as evidence of dangerous intentions or illicit activity, without giving the participants a fair opportunity to explain the content and circumstances of the conversation. Such conduct can damage their reputation, weaken mutual trust within the organization, and discourage other citizens from engaging in political activity.

An additional problem is the possibility of surveillance of elected political representatives. A case has been publicized of an opposition member of parliament who stated that she had been under surveillance measures since May 2024, during a period when opposition parties were negotiating a joint appearance in local elections. If the state security service were to obtain confidential information about opposition parties' negotiations, their political agreements, and election strategies without legal grounds, such information could be used to create an immediate political advantage for the ruling party. The inequality among political participants then arises not only from the public campaign or unequal media coverage, but also from the ability to access information that political competitors reasonably consider confidential.

A particularly serious example of political expectations placed on the security services is a public statement made on October 5, 2025, by Aleksandar Vučić, then president of Serbia. Speaking about the student blockades, Vučić expressed his dissatisfaction that the BIA had not provided him with a single recording of the student plenums during the first six months of the student protests. He portrayed the agency's failure to obtain such recordings as a professional failure, declaring that "nobody is that incompetent." The statement is particularly significant because it did not come from a police representative or an official in charge of conducting a specific legal investigation, but from the head of state, and it referred to internal meetings of citizens who were organizing to protest against the government.

Student assemblies are a form of collective decision-making, civic organizing, and political expression. They do not, in and of themselves, pose a threat to national security. Monitoring such meetings solely for the purpose of gathering information about political plans, without an appropriate legal basis and necessary safeguards, would constitute an infringement on constitutional freedoms and the right to privacy. The president's statement alone does not prove that the illegal wiretapping was actually carried out. It does, however, document the expectation of the highest state official that the civilian intelligence service collects and delivers information about the internal organization of the student movement.

When the head of state presents the failure to provide recordings of political dissidents as a professional failure of the intelligence service, the issue is no longer just the legality of the possible surveillance, but also the use of presidential political authority to direct the work of a security institution. Such a public expectation raises serious concerns about the boundary between the constitutional authority of state officials and the political misuse of security services.

The protection of national security cannot be equated with preserving the political stability of the ruling party. Citizens who peacefully organize for a change of government are exercising their rights in a democratic society and do not threaten the state simply by challenging its political leadership.

Pressures on citizens, families, and professional existence

Security services do not need to use direct coercion or explicit threats to exert pressure on citizens. Such pressure can involve summoning citizens for questioning, visiting their homes or workplaces, contacting family members, and sending messages that link cooperation with the service to possible assistance or negative consequences for refusing. Publicly released testimonies describe such actions toward journalists, students, civic activists, and family members of people involved in opposition organizing. Similar patterns also appear in the context of economic protests, environmental initiatives, and student blockades. Individual allegations have varying degrees of confirmation, but their collective consideration raises the question of the line between legitimate security work and the control of social discontent.

The experiences of farmers protesting economic hardship, government subsidies, and unfulfilled official promises are particularly revealing. In one instance, members of the service came to the home of the protest organizer and inquired about the planned blockades. In another, representatives of agricultural associations were summoned for talks and, according to their testimonies, dissuaded from organizing protest activities. In a third case, farmers who were expecting a meeting with the relevant minister were called to the offices of the BIA to discuss their agrarian demands. What these events have in common is the involvement of the institution responsible for national security in disputes that primarily concern economic policy, subsidies, production conditions, and the state's obligations to farmers.

Similar patterns appear in the cases of environmental activists who opposed certain mining and other projects. Summoning activists for questioning, temporarily seizing their phones, monitoring private communications, and, in some documented cases, compromising devices with spyware can have a powerful intimidating effect. Civil opposition to government decisions, including those regarding the use of natural resources, does not in itself constitute a security threat. Treating such opposition as a national security matter therefore requires a specific and lawful basis, not just a political assessment that a particular protest is a problem for the ruling structure.

Particularly troubling are cases in which the security service directs its attention toward the family members of protesters. In one publicly described case, the mother of a student involved in the blockades testified that people identifying themselves as members of the BIA came to her workplace and questioned her about the organization, motives, and demands of the student movement. This form of indirect pressure can be particularly effective because the sense of threat is transferred from the immediate protester to their parents, family, and professional environment. According to other public testimonies, students were summoned for questioning about organizing campus blockades, the composition of working groups, internal decisions, and future gatherings.

Even when such conversations are not accompanied by explicit threats, the very fact that the security service is interested in lawful student organizing can encourage self-censorship and discourage other citizens from participating.

