2. Public Sector
Since the Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012, the management of the public sector in Serbia has gradually become one of the key mechanisms for concentrating political and economic power. State institutions, public enterprises, budget funds, infrastructure projects, and the state's economic powers have become increasingly linked to the interests of the ruling party and the political survival of its leadership. At the center of this system is Aleksandar Vučić, whose political influence far exceeds the formal powers of the positions he has held since 2012.
The structure of this power can be represented as a broad pyramid, with Vučić at its top. Below him are the most influential state and party officials, heads of public enterprises, politically connected businesspeople, regional and local coordinators, all the way down to municipal institutions and local communities. This pyramid does not represent an exclusively formal hierarchy. Its strength also comes from informal ties, personal loyalty, mutual dependence, and the ability to influence decisions that are supposed to be made by independent institutions.
Connections within such a system are established both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, political influence is transmitted from the state and party leadership to lower levels of government, while information, requests, and political support move in the opposite direction. Horizontally, connections are established between ministries, public enterprises, local authorities, party organizations, and business circles. Cooperation does not exclude differing interests, rivalry, and competition among individual centers of power. For this reason, this system should not be viewed as a simple administrative hierarchy, but rather as a network of formal authority and informal political influence centered on Vučić.
To understand how this system functions, six people from Vučić's closest private, political, and business circle were selected. They are Siniša Mali, Ana Brnabić, Miloš Vučević, Andrej Vučić, Nikola Petrović, and Darko Glišić. Their political careers, government positions, business activities, and interconnections allow for an analysis of the various ways political power is exercised and maintained. They do not represent the entire structure of power, but rather selected examples of its most influential part.
Control over the public sector enables political decisions to be linked to the allocation of state funds, the awarding of large contracts, subsidies, employment, and the business survival of companies. When public resources are systematically used to promote the ruling party, reward political loyalty, or exert pressure on employees and business owners, institutions intended to serve the public become instruments for preserving political power. This relationship does not end at the top of the government. Its consequences are felt in local communities, in the workplace, and in everyday economic relationships.
The ultimate political significance of this system is particularly evident in the electoral process. Victory in free and fair elections is a legitimate goal for any political party. However, when the ruling party uses state institutions, public money, economic dependence, and pressure on citizens to secure an electoral advantage, the distinction between the state and the ruling party effectively disappears.
The electoral contest is then not between equal participants, but between the government, which has the state's resources at its disposal, and political opponents who do not have such power. Preserving power in this way allows the continuation of the same system of political and economic control.
2.1 The Political Elite and the Management of State Economic Resources
The six selected associates of Aleksandar Vučić differ in their formal authority, business interests, and methods of exercising political influence. Siniša Mali, Vučić's Meyer Lansky, plays a key role in managing public finances and major state investments. Ana Brnabić has participated in decision-making at the highest levels of government for years, while Miloš Vučević connects local government, national institutions, and the ruling party's leadership. Andrej Vučić, Aleksandar's brother, holds no comparable government position, while Nikola Petrović and Darko Glišić, Vučić's godfathers, are connected to energy business and the party organization and public investments, respectively. Their relationships with Vučić, specific decisions, business arrangements, and mutual interests provide insight into where formal authority intersects with informal influence and how these relationships affect the management of public resources.
Siniša Mali
Since 2012, Siniša Mali has risen from his position as Aleksandar Vučić's economic adviser to serving as mayor of Belgrade from 2014 to 2018, and subsequently as Serbia's minister of finance and first deputy prime minister. His political rise is also linked to personal and family connections within Vučić's inner circle. In a 2014 interview, Mali stated that the idea of his appointment as mayor came from Andrej Vučić, the brother of Aleksandar Vučić, whom he described as the power behind the scenes of the Serbian Progressive Party. His brother, Predrag Mali, and Andrej Vučić have been longtime friends. This case represents one of the most direct public examples of the potential influence of private relationships on the selection of individuals for the highest state offices.
Questions about the intersection of public authority and family business interests arose even before Mali joined the government. As an official of the Privatization Agency, he participated in the sales procedures of state-owned enterprises. In the case of the Subotica-based "Bratstvo," which was purchased by his father and a business partner, the Ministry of Economy determined that the buyers may have had access to information obtained through Siniša Mali and demanded a repeat of the sale. The Privatization Agency did not comply with that demand. The disputed circumstances of the "Beopetrol" privatization and other business relationships from that period show that questions of possible conflicts between public and private interests followed his career long before he took over the Ministry of Finance.
During his tenure managing Belgrade, Mali played a prominent role in the implementation of the Belgrade Waterfront project, based on a partnership between the state and investors from the United Arab Emirates. On the night of April 24–25, 2016, masked individuals illegally demolished several buildings in Savamala, an area connected to the project, while the police failed to respond to citizens' calls. Aleksandar Vučić later attributed the responsibility to the top leadership of the Belgrade authorities and called them complete idiots. Shortly thereafter, Mali's ex-wife stated that Mali had told her he had organized the demolition in that part of Belgrade, an allegation he denied.
The prolonged lack of clarification regarding the organization of the demolition and the responsibilities of all participants raised serious questions about institutional control during the implementation of major investments.
Documents published in 2021 as part of the Pandora Papers investigation revealed that Mali owned two companies registered in the British Virgin Islands, through which 23 luxury apartments were purchased on the Bulgarian coast. Another apartment was purchased directly in his name. The total value of the properties was estimated at approximately $5.62 million, and after the publication of new documentation confirming this, Mali continued to dispute the investigation's findings. According to published records, he did not declare the offshore companies to the relevant agency after taking public office. The source of the funds and the full extent of his financial interests at the time remained matters of public concern.