What these examples have in common is a blurring of the line between protecting the state and surveilling society. Farmers demanding solutions to economic problems, environmental activists opposing government decisions, students participating in protests, and citizens supporting the political opposition do not, in and of themselves, pose a threat to national security. Their actions fall within the realm of civil and political liberties that the state is obligated to protect. When the security service becomes involved in monitoring and investigating such activities, its role goes beyond the scope of protecting national security and raises the question of using state authority to control political and social discontent.

The potential impact on citizens' livelihoods and their families' security makes such pressure especially serious. The knowledge that the security service possesses information about their employment, income, private contacts, and family members can be enough to make individuals abandon public engagement. This mechanism is particularly effective in a society where a large number of people are economically dependent on the state, public enterprises, and politically influenced institutions. A citizen then assesses not only whether they can afford to support the opposition, participate in a protest, or report an electoral irregularity, but also what consequences their action might have for their job, family, and future. Fear of the state apparatus thus becomes a means of political control, even when open threats and immediate coercion are absent.

The significance of the BIA's potential political abuse for elections is not measured solely by its actions on election day. Secret surveillance, the gathering of confidential information on political opponents, and pressure on civic organizing can restrict freedom of political action in advance and weaken the equality of participants. The BIA is tasked with protecting the constitutional order and the security of all citizens, not the political position of a party or an individual. When demands for a change in power are treated as a security issue, citizens may retain the formal right to vote, while their freedom to organize, inform themselves, and support political alternatives is curtailed long before the election.

3.2. Military Security Agency

The Military Security Agency (VBA) is Serbia's military security service, operating within the Ministry of Defense. Its responsibilities include the security and counterintelligence protection of the Ministry of Defense and the Serbian Army, the detection of certain criminal offenses that threaten the defense system, and the protection of confidential military information. Unlike the civilian Security and Intelligence Agency (BIA), the VBA operates primarily within the military and has specialized personnel and operational capabilities suited to military security and counterintelligence work.

The Ministry of Defense is headed by Bratislav Gašić, a co-founder of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and a longtime political associate of Aleksandar Vučić. Gašić was the vice president of the SNS from 2012 to 2016, and then held high-ranking positions in various parts of the security system, including as director of the BIA and Minister of Internal Affairs. His transition from one key security position to another is an example of political cronyism in institutions that wield significant powers. This raises the question of separating party interests from the professional management of the state's security system.

A particularly significant role in establishing political control over the military security system, and through it, over the Serbian Army itself, is played by Đuro Jovanić, the director of the Military Security Agency since September 2018. His professional rise is directly linked to the period when Aleksandar Vučić served as Minister of Defense. Jovanić served as Vučić's aide-de-camp during that period and subsequently advanced through the military ranks at an unusually rapid pace. In four years, he rose from captain to colonel, with three extraordinary promotions. After his appointment as director of the VBA, he was also given a general's rank: in April 2019, Vučić promoted him to brigadier general. Such a professional path demonstrates the importance of personal trust and proximity to the political leadership for advancing to the highest positions in the military security apparatus.

Jovanić's career is one of the most striking examples of building a military security hierarchy based on Aleksandar Vučić's personal political trust. As his former adjutant and long-time associate, Jovanić became head of an institution that has access to confidential information about military personnel, conducts security checks, and can influence an officer's professional standing. This relationship gives the political leadership considerable influence over an agency responsible for conducting security assessments and evaluating the reliability of military officers.

The VBA is staffed by professional military personnel and civilian experts, and personnel can be drawn from the Ministry of Defense and the Serbian Army through prescribed selection and security clearance procedures. Political influence does not necessarily require the recruitment of party loyalists into the agency. It can be exercised by appointing leaders, setting operational priorities, making security assessments, and directing the work of already trained professionals. The VBA does not formally command military units, but its access to security information, its role in vetting, and its influence on officers' careers make it a powerful instrument of political influence over the people who command those units.

The line between protecting the defense system and involving the military security apparatus in domestic political conflicts is crucial. The military counterintelligence service has a legitimate role in protecting the state, but its powers do not give the political leadership the right to use it to monitor critics of the government, independent unions, or political opponents. Crossing that line opens the possibility for professional military capabilities to be directed toward political objectives unrelated to national security.

Political direction of the professional military structure

Professional education, military discipline, and specialized training equip VBA personnel to carry out complex security operations. However, the way they are used depends on the leadership, accountability, and effectiveness of institutional control. When political loyalty becomes an important criterion for trust and advancement, military expertise can be directed toward protecting the political position of the ruling structure.

This mechanism operates through leadership appointments, the setting of operational priorities, and the assignment of personnel expected to carry out politically desirable tasks. An officer can retain their rank, professional status, and formal authority, while the practical purpose of their work gradually shifts from protecting the defense system to protecting the interests of the political leadership. Political misuse of a professional security service can therefore be less visible than direct partisan recruitment. Military personnel may continue to carry out orders that are formally lawful, even as personnel decisions and security assessments gradually create political dependence within the military hierarchy.

Such a relationship is of special significance for the electoral process. Military security institutions possess information, professional experience, and operational capabilities that are not available to political organizations. If these capacities are used to monitor, intimidate, or weaken political opponents, this creates an imbalance in access to state resources that has nothing to do with differences in public support. At the same time, political control of military security structures allows for monitoring the sentiment within the professional military and influencing the careers of officers whose political reliability is questioned.

Security checks, military career, and political loyalty

Security checks are an integral part of the military system. Their results can affect personnel assignments, contract extensions, professional development, and deployment to international peacekeeping missions. Because these procedures can directly affect military careers, their misuse can become a particularly effective means of pressure.

Throughout 2024, representatives of the Military Union of Serbia publicly spoke about pressure on members to leave the union. According to their testimonies, security checks required for contract extensions, peacekeeping missions, and training were used as a tool of pressure. They also described cases of preventing professional development and terminating training that had already begun. The union's independence is important because it enables military personnel to collectively raise concerns about working conditions, irregularities, and potential abuses within the defense system.

Particularly significant was the case of the union’s president at the time, who had spent years publicly criticizing military leadership and exposing irregularities. His actions went beyond individual labor disputes: the union represented one of the few independent channels through which information about the military's internal workings reached the public. He was subjected to disciplinary proceedings related to his union activities and public appearances, and subsequently lost his position in the Serbian Army.

In 2024, he was arrested in an operation led by the VBA on suspicion of embezzlement. While he was in detention, the union's previous leadership was replaced. His legal representatives described this sequence of events as an attempt to remove the independent leadership and replace it with people loyal to the authorities. The political significance of the case goes beyond the criminal liability of one man and also concerns the consequences for an organization that publicly challenged the decisions of the state and military leadership.

An additional dimension is the publicly disclosed allegations of surveillance of the trade union representative's family members and his lawyers. Investigations published in 2024 described the alleged tracking of their movements and meetings in public places by members of the VBA. A criminal complaint was also filed alleging unlawful surveillance and recording. This raises concerns about pressure extending beyond military personnel to civilians who have no direct connection to their official duties.

Such conduct can have a powerful chilling effect on military personnel. A service member who believes that the security service might be monitoring their loved ones and lawyers due to union organizing or criticism of leadership faces pressure that extends far beyond professional consequences. Formally guaranteed rights to organize and free expression then become difficult to exercise in practice.

A similar pattern emerged during the 2025 student protests. According to publicly released testimonies from members of the Serbian Army, the VBA monitored their social media activity, including public support for the student protests, comments, and likes on posts. According to these testimonies, officers and noncommissioned officers who expressed support for the students were transferred to remote garrisons. Formal justifications cited the needs of the service, while interviewees linked such decisions to the employees' political views.

This example shows how ordinary administrative powers can become a tool for political disciplining without an open ban on political expression. A transfer to a remote garrison can mean separation from family, additional expenses, and a serious disruption of professional and personal stability. When such a decision follows public support for a movement disapproved of by the authorities, its effect is not limited to the officer who is transferred. A message is sent to others that expressing political views can have consequences for their career and family.

Political control does not require every soldier or officer to openly support the ruling party. It is enough to create an environment in which political dissent is perceived as a professional risk, and silence is seen as a condition for preserving one's career. Such a mechanism limits the freedom of political expression of military personnel and their families and weakens the possibility of independent organizing within the defense system.

Treatment of civilian critics and public discrediting

The potential political misuse of military security capabilities extends beyond the armed forces. Particularly serious issues arise when those capabilities are directed against civilians who publicly criticize the Ministry of Defense, the Serbian Army, or military security structures.

In 2026, authorities searched the home and office of one of Serbia's best-known military analysts and journalists and seized his electronic devices. He is a civilian expert with years of professional experience in defense and security affairs. According to a published investigation, based in part on a review of the court order, the seized devices were handed over to the VBA. The analyst also received a summons from the Military Police in connection with their forensic examination.