A particularly significant link between private relationships and state business is the company "Millennium Team," owned by Ivan Bošnjak and Stojan Vujko. The company participated in major infrastructure projects, including Belgrade Waterfront, gasification projects, and housing construction for members of the security services.
Mali also has business and professional ties to attorney Igor Isailović, who appears in business relationships with Ana Brnabić and Nikola Petrović. By July 2026, Isailović's law firm had secured three contracts to provide legal services for the EXPO 2027 project, with a total value of approximately $344,000. The significance of this circumstance lies not only in the value of the contracts but also in the fact that the same circle of associates appears in business relationships with various top political leaders and in publicly funded projects.
As Minister of Finance, Mali has a key role in preparing the state budget and financing major investment programs, including EXPO 2027 and the national stadium. His position is also particularly significant for decisions on immediate payments to citizens. The August 2026 revised budget allocated approximately $1.10 billion to a package of financial assistance measures, or approximately one percent of the gross domestic product. Payments to pensioners, social welfare recipients, and other population groups were made during September, just before the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 25. The economic justification for individual payments does not eliminate the need to examine their timing, how they were presented to the public, and the potential political benefits of distributing state funds.
Ana Brnabić
In 2016, at the suggestion of Aleksandar Vučić, Ana Brnabić became Minister of State Administration and Local Self-Government, and the following year, she became the Prime Minister of Serbia. She held that position until 2024, when she was elected Speaker of the National Assembly. After Vučić's resignation in September 2026, she also took over as acting President of the Republic. Her nearly continuous service in Serbia's highest government offices illustrates how the political priorities of the ruling leadership are translated into government policy, legislation, and institutional action.
Before entering the government, Ana Brnabić was the director of the company "Continental Wind Serbia," which was engaged in the development of the "Čibuk" wind farm near Kovin. Her first significant public appearance came in October 2015, during a scandal in which Nikola Petrović, then director of Serbia's state-owned electricity transmission company, Elektromreža Srbije, and a close personal associate of Aleksandar Vučić, was accused of demanding approximately $2.25 million for connecting the wind farm to the power grid. The allegations stemmed from a published conversation between Lidija Udovički, sister of then-Minister Kori Udovički, and politician Bojan Pajtić. Brnabić, along with Petrović and then-Minister of Energy Aleksandar Antić, publicly dismissed the allegations, which were never proven in court. That appearance marked the beginning of her rapid political rise. By August 2016, at the suggestion of Aleksandar Vučić, she succeeded Kori Udovički as Minister of State Administration and Local Self-Government, and the following year became the Prime Minister of Serbia.
Her business ties with individuals from Vučić's inner circle predated her entry into government. In July 2015, she founded the company "Energy & Innovation" with attorney Igor Isailović, a long-time associate of Siniša Mali and the legal representative for Nikola Petrović. Brnabić owned 70 percent of the company, and three days before her appointment as minister, she transferred her ownership stake to her life partner, Milica Đurđić. These documented business relationships show that the connections between certain members of Vučić's political, private, and business circles existed before they began acting together in the highest state offices.
A separate issue of potential conflict of interest was raised by the business of the company "Asseco SEE," which was managed by her brother, Igor Brnabić, from 2016 to late 2020. During her premiership, the company received numerous contracts from state institutions and public enterprises. One notable example was a contract worth approximately $1.72 million to develop Serbia's Central Population Register, which was awarded to it in late 2019 by the Office for Information Technology and e-Government, established by a decision of the Government of Serbia. Among other documented deals is a 2018 contract with the Republic Geodetic Authority (Republički geodetski zavod) worth approximately $869,000, excluding VAT, for the procurement of information equipment and related services. Opposition representatives also presented serious documentation showing that the value of state contracts for her brother's company exceeded the equivalent of approximately $45 million over a period of approximately two years.
The Office of Information Technology stated that before the contract was awarded, it sought an opinion from the Public Procurement Administration and received a response that there was no legal impediment to selecting the company. There were two acceptable bids in the tender, and Asseco offered a lower price. However, the Office's direct institutional connection to the Government, whose prime minister was the sister of one of the directors of the selected bidder, raised questions about the effectiveness of conflict of interest rules.
A more direct example of Brnabić's influence on government policy is the legal framework established for EXPO 2027. During her premiership, a special law was passed in October 2023, exempting the companies established to implement the project from the application of the regular Public Procurement Law. This established special contracting rules for major investment projects, limiting the usual mechanisms of competition and legal protection for bidders. The European Commission has pointed out the need to respect European rules on public procurement, transparency, and oversight of contracting. Unlike a single disputed contract, this is an institutional decision that has changed the rules in advance for the disposal of significant public funds.
Miloš Vučević
Miloš Vučević rose through the political ranks by connecting local government, state institutions, and party leadership. From 2012 to 2022, he was the mayor of Novi Sad, after which he served as Minister of Defense, Deputy Prime Minister, and Prime Minister of Serbia. In May 2023, he succeeded Aleksandar Vučić as the president of the Serbian Progressive Party. His political career is particularly significant because it shows how the long-term management of one of Serbia's largest cities can be linked to influence over national government institutions and the top leadership of the ruling party.
During his ten-year tenure as mayor of Novi Sad, serious questions were raised about the relationship between urban planning decisions and the interests of major private investors. The company "Galens" achieved strong business growth through the construction of residential and commercial complexes, including the "Pupin Palace" and projects related to the proposed Novi Sad Waterfront development. Amendments to urban plans allowed for an increase in the permitted scale of construction, thereby increasing the economic value of the investments. In the case of the "Pupin Palace," opposition representatives documented an increase in the planned floor area of the building from approximately 18,000 to 31,000 square meters. Vučević has denied allegations of favoring investors, but the way planning decisions were made has raised questions about the relationship between public authority and private financial gain.