The analyst linked the actions of state institutions to his years of criticizing the VBA's leadership and its political activities. He spoke of being surveilled, pressure on people from his professional circle, and attempts to limit his access to military information and events. He also described a media campaign in which his public positions were portrayed as acting on instructions from foreign centers of power. After recordings of him and his minor daughter were published in pro-government media, he temporarily left Serbia with his family.

Particularly significant is the involvement of several state institutions in the same case. Civilian prosecutors, police authorities, the Military Police, and the VBA all played a role, while a public discrediting campaign was underway. The combination of official proceedings and media pressure can produce consequences far more serious than any single measure. The citizen then faces not just one institution or procedure, but simultaneous pressures on different parts of their professional and private life.

The political implications of such conduct extend beyond the individual journalist involved. Searches, seizure of electronic devices, public discrediting, and subjecting family members to hostile media treatment can produce a powerful chilling effect. Other journalists, military analysts, and independent experts may conclude that criticizing the security apparatus jeopardizes not only their professional position and reputation but also the privacy and safety of their families.

The cases of the military union representative and the civilian analyst are particularly important because of the issues they raised. The union representative pointed out irregularities in the military and possible abuses of military resources. The analyst questioned the lack of transparency in arms procurement, the concentration of decision-making, and the role of politically connected individuals in the defense industry. Both spoke about institutional accountability and the use of public funds, issues by which citizens evaluate the work of the government.

Pressure on those who disclose such information can undermine independent sources and diminish the political impact of their findings. Instead of a discussion about the reported irregularities, public attention is redirected to the alleged unreliability of the critics, their political motives, or their loyalty to the state. This reduces the possibility that information about the work of government institutions will become the basis for public debate, political accountability, and informed decision-making at the polls.

When critics of the state security apparatus are portrayed as enemies of the state, the debate about the authorities' accountability is transformed into a debate about their alleged loyalty and security suitability. This diverts attention from the substance of the allegations, while making it difficult for citizens to access the information needed to evaluate the work of the authorities.

Security Networks and Efforts to Secure Reliable Votes

An investigative report published in August 2026 cited confidential sources alleging that former police, BIA, and VBA personnel were working in special operational centers linked to the Serbian Progressive Party. According to these allegations, their tasks included verifying the contacts and movements of party members and sympathizers and organizing efforts to identify and secure support from voters considered reliable supporters of the ruling party. The formal status of the engaged individuals and their chain of command have not been publicly clarified.

Such allegations raise the question of transferring professional knowledge, intelligence methods, and personal contacts gained in government service into direct party organizing. The perceived authority of former security service members can exert particular pressure on citizens expected to demonstrate their political support. Knowledge of methods of surveillance, data collection, and the assessment of personal relationships can create the impression that political behavior is monitored much more closely than in typical party work.

Gathering electoral support can then evolve into monitoring political behavior. Citizens may begin to worry about whom they are seen associating with, which party they support, and what consequences they might face for failing to meet political expectations. Pressure to confirm loyalty through voting, public support for the authorities, or by securing additional votes can exist even without an open threat. Freedom of political choice is thus limited long before one even enters the polling place.

It is also significant that former members of several different services are mentioned in the activities described. Their shared experience, personal connections, and knowledge of the state security system can provide a political organization with capabilities that go beyond regular party activities. This further blurs the line between legitimate political organizing and pressure based on the authority of former state service members.

Difficulty with Institutional Control and Continuity of Political Oversight

The problem of the Military Security Agency's overstepping its authority has a longer documented history. In its 2015 annual report, the Ombudsman found that the VBA had collected data on the activities and cooperation of certain political parties and movements under circumstances that did not justify its jurisdiction. The same report stated that the agency had not acted on any of the eleven recommendations to address the identified illegalities and irregularities.

Particularly significant was the case of data collection on the Serbian Radical Party during preparations for a political rally in November 2014. The documentation that reached the Ombudsman contained information about the organization of the gathering, political activities, and participants. The parliamentary committee responsible for overseeing security services confirmed the authenticity of the documentation. In subsequent proceedings, however, it accepted the explanation that the information had been collected to protect senior government officials. This case shows how the collection of data on political organizations can be justified by a broad interpretation of security needs, even when it exceeds the legal authority of the military service.

Institutional oversight is also affected by restrictions on public access to military information. In 2023, the VBA initiated the suspension of the electronic publication of certain data in the Official Military Gazette, including data on promotions, appointments, retirements, and the termination of professional military service. Limiting access to these records makes it difficult to monitor personnel changes, the departure of experienced military personnel, and the advancement of leaders. At the same time, it reduces the public's ability to assess whether personnel decisions are based on professional criteria or political interests.

These examples show two related problems. The first is the possibility that the military service collects information and conducts activities outside its legal authority. The second is the insufficient effectiveness of the institutions that are supposed to control such conduct. When oversight bodies cannot obtain information or ensure that their recommendations are implemented, the secrecy required for security operations can become a shield against accountability. This creates an institutional space where state security powers can be used for political purposes, while the possibility of their independent scrutiny remains limited.

Political control of the military

The political significance of control over the VBA goes beyond the management of a single military service. Although the agency does not formally command military units, its access to confidential information and its role in security clearances allow it to influence the professional standing of officers in command. Control over the VBA therefore represents an important mechanism of political influence within the military hierarchy.

Serbia's democratic transition in 2000 demonstrated the importance of how the professional military responds during a major political crisis. After Slobodan Milošević's electoral defeat, the military high command did not order the use of the army against citizens who were demanding the recognition of the results. The absence of military intervention showed that the preservation of power in such circumstances also depends on the decisions of the people who manage the state's apparatus of force.

In this historical context, the rise of Đuro Jovanić, a former aide-de-camp to Aleksandar Vučić and his longtime collaborator, to the head of the VBA takes on additional significance. His career, previously described in this chapter, shows how personal political trust can be linked to leading an institution that has significant influence on the professional military system. Such a position allows the political leadership to monitor the state of the military hierarchy and influence the position of officers responsible for commanding units through security assessments, personnel information, and professional relationships.

Political control over the military involves more than the ability to issue orders or deploy military force directly. It can be built through the long-term shaping of the command structure, by the promotion of individuals of particular political trust, and by suppressing the autonomy of officers unwilling to subordinate professional decisions to political expectations. In such a system, loyalty to the state and the constitutional order can gradually be supplanted by loyalty to the political leadership, thereby calling into question the military's ability to act independently of the ruling party's interests during a political crisis.

Military Security as an Instrument of Political Control

The cases described reveal three interconnected mechanisms of political control that can operate even without overt prohibitions or immediate coercion.

The first concerns the professional dependence of military personnel. Security checks, reassignments, disciplinary actions, and the collection of information about employees' political views can become means of political disciplining. When officers believe that supporting the opposition, student protests, or an independent union could jeopardize their careers and their families' security, exercising freedom of political expression becomes a matter of accepting personal and professional risk. It is not necessary to punish every individual. It is enough for the treatment of a few to serve as a warning to the others.

The second mechanism involves limiting independent reporting. Pressures on union representatives, military analysts, and journalists can weaken sources of information on public spending, arms procurement, personnel decisions, and potential abuses of power. When expert criticism is presented as hostile action, and its authors are subjected to institutional and media pressure, public attention is redirected from the government's responsibility to the alleged unreliability of its critics. Citizens thus have less access to the information needed to independently assess the work of the state leadership.

A third mechanism involves the transfer of the professional knowledge, personal networks, and authority of former security service members into direct party organizing. Their involvement in gathering and verifying political support can enable the ruling party to use methods that go beyond typical campaign activities. When efforts to secure support from voters considered reliable supporters of the ruling party are combined with monitoring personal contacts and political behavior, support for the party can become a matter of pressure rather than free choice.

Although these mechanisms serve different immediate purposes, they reinforce one another politically. Professional dependence encourages silence within the state system. Pressures on independent critics limit the information available to the public. The use of security networks in party work creates an additional advantage in mobilizing and controlling political support. Their common consequence can be a political system in which the ruling party does not rely exclusively on voter support, but also uses the capabilities of state institutions to preserve its position.

Control over the professional military hierarchy gains special significance in a political crisis. Security checks, monitoring of personnel, and influence on officers' careers do not represent direct command of the military, but they can shape the conditions under which the command staff makes decisions. That is why the independence of the VBA is also important for preventing political pressure on the people who are responsible for the military's lawful conduct.

Military security services are responsible for protecting the defense system and the constitutional order, not the political interests of the party in power. When these services' capabilities are directed toward protecting the government, the consequences extend beyond professional careers and union activities. They can affect freedom of public action and the ability of the state apparatus to accept democratic succession of power. The VBA's role in elections must therefore be understood in terms of professional accountability, political influence, and the military's constitutional obligations.

3.3. Police

Serbia's police operate under the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a unified nationwide system of regional police departments and local police stations. The minister provides political leadership, while the police director and heads of individual units form the professional chain of command. Since all police directorates and stations belong to the same state system, political influence at the top of the Ministry can have consequences for the work of the police throughout Serbia.