A particularly significant example is the Novi Sad Waterfront project, associated with the planned construction of a large residential and commercial complex along the Danube. Experts from the Public Water Management Enterprise "Vode Vojvodine" had previously opposed the planned relocation of the flood defense levee, pointing to the potential threat to the city's water regime and safety. In November 2020, the Provincial Government dismissed the then-director, Slavko Vrndžić, a civil engineer, and appointed Srđan Kružević, a former deputy mayor of Novi Sad under Miloš Vučević, in his place. Following the change in leadership, new personnel decisions were made, and the company later gave its consent for amendments to the urban plan. This sequence of events raised a serious question about the institutional independence of expert decision-making in circumstances where the decisions of public enterprises directly affect the realization of large private investments.
Questions of accountability for the management of public funds also arose during the earlier years of his mayoral term. In late 2015, the State Audit Institution launched a procedure for irregularities in the calculation of salaries for city administration employees, which resulted in approximately $1.20 million being spent from the Novi Sad budget more than was prescribed. In 2016, the Misdemeanor Court fined Vučević approximately $765. Unlike numerous political accusations, this case represents a legally sanctioned irregularity in the handling of public funds.
Communication from 2020, published in January 2025, provided a much more direct insight into the relationships between political power, private capital, and individuals from the criminal underworld. The documentation includes messages that Vučević exchanged with businessman Dragoljub Zbiljić, whose companies secured significant government contracts in the energy sector. Zbiljić forwarded parts of their communication to Miloš Pandrć, a previously convicted associate of Darko Šarić's criminal group. The published messages show that conflicts were taking place within Novi Sad's party and business circles over major state contracts, political influence, and the positions of certain businesspeople.
The same communication features Andrej Vučić, Nikola Petrović, and Zvonko Veselinović, as well as claims about their relationships with opposing business groups. It is particularly significant that some participants in the correspondence sought to secure the favor of Andrej Vučić, while competing groups attempted to influence the distribution of multi-million-dollar energy deals. The direct communication between Vučević and Zbiljić is documented, while the claims of other participants about alleged financial payments and individual political interventions are not thereby proven. This case, however, provides concrete insight into the intertwining of party relationships, private business interests, and contacts with individuals linked to organized crime.
Vučević's long-standing position in Novi Sad gained additional political significance after the collapse of the canopy at the reconstructed railway station on November 1, 2024, which killed sixteen people. As the former mayor and then-Prime Minister, he was exposed to demands for establishing political and institutional responsibility. After the attack on students in Novi Sad, he resigned from his position as Prime Minister on January 28, 2025. The circumstances of the tragedy, the way the work was contracted, and the question of responsibility are detailed in the next section of this chapter.
Despite stepping down as prime minister, Vučević retained his position as leader of the Serbian Progressive Party. His formal leadership position is particularly interesting in the context of the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 25, 2026. Aleksandar Vučić, who has not been the president of the SNS since May 2023, is in first place on its electoral list, while Vučević takes second place. This arrangement directly demonstrates the difference between the formal party leadership and the central political position of Aleksandar Vučić, whose name still forms the basis of the ruling party's electoral performance.
Andrej Vučić
Unlike previous associates, Andrej Vučić does not exercise his political influence primarily through high state office. As the brother of Aleksandar Vučić, he has been present in the internal affairs of the Serbian Progressive Party for years, especially through contacts with local party leadership, political officials, and influential business circles. He is employed at the Banknote and Coin Printing Plant of the National Bank of Serbia, and he has publicly confirmed his membership on the SNS's Main Board. However, he has no formal state authority that would allow him to make decisions on the public investments, government contracts, or appointments that are the subject of this analysis. The mismatch between his formal position and the influence attributed to him is one of the most important issues in the functioning of informal power structures.
One of the most immediate examples of such influence has already been presented through the political rise of Siniša Mali, who in 2014 stated that his appointment as mayor of Belgrade was the idea of Andrej Vučić, whom he described as the power behind the scenes of the Serbian Progressive Party. Similar questions have also been raised in Vojvodina, where opposition representatives have publicly identified Andrej Vučić as the man who, without formal authority, influences the most important political and business decisions. Andrej Vučić has denied these allegations, but his position and contacts with local SNS structures have remained a subject of public interest.
His political and economic influence came to the attention of American institutions as early as September 2015. Five members of the United States House of Representatives sent a letter to then-Vice President Joseph Biden, expressing concern about reports of a concentration of business influence in a circle led by Andrej Vučić. The letter specifically mentioned Nikola Petrović and Zoran Korać, and listed energy, telecommunications, infrastructure, and major government contracts among the areas of their influence. This communication did not constitute a judicial determination of illegal activities, but it documents that the issues of informal centers of economic power in Serbia were of interest to American lawmakers as early as the initial phase of the SNS's consolidation of power.
A particularly serious dimension of Andrej Vučić's position involves his documented contacts with individuals linked to organized crime. Photographs from 2014 show him together with Zvonko Veselinović in the offices of a marketing agency hired during the SNS election campaign, while their joint meetings at Kopaonik were also documented the following year. The United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned Veselinović on December 8, 2021, designating him as the leader of an organized criminal group involved in corruption, smuggling, and other illicit activities. U.S. authorities specifically documented his arrangements with politicians, in which support for candidates and help with election victories were linked to subsequent business advantages, access to government information, and infrastructure contracts.
The clearest documented example of the overlap between political, business, and criminal circles surrounding Andrej Vučić emerged from communications dating to 2020 and published in January 2025. Intercepted communications of Miloš Pandrć, a previously convicted associate of Darko Šarić's criminal group, revealed conflicts within Novi Sad's business and party structures over multimillion-dollar state contracts in the energy sector. One group consisted of businessman Dragoljub Zbiljić and individuals close to him, with documented communications with then-mayor Miloš Vučević. The competing group included Zvonko Veselinović, Goran Kovačević Goranac, and their associates, while Nikola Petrović, Aleksandar Vučić's longtime friend and kum (a traditional Serbian godfather relationship), was also connected to this business circle. The correspondence showed that the opposing groups were simultaneously competing for government contracts and trying to secure the political support of Andrej Vučić.