As of September 2026, Ivica Dačić served as Serbia's minister of internal affairs and deputy prime minister. Since December 2006, he has been the president of the Socialist Party of Serbia, which he inherited from Slobodan Milošević. From 1992 to 2000, he was the party's spokesperson and a close political associate of Milošević. The ministry's political leadership at that time therefore reflected direct personal and party continuity with Serbia's government of the 1990s. The Ministry also handles matters related to residency and personal documents, which are important for exercising the right to vote. The police, at the same time, are supposed to protect citizens from threats and violence, collect evidence, and act on reports of criminal offenses. Their politically impartial conduct is therefore important both for preparing for the elections and for the day of voting itself.

Election Day Procedures

Members of the polling station committee are responsible for maintaining order at the polling place, while police intervene when necessary to restore safety and order. Police responsibilities also include responding to violence, threats, vote-buying, and other possible criminal offenses in the vicinity of polling places. Election observation and publicly documented events point to situations where organized groups, parallel voter registers, pressure, and violence have appeared around voting. In such circumstances, it is crucial for the police to promptly establish the identities of the participants, protect endangered individuals, and preserve evidence. Delayed police intervention allows those involved to leave the scene, evidence to disappear, and intimidation to continue.

It is particularly serious when endangered observers, journalists, or citizens report an incident, and the investigation does not lead to a timely resolution. In one documented case of an attack on election observers, a complaint was dismissed after approximately two and a half years, while important footage was not obtained in a timely manner. Such protection loses its practical effect for the elections during which the attack occurred.

The consequences extend beyond a single incident. Citizens who see that reporting does not provide protection may be deterred from testifying, observing elections, or opposing pressure. This expands the space for electoral abuse.

Selective protection and tolerance of violent groups

Political misuse of the police can take the form of selective protection, selective enforcement, and tolerance of certain groups' conduct. During local elections, situations were documented in which organized groups connected to the ruling party's activities were present around polling stations and other election-critical locations, intimidating citizens and engaging in violent clashes. Election observers described an environment in which pressure and violence seriously threatened the freedom to vote.

Public reports also described police cordons separating local citizens from such groups, while interventions were directed at citizens who were protesting or demanding an explanation for their presence. In other situations, provocations and violent behavior were described in the immediate vicinity of the police. Such conduct creates the impression that police protect organized groups engaged in intimidation while treating citizens who confront them as a threat to public order. Adding further weight to this impression are investigations that have documented contacts and cooperation between individual police officials and violent hooligan and criminal groups. Such connections show why it is necessary to verify whether the official authority is providing protection to extra-institutional actors.

The integrity of elections is undermined when citizens believe they face both violent groups and state institutions unwilling to protect them. Fear can then limit voting, the work of poll watchers, reporting irregularities, and public political engagement. Repeated experiences of this kind erode public trust in the police. Citizens become less willing to report threats and cooperate as witnesses, as they do not expect impartial treatment. An institution entrusted with protecting freedom of choice thus loses the trust of the very citizens it is supposed to protect.

Pressure on political dissenters

Police powers can be used to restrict political organizing long before Election Day. Summonses for questioning, detentions, searches, and the seizure of devices affect citizens' ability to maintain contacts, organize activities, and participate in public life. An investigation into the treatment of participants in protests against lithium mining during August 2024 documented dozens of cases of police action against activists. This period preceded the tragedy at the Novi Sad train station and the subsequent student movement, which shows that the pressure on dissenters has a longer continuity.

For political activity, the consequences can be immediate. Detention disrupts participation in planned activities, the seizure of a phone makes communication difficult, and repeated visits and calls create pressure on one's family and professional position. Citizens may begin to withdraw from public life out of fear of the consequences, even when no final court ruling has been issued against them.

A particularly serious form is physical violence in official premises. Published testimonies from multiple individuals about police conduct in the garage of the Government Building during 2025 described beatings, threats, and humiliation following detention. Such experiences, when made public, can intimidate people who were not directly subjected to the treatment.

The connection to elections is realized through deterring political participation. Free choice requires the ability for citizens to speak, organize, support candidates, and monitor voting without fear of police action for their views. When this space is narrowed, the authorities gain an advantage before the formal campaign even begins.

Political Loyalty as a Hiring Criterion

Political influence over the police is also maintained through personnel decisions. A particularly serious pattern is one in which officers investigating irregularities involving people in power suffer reassignments, removal from sensitive assignments, or other pressures, while people expected to be loyal to the political leadership are appointed to important positions. Published reports of dismissals and transfers throughout the police force have raised questions about political considerations in personnel decisions, the handling of sensitive investigations, and efforts to undermine professional independence. Such decisions also affect officers who remain in their positions. They must consider whether pursuing an investigation could jeopardize their careers and whether their superiors would support them for acting lawfully.

On the other hand, the promotion of leaders associated with publicly described questionable conduct can give the impression that such behavior is not a barrier to higher office. Marko Kričak, whose name appears in testimonies about violence in the Government garage, was appointed Chief of the Criminal Police Directorate (UKP) at the end of 2025. That directorate plays an important role in investigating serious crimes. The personnel system can thus send two related messages. An officer who jeopardizes the interests of politically protected individuals through their work risks their position, while a willingness to act in accordance with the expectations of the authorities can facilitate advancement. The result is the suppression of professional responsibility and the encouragement of self-censorship within the police.

In the electoral process, such a system influences which reports will be seriously investigated, who will receive protection, and against whom authority will be applied. If political loyalty determines actions, the police can simultaneously tolerate pressures beneficial to the ruling party and use coercion against its opponents. This undermines a fundamental condition of free elections: that the state equally protects voters and political participants. The ruling party's electoral advantage then also stems from its ability to influence the work of an institution that wields coercive powers and from which citizens expect protection.

Spasoje Vulević and Marko Kričak as examples of changes in police leadership

The contrasting careers of Spasoje Vulević and Marko Kričak offer particularly revealing examples of how political loyalty can influence the appointment and removal of senior police officials. Spasoje Vulević spent 33 years in the Special Anti-Terrorist unit (SAJ) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia. This elite police formation is responsible for counterterrorism, hostage rescue, and other high-risk security operations. After completing military high school and graduating from the Military Academy, Vulević joined the unit in 1993, advanced through its ranks, and became its commander in 2005. He served in that position for approximately twenty years.

His career included extensive specialized training and cooperation with international police institutions. In 2008, he became the first Serbian police officer to graduate from the FBI National Academy in Quantico, completing its 233rd session. He received his diploma from Robert S. Mueller III, who was FBI director at the time. It is a professional development program for experienced police officers, focused on leadership, investigative skills, professional standards, and international cooperation.

Vulević's cooperation with American institutions continued after the formal training. In May 2025, members of Serbia's Special Anti-Terrorist Unit participated in joint training with members of the U.S. Army's special forces, known as the Green Berets. The final exercise, which included a simulation of a hostage rescue, was held at the U.S. Ambassador's residence in Belgrade. Vulević was recognized for his contribution to this cooperation. Yet his international training and professional ties to American institutions later became the focus of a public campaign questioning his political loyalty.

Pro-government media and television commentators portrayed Vulević and the unit he commanded as being too connected to the United States. His training at the FBI Academy and cooperation with American security institutions were presented in a climate of suspicion, with insinuations that he represented the interests of American intelligence agencies rather than the state of Serbia. Such a campaign demonstrated a striking distortion of professional standards. International education and cooperation aimed at enhancing police capabilities were turned into a pretext to question the reliability of an experienced police commander.

On September 5, 2025, Vulević was informed that he would no longer command the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit. He was offered an advisory position at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which he declined, after which he applied for retirement. Vulević publicly stated that he had been told that Aleksandar Vučić, who was president at the time, did not want an armed police unit outside his absolute control. His account raised questions about the president's political influence over the decision to replace the unit's commander. The problem the former commander described did not relate to the unit's operational capability, but to the degree of political control over a specialized formation that possesses significant powers and means of coercion.

Vulević's removal was followed by changes in the unit's leadership. In November 2025, Igor Žmirić was appointed commander of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, previously associated with another police formation responsible for security. Additional personnel changes within the command structure followed.

At the same time, Marko Kričak had a completely different professional path. Before entering the security apparatus, he worked in car sales. In 2018, he was hired by the Security and Intelligence Agency (BIA), at a time when its director was Bratislav Gašić, a prominent political associate of Aleksandar Vučić. Kričak then transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in 2023 became the commander of the Unit for the Security of Certain Persons and Objects (JZO), a police formation responsible for protecting high-ranking state officials and important state facilities.

Unlike commanders who spent decades advancing through the police ranks, Kričak entered the security services after working in a civilian profession. His formal police training and professional qualifications became the subject of public controversy. His official biography described his appointments and duties but did not list his educational background. During the mass demonstrations in 2025, the unit commanded by Kričak participated in operations against citizens protesting the government.