Particularly significant are the allegations in those messages that Andrej Vučić sought to expand his influence over the energy sector and participated in informal discussions about personnel appointments in the police and state institutions. The communications mention enormous revenues from government contracts, alleged money distributions, and competition for positions that provide access to public business. The claims about Andrej Vučić's direct involvement in decision-making and financial arrangements come from participants in the correspondence and have not been independently verified as having occurred. Andrej Vučić has denied these allegations. However, the documentation shows that he was perceived by certain business and criminally connected actors as a person whose favor could be crucial to their standing with state institutions.
A particular problem is the institutional response to the published documentation. Although law enforcement authorities had access to the communications provided through international police cooperation, as of early 2026, the public had not been informed whether all relevant materials had been submitted to the competent prosecutor's office or what specific checks had been conducted. Such uncertainty further raises the question of institutional accountability when the documentation of dealings with the state involves individuals from the immediate family circles of the political leadership, influential businesspeople, and individuals connected to organized crime.
Nikola Petrović
Nikola Petrović, Aleksandar Vučić's longtime friend and kum, represents one of the most significant links between the state energy sector, private capital, and Vučić's closest personal circle. Immediately after the Serbian Progressive Party came to power in 2012, he was appointed director of Elektromreža Srbije (EMS), Serbia’s state-owned electricity transmission system operator. He remained in that position until the end of 2016, after which he expanded his private business activities, primarily in the energy sector. His closeness to the political leadership came under particular public scrutiny during the 2015 "Čibuk" wind farm affair, when he, along with Ana Brnabić, publicly denied allegations that he had demanded approximately $2.25 million for connecting the project to the power grid. These allegations were never proven in court.
Petrović's companies had been generating significant revenue for years through the state's preferential purchase system for electricity produced in small hydroelectric plants. From 2013 to 2023, approximately $26.3 million was paid to the plants in which he had ownership stakes. The business was based on guaranteed purchase prices and a renewable energy incentive system, the costs of which were financed through fees associated with electricity consumption. In 2023, most of the associated power plants exited that system. These revenues do not in themselves constitute proof of illegal business practices, but they document the extent of the financial benefit obtained under the state regulatory regime.
Business relationships with the public sector continued through the company "GBG snabdevanje," of which Petrović is a co-owner. Between early 2024 and December 2025, the company secured public procurement contracts worth approximately $7.1 million to supply electricity to state institutions. The clients included public enterprises, schools, universities, museums, and other institutions. In the analyzed procedures, competition was largely limited to Petrović's company and the state-owned Electric Power of Serbia. This allowed his business to continue generating significant revenue through its relationships with the public sector, now directly through public procurement contracts.
The question of the transparency of his assets was further raised by documentation published in 2021 as part of the international "Pandora Papers" investigation. Documents showed that in 2016, while he was still heading Elektromreža Srbije, Petrović became the owner of the company "Arkshore International," registered in the British Virgin Islands, which had a bank account in Switzerland. He did not declare ownership of this company to the competent Anti-Corruption Agency, even though as a public official he was legally obligated to report his assets. This case directly links his then-position at the state-owned enterprise to the issue of transparency regarding his private financial interests.
After leaving public office, Petrović also developed his business through the company "Fabergé Advisors," founded in Luxembourg in 2019. Through this company, the following year he bought the airline "Air Posh" from businessman Stanko Subotić for approximately $112,000, even though the estimated market value of just one of the company's aircraft ranged from approximately $787,000 to $1.46 million. The full financial terms of the transaction were not publicly available. Petrović's earlier business partnerships also included the telecommunications company Bel Mobile, which he co-owned with Dejan Stanković from 2004 to 2010. Stanković was later linked to international cocaine trafficking and was killed in Colombia in 2020.
A particularly significant connection to business circles linked to organized crime is the company "Storenergy," which develops solar energy technology. In 2019, Petrović bought half of the company through his Luxembourg-based company, and in 2021, Ljiljana Božović, Zvonko Veselinović's wife, entered its ownership structure. Petrović and Božović thus became direct business partners. Veselinović was sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury in December of the same year as the leader of an organized criminal group, citing corruption, smuggling, and political arrangements that secured support for candidates in elections in exchange for business favors and government contracts. Petrović's partnership with Veselinović's wife represents a documented business relationship, regardless of the question of his personal responsibility for the activities for which Veselinović was sanctioned.
Petrović also appears in 2020 communications, published in January 2025, which revealed conflicts within Novi Sad's political and business circles over major state contracts in the energy sector. In correspondence from Miloš Pandrć, an associate of Darko Šarić's criminal group, Petrović is linked to a group close to Zvonko Veselinović, which was in opposition to businessman Dragoljub Zbiljić and his political allies. Participants in the correspondence also mentioned alleged payments of large sums of money to Petrović from certain energy deals, but the actual execution of these payments has not been independently confirmed. The documentation also shows that the opposing groups were competing for the favor of Andrej Vučić. These relationships complement the previously described connections between Miloš Vučević, Andrej Vučić, and business circles in Vojvodina, without the need to re-explain the entire correspondence.
A particularly serious question of equal treatment by state institutions was raised after a traffic accident in Belgrade in March 2023, in which Petrović was driving a McLaren, and two women were slightly injured. The police documentation contained findings of alcohol and cocaine in his system. Prosecutors did not initiate criminal proceedings. The separate misdemeanor proceedings ended in March 2025 when the statute of limitations expired, following the reversal of the initial judgment. Meanwhile, police officer Katarina Petrović was arrested and criminally prosecuted for allegedly disclosing classified information after providing the accident report to a member of parliament. The report was subsequently published. In October 2024, the appellate court issued a final decision upholding her acquittal, ruling that the information provided did not constitute a legally protected secret. This different institutional outcome raises serious questions about accountability and the treatment of politically connected individuals and officials who disclose information of public interest.
Darko Glišić
Darko Glišić, who also has a traditional Serbian kum relationship with Aleksandar Vučić, holds a prominent position within the Serbian Progressive Party's organizational structure. From 2012 to 2024, he served as president of the Municipality of Ub, the chief executive of the local government, and since 2016, he has led the Executive Board of the SNS, one of the most important bodies for implementing party decisions and controlling local organizations. In May 2024, he was appointed Minister of Public Investments, adding responsibility for the implementation of major infrastructure projects funded with public money to his long-standing party influence. His position connects the central political leadership with regional, city, and municipal party structures.
The SNS Executive Board has the authority to oversee local party committees, remove their leaders, and impose disciplinary measures. In 2017, Glišić spoke openly about disciplining party officials and their attempts to secure ministerial positions through Vučić's closest associates. He particularly highlighted their interest in ministries with large budgets and numerous tenders, as well as the role of Vučić's inner circle in such staffing decisions. His statement illustrates the connection between advancement within the ruling party and access to public funds and government contracts.
Questions about Glišić's influence over public-sector hiring emerged prominently during the scandal involving Krušik, a state-owned defense manufacturer in Valjevo. Whistleblower Aleksandar Obradović stated in December 2019 that Glišić was the main party official for personnel matters at the company and that during 2016 and 2017, a large number of employees were hired based on political affiliation, including people from Ub, Mionica, and surrounding towns. Obradović also described the appointment of managers based on party criteria, along with an atmosphere of fear among employees. These allegations raised questions about the use of a state-owned enterprise to consolidate the party's organization and the economic dependence of its employees.
His influence on local political relations is also evident in the case of Kraljevo, following the elections held in December 2023. Opposition politician Ivan Matović stated that he was offered membership in the ruling party at Glišić's behest. After Matović refused, Glišić publicly warned him during a television appearance that if he wanted to play with fire, he would get burned. This statement, made during disputes over the formation of the local government, represents a documented example of a high-ranking party official pressuring a political opponent.
Veljko Belivuk made particularly serious claims about the relationships between party structures and organized crime during the court proceedings against his criminal group in October 2022. Belivuk claimed that he met with Glišić in Ub and that Glišić mediated his alleged meeting with Aleksandar Vučić. He also claimed that his group participated in providing security for political events and violently breaking up demonstrations. Glišić dismissed these allegations. They are claims made by a defendant during his defense, not judicially established facts, but they raise serious questions about possible relationships between criminal groups and the ruling party's organization.
The question of personnel criteria also arose after Glišić took over the Ministry of Public Investments. One of his aides became Vladimir Mićić, a former official of the city government in Šabac, whom the media identified among the participants in the attack on demonstrators during the protests on the Šabač Bridge in November 2021. His subsequent appointment to a senior government position raised questions about political criteria and accountability in appointments to public office.
As minister of public investments, Glišić simultaneously held responsibility for major infrastructure projects and continued to lead the party body overseeing local SNS organizations. During July 2026, he stated that the Ministry was implementing 64 active projects, with a total value of approximately $621 million. The significance of this concentration of functions was particularly evident during the 2025 local election campaigns in Kosjerić and Zaječar, when visits by government officials, investment announcements, and infrastructure work intensified. In Kosjerić, national government institutions assumed responsibility for financing and carrying out work on approximately 45 kilometers of local roads, while the number of ministerial visits during the campaign exceeded the number recorded in the previous four years.
This intertwining of state and party activities continued during the 2026 parliamentary campaign. As chairman of the SNS Executive Board, Glišić toured local communities, spoke with residents about their infrastructure needs, and presented state investments as achievements of Aleksandar Vučić's policy. During a September 2026 visit to Bajina Bašta, he directly linked the newly built roads, schools, and other public facilities to calls for citizens to support the ruling party's electoral list. This simultaneous use of a state function and a party position shows how public investments can become a tool for election promotion and maintaining a political advantage.
The Interconnection of Political, Economic, and Party Power
The cases presented show that political and economic power in Aleksandar Vučić's inner circle is not exercised exclusively through official state and party positions. Family and in-law ties, long-standing business collaborations, and informal relationships connect people who control public funds, decide on major state affairs, manage institutions, or exercise influence without holding corresponding formal authority. Documented contracts, business partnerships, and personnel decisions show various forms of this interconnectedness, while individual cases raise serious questions about the independence of institutions and the protection of the public interest.
The interrelationships of these actors do not imply fully aligned interests. Documentation on competition for state contracts, particularly in the energy sector and business circles of Vojvodina, shows that within the same political environment, there are different interests and rivalries. However, such competition does not diminish the significance of Aleksandar Vučić as the central figure within this political network, whose support and position represent an important lever for advancing in the party hierarchy, gaining access to state functions, and pursuing business interests. It is precisely this intertwining of formal authority, personal relationships, and informal influence that makes it difficult to establish accountability for decisions that should be made independently, transparently, and solely in the public interest.
For the electoral process, it is particularly significant that these relationships do not end at the political and economic top, but are transmitted through state institutions, public enterprises, and local party structures into the daily lives of citizens. International election observers documented pressure on public sector employees, abuse of public resources, and systemic advantages for the ruling party. When employment opportunities, access to public-sector positions, and the allocation of public funds are tied to political loyalty, an electoral advantage is created long before the actual vote. Remaining in power allows the ruling party to retain control over these resources and preserve the same relationships across successive election cycles.