A particularly serious incident occurred on August 14, 2025, following demonstrations in Belgrade. Nine individuals subsequently provided consistent accounts of physical violence, threats, humiliation, and inhumane treatment in the garage of the Serbian government building. In their statements, Kričak and members of the unit he commanded were implicated in the described abuse. The testimonies included allegations of beatings and threats of sexual violence, which raised serious questions about the treatment of detained citizens and the accountability of commanding officers. The events drew international attention and calls for an impartial investigation.

Nevertheless, Kričak continued to advance through the police hierarchy. On December 30, 2025, he was appointed Chief of the Criminal Police Directorate, one of the most important law enforcement bodies in Serbia, responsible for investigating serious crimes. Earlier in 2025, Aleksandar Vučić, then president of Serbia, had decorated the police unit commanded by Kričak, who accepted the award on its behalf.

His appointment was followed by a broader reorganization of the police leadership. Officers previously connected to his command structure took on important positions in other police units. Igor Žmirić took command of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, which was previously led by Vulević. Marko Zafirović became the head of the Organized Crime Unit, while Nenad Marić was appointed deputy head of the Criminal Police Directorate. Additional members of the same professional circle were assigned to investigative and specialized police structures. These appointments placed individuals with established professional ties in leadership positions across several police units with distinct but interconnected responsibilities.

The Criminal Police Directorate manages important criminal investigations, the Organized Crime Unit investigates serious forms of organized crime, while the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit has specially trained personnel and significant operational capabilities. Control over these institutions influences which investigations are prioritized, how police resources are allocated, and how the state responds in politically sensitive situations.

The significance of these two professional careers therefore extends far beyond the individuals themselves. Vulević represented an established professional command structure, built through decades of service, specialized training, and international cooperation. Kričak represented a different path to a high-ranking police position, accompanied by the advancement of officers from the same personnel circle into influential roles throughout the police force.

Viewed together, these events show how established professional authority can be displaced by a chain of command that increasingly depends on political trust. The central political figure in that process is Aleksandar Vučić. His influence over appointments and command structures extends beyond the president's formal constitutional authority, while key parts of the police hierarchy increasingly depend on politically trusted officials.

Police Control and the Defense of Political Power

The events of October 5, 2000, demonstrated the importance of political control over the police during a major political crisis. After losing the federal presidential election in September, Slobodan Milošević refused to accept the result. Mass demonstrations culminated in citizens entering the Federal Assembly and the state television headquarters in Belgrade. Although some parts of the police initially used force, the security apparatus did not maintain the resistance necessary to preserve Milošević's power. The breakdown of that resistance was a decisive factor in the political change.

The question is not limited to whether these institutions investigate individual electoral crimes. It also encompasses how they would act if the authorities attempt to retain political power despite losing the support necessary to govern, if election results are disputed, or if mass demonstrations demand the recognition of the citizens' electoral will. Under such circumstances, police control becomes a means of influencing the balance of power between the political leadership and citizens who challenge its authority.

Viewed in light of the events of October 2000, the removal of Spasoje Vulević, the promotion of Marko Kričak, and later changes in the police command staff raise the broader question of who would control the state's apparatus of force during a contested election. Political leadership that influences the appointment of police commanders simultaneously gains influence over the institutions responsible for responding to public unrest, investigating politically sensitive crimes, and enforcing powers of coercion.

Such control does not necessarily require explicit political orders in each individual case. Personnel decisions, expectations for advancement, and the treatment of officers who show professional independence can shape the behavior of an entire institutional hierarchy. The consequences for the freedom of choice are therefore much broader than the possible misuse of police powers on election day itself.

Citizens must be able to report electoral irregularities, organize politically, demonstrate peacefully, and challenge election results without fear of retaliation from the very institutions that are obligated to protect them. If these institutions act on political loyalty instead of on the basis of impartial law enforcement, the state can protect the interests of the ruling party while simultaneously limiting citizens' ability to defend their voting rights.

Taken together, the Security and Intelligence Agency, the Military Security Agency, and the police have distinct but interconnected capabilities. The BIA has access to confidential information and secret surveillance methods, the VBA has significant influence over the professional military security system, while the police have immediate coercive powers. Their political instrumentalization can limit citizens' ability to organize freely and protect their choice, and particularly influence the state's actions when citizens challenge electoral irregularities or demand a change of government. Free elections depend not only on citizens' ability to choose a new government, but also on state institutions respecting that choice and allowing it to be implemented peacefully and lawfully.