2.2 Public Investments and the Novi Sad Railway Station Canopy Collapse
Public investments are one of the most visible areas where state funds can be used for political promotion. The construction of roads, railways, hospitals, schools, and other public facilities is financed with citizens' money, but their completion is often presented as a personal achievement of Aleksandar Vučić and the ruling party. A particular problem arises when project deadlines and ceremonial openings are tied to election campaigns, as the political interest in public promotion is prioritized over transparency in contracting and independent expert oversight.
This approach is further enabled by intergovernmental agreements, particularly those governing major infrastructure projects involving Chinese companies. Instead of open tendering, contractors are selected through direct negotiation, while commercial contracts, annexes, and financial data are often not fully accessible to the public. The European Commission has warned in its reports about the circumvention of regular public procurement procedures through intergovernmental agreements and special laws. Such a system reduces the possibility of independent verification of prices, the quality of work, and the accountability of project participants.
A particularly serious example is the reconstruction of the railway station in Novi Sad, where the collapse of a canopy on November 1, 2024, claimed sixteen lives. The tragedy was preceded by two publicly promoted openings of the railway infrastructure, while the documentation, work execution, and actions of the competent authorities later became the subject of multiple investigations. Demands for accountability and the disclosure of documentation sparked massive student blockades and civil protests across Serbia.
The first ceremonial opening of the high-speed railway between Belgrade and Novi Sad took place on March 19, 2022, in the presence of Aleksandar Vučić and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The presidential and parliamentary elections in Serbia were held just fifteen days later, on April 3. Work on the station building itself was not yet complete at the time. The station was officially reopened on July 5, 2024, in the presence of Minister of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure Goran Vesić, President of the Provincial Government Maja Gojković, and the Mayor of Novi Sad. Vesić announced that the station was fully operational, while public statements by government officials created the impression that the reconstructed facility was ready and safe for use.
However, the station was opened without an occupancy permit. Documents subsequently made public included a recommendation by the technical inspection commission to authorize trial operation of the facility, the sufficiency and legality of which were disputed by experts. An occupancy permit is an important mechanism for confirming that a building meets the prescribed conditions for use after construction work and the appropriate inspections are completed. Its absence alone does not establish the cause of the canopy's collapse, but it is a significant factor in determining responsibility for allowing an unfinished or insufficiently inspected public facility to be used.
The project's main contractor was the Chinese consortium of China Railway International and China Communications Construction Company, engaged through an intergovernmental arrangement between Serbia and China. China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation was also involved in the project's contracting chain, while part of the work at the station was entrusted to the domestic company "Starting." The published contracts stipulated the obligations of the Chinese contractors to oversee the progress, quality, and safety of their subcontractors' work. Such a project organization is particularly important for determining liability, as multiple companies were involved in the execution and supervision of the work on the facility that later became the site of the tragedy.
A financial investigation by the Public Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime raised significantly broader issues than individual construction failures. In August 2025, authorities launched an investigation into suspected financial losses to the state budget exceeding $115 million during the modernization of the railway line from Novi Sad to the Hungarian border. Among the suspects were former ministers of construction Tomislav Momirović and Goran Vesić, as well as other government officials, representatives of public enterprises, and private companies. According to the order to conduct the investigation, certain construction work was presented as additional work through contract amendments, billed separately, and contracted without public procurement. The investigation also examines suspected fictitious transactions, tax-related abuses, and the diversion of funds through a network of affiliated companies. The stated amount refers to the broader railway project, of which the reconstruction of the Novi Sad station was a part, and not exclusively to the canopy itself.
A separate issue is the responsibility of the Chinese contractors and the domestic subcontractors. Although the published contracts provided for supervisory obligations for the Chinese side, representatives of the Chinese consortium were not among the suspects in the initial order to conduct a financial investigation. This is particularly significant because the investigation itself involved suspicion that the Chinese contractors had obtained an illicit property benefit through questionable contractual arrangements. The prosecution subsequently announced that it had questioned representatives of the Chinese companies. These circumstances raise the question of whether liability is determined throughout the entire chain of contracting and decision-making, including foreign contractors, domestic subcontractors, and government officials.
In parallel with the financial investigation, criminal proceedings were initiated to determine responsibility for the collapse of the railway station canopy itself. In September 2025, the Public Prosecutor's Office in Novi Sad filed an indictment against thirteen individuals, including former Minister Goran Vesić, representatives of railway institutions, and those involved in the design, construction, and supervision of the work. After the Higher Court suspended the proceedings against six of the accused in December of the same year, the Court of Appeals overturned that decision in July 2026 and upheld the indictment against all thirteen individuals. The proceedings could therefore move forward, but the court's decision to uphold the indictment did not establish the defendants' guilt.
An independent inquiry commission established by university professors and experts in civil engineering, law, and economics examined the contracting process, project management, and the actions of public institutions following the tragedy. Its findings pointed to irregularities in the documentation, execution, and supervision of the work, as well as problems that arose from bypassing regular public procurement procedures. Particular attention was drawn to discrepancies between the construction logs maintained by the Chinese contractor and the domestic subcontractor, which raised questions about the reliability of the records of the work actually performed.
The Commission also examined documents indicating political interest in accelerating construction and meeting deadlines associated with the public opening of the infrastructure. Its representatives pointed to communications mentioning the presidential office, certain associates of Aleksandar Vučić, and the Chinese consortium's demands regarding financing and deadlines. These documents raise questions about how political priorities may have influenced project management and the actions of institutions responsible for independent technical oversight. The existence of this communication alone did not establish a direct causal link between such political demands and the collapse of the railway station canopy.
A particularly serious allegation was made by representatives of the Inquiry Commission in May 2026, claiming that on the day of the tragedy, Aleksandar Vučić promised the Chinese ambassador that he would not allow the prosecution of the Chinese consortium. Vučić dismissed this claim, and the Chinese Embassy in Serbia labeled the allegations about the conversation as unfounded. The allegations and their public denial further illustrate how efforts to establish independent accountability have become entangled with relations between Serbia's political leadership and foreign contractors involved in major infrastructure projects.
The case of the railway station in Novi Sad shows why the political promotion of public investments cannot be separated from how projects are contracted, financed, and subjected to independent technical oversight. State officials who publicly take credit for the implementation of major projects also have a political responsibility to ensure transparency in decision-making, adherence to legal procedures, and the independence of institutions responsible for citizens' safety. When political deadlines, limited public oversight, and opaque business arrangements converge within the same project, the consequences can go beyond financial losses and directly threaten public safety.
2.3 Public Procurement and Favored Business Circles (EXPO 2027)
Public procurement is one of the most important mechanisms through which the state allocates public funds and determines which private companies receive major government contracts. Its purpose is to ensure competition, fair pricing, quality of work, and equal access for all interested bidders. When regular procedures are bypassed or contract terms are tailored to a limited circle of companies, public spending can become a means of creating economic privileges and long-term business dependence on the political authorities.
A particularly significant example is EXPO 2027, an international specialized exhibition dedicated to sports and music, which will be held in Belgrade. In addition to the exhibition complex, the project includes a national soccer stadium, residential buildings, and accompanying transportation and utility infrastructure. In January 2024, Aleksandar Vučić also presented the broader development program "Jump into the Future – Serbia EXPO 2027," announcing investments of approximately $20 billion. This figure covers a much broader government investment program, including healthcare, education, energy, and other sectors, rather than just the exhibition and its associated infrastructure.
A special legal framework for EXPO 2027 was established through legislation adopted in October 2023, during Ana Brnabić's tenure as prime minister. It excluded the application of the regular Law on Public Procurement for the special state-owned enterprises established to implement the project.
Instead of the general legal rules, procurement by these companies is governed by a special government decree. This arrangement has limited bidders’ usual legal remedies, including their ability to challenge procurement requirements that favor particular companies. In this way, a contracting system with weaker independent oversight mechanisms has been established for major public investments.
In January 2024, Transparency Serbia filed an initiative with the Constitutional Court to assess the constitutionality of this legal exemption. According to the latest publicly available information from September 2026, the Constitutional Court has not yet ruled on the initiative, while the projects have continued under the special regime. The European Commission has also pointed out the problems that such legal exemptions create regarding competition, transparency, tender deadlines, and the right to legal protection for bidders.
The extent of limited competition was documented through an analysis of 72 procurement procedures conducted by special companies associated with EXPO 2027. In 86 percent of the procedures analyzed, contracts were awarded to the only bidder whose offer met the requirements. The average number of bids received was 1.56, while the average number of eligible bids was just 1.19. The total value of the contracts covered exceeded the equivalent of approximately $371 million. These figures refer only to the procurement procedures analyzed, not to all investments associated with the project. Nevertheless, they clearly demonstrate how limited competition was in a significant portion of government contracting.
The largest construction contracts related to EXPO 2027 were also awarded through direct agreements with Chinese state-owned companies. Power China was entrusted with the construction of the national stadium, preparatory works, and significant parts of the infrastructure and exhibition complex, without an open international tender. These contracts were awarded under an intergovernmental agreement between Serbia and China and were not included in the analysis of 72 procurement procedures discussed above. According to the fiscal documentation analyzed by Transparency Serbia, the estimated value of the stadium and related facilities exceeds approximately $1.98 billion. As a result, most of the construction work was awarded to preselected contractors, while competition was further restricted in other procurement procedures.
A particular problem is the complex network of domestic contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. A study published in June 2026 identified more than 200 companies engaged in the construction of the EXPO complex, the national stadium, and the accompanying infrastructure. No comprehensive official list of these companies was publicly available. Their identities were established through document collection, examination of business records, and direct contact with the companies. Such a lack of transparency makes it difficult to determine the value of individual contracts, the method of subcontractor engagement, and the actual distribution of public funds.
Among the domestic companies engaged on these projects is "Millennium Team," already mentioned in Siniša Mali's analysis. The company participates in work related to the EXPO complex and the national stadium, while also being present in other major infrastructure projects funded by the state. Its long-standing involvement in government-funded projects illustrates how access to major public investments can become a significant driver of private-sector growth.
Particular attention was also drawn to the hiring of companies associated with individuals from criminal and politically influential circles. The company "Makiš Beton," which was generating significant revenue from work for EXPO, is owned by the sister of Aleksandar Vidojević, known for his connections to hooligan and party structures, and a business partner who had previously been convicted of assisting the perpetrator of the murder of Željko Ražnatović, known as Arkan. During 2025, approximately 70 percent of this company's revenue, out of a total of approximately $20.1 million, came from work on the EXPO. The involvement of other companies whose owners or business associates are linked to former criminal groups has also been documented. These circumstances do not in themselves establish the illegality of individual contracts, but they further emphasize the importance of verifying ownership structures, terms of engagement, and the origin of business revenues.
The political significance of EXPO 2027 extends beyond its economic and infrastructure-related aspects. Since the presentation of the development program in 2024, Aleksandar Vučić has taken a central role in the public promotion of the project, linking it to promises of accelerated economic development, a higher standard of living, and Serbia's future progress. Visits to construction sites, announcements of new investments, and presentations of expected results provide opportunities for continuous political promotion, even outside formal election campaigns. The public project thus becomes part of the ruling party's broader political narrative, while its implementation is linked to the continuation of the current leadership's policies.
The electoral significance of this way of managing public resources stems from the unequal position of political actors. The ruling party has the ability to determine investment priorities, influence the distribution of major contracts, and politically promote their implementation through state institutions. Private companies whose revenues depend significantly on government contracts simultaneously have a strong economic interest in continuing such cooperation. When this is combined with limited competition, insufficient transparency, and weak independent oversight mechanisms, public investments can become a permanent source of economic and political advantage for the authorities.
EXPO 2027 therefore illustrates how a major development project can serve legitimate public needs while also creating conditions for the concentration of political and economic power. The international significance of the exhibition and the potential benefits of new infrastructure do not diminish the state's obligation to ensure fair competition, transparent spending, and a clear separation of the public interest from the interests of the ruling party.
2.4 Subsidies and the Allocation of Public Funds as a Mechanism of Political Dependence
Subsidies and other forms of state aid are an important economic policy tool, intended to encourage investment, create jobs, develop agriculture, and finance activities of public interest. Unlike public procurement, through which the state directly contracts for works, goods, and services, subsidies enable the government to allocate public funds to private companies, agricultural producers, and organizations through designated support programs. When the decision-making on such funds is not transparent enough, and access to aid depends on political connections or intermediaries, the state gains the ability to influence the business interests, economic security, and political behavior of the beneficiaries through the distribution of public money.
The extent of government financial support for major private investors is particularly evident in programs associated with preparations for EXPO 2027. Nearly $67.4 million in subsidies have been approved for the construction and renovation of five hotels in Belgrade. The largest single amount, approximately $33.9 million, was allocated to the company "Danube Riverside," owned by the "Millennium Team," for the construction and equipping of the "Ritz-Carlton" hotel on the site of the former "Yugoslavia" hotel. This is a business group that is already participating in major state infrastructure projects, which concentrates public contracts and state incentives within the same business circle. Questions of a possible conflict of interest also arise in the case of smaller subsidies. In April 2024, the Serbian government approved approximately $983,000 for the company "Mona Manufaktura," owned by Uroš Momirović, the brother of Tomislav Momirović, who was serving as a government minister at the time. It was not publicly clarified whether the minister was recused from the decision-making regarding support for his brother's company. These examples call for an investigation into the selection process for beneficiaries, the economic justification of the incentives, and the protection of the procedure from family and political interests.
The operations of large companies may rely on government contracts, investment incentives, and regulatory decisions, while for small producers and farms, the consequences of dependence on public funds are often more immediate and severe. Agricultural incentives cover the acquisition of machinery, breeding stock, equipment, irrigation systems, and other investments necessary for sustaining production. Beneficiaries often invest their own money or take out loans in advance, expecting the government to reimburse part of their expenses. Therefore, a decision to approve a subsidy, a delay in its payment, or the loss of eligibility for incentives can directly jeopardize loan repayment, the continuation of production, and the family's economic survival.
Such dependence is particularly acute in smaller communities, where local party officials can mediate in obtaining information, preparing documentation, and communicating with government institutions. When assistance to which a beneficiary is entitled under established criteria is presented as the personal merit of a political representative, the institutional process can be transformed into a relationship of political indebtedness. At the same time, the possibility of denying a request, delaying a payment, or initiating an audit takes on special gravity for a producer whose livelihood depends on continued government support.
Some of the most serious documented cases of such pressure involve placing registered farms on inactive status (known in Serbia as “passive status”), making them ineligible for government subsidies. In December 2024, such decisions were made for the holdings of Predrag Veljković, Zlatko Kokanović, and Đoko Ćurčić, farmers known for their participation in protests and public opposition to certain government decisions. The affected farmers linked the authorities' actions to their political activism, while the Ministry of Agriculture justified its decisions by citing irregularities it said it had identified. Following appeals by the affected farmers, the Ministry annulled the decisions on December 18 and returned the cases for reconsideration.
A similar case was recorded in the Mačva region in 2025. Nemanja Lacković, a farmer from the village of Klenje who had publicly supported student protests, underwent repeated inspections, including four inspections over approximately two months. In December, his farm was placed on inactive status for three years, making it ineligible for subsidies. Lacković linked this action to his support for the students and warned of serious consequences for his family's livelihood. This case raised further concerns about the selective use of inspection authority against farmers who publicly oppose government policies.
The initiation of an inspection proceeding or the finding of irregularities does not in itself prove political retaliation. However, when intensive inspections and measures that can threaten economic survival appear immediately after public political engagement, it is especially important to examine their frequency, justification, and the treatment of other farms in comparable circumstances. The consequences of such measures can extend beyond the individual producer. Other farmers, who depend on the same institutions, may conclude that participating in protests or publicly opposing the authorities carries the risk of losing the funds necessary to continue production.
The distribution of public funds is an important instrument of influence beyond the economy and agriculture. Significant public funds are allocated to associations and other organizations for projects supporting families, young people, and other vulnerable groups, as well as providing social assistance. Unlike businesses that receive funds for investment in production, these organizations are funded to carry out activities that are supposed to directly benefit citizens. For this very reason, it is especially important that the selection of beneficiaries, the implementation of projects, and the spending of approved funds be subject to independent oversight.
A particularly serious example of the misuse of public funds emerged from the Ministry of Family and Demography's allocation of funding in 2021. An investigation based on the Ministry's documentation, state treasury data, and other official records showed that funding equivalent to at least approximately $5.62 million was allocated to a network of affiliated associations and private agencies for projects intended for young people, women, and vulnerable families. A significant portion of the reported activities did not take place, while fictitious reports and inaccurate financial data were used to justify the spending. Some of the activities that the associations presented as their own expenses were actually organized free of charge by schools and local institutions. According to documented findings, funds were transferred between interconnected organizations and private agencies, while the actual benefit to the citizens for whom the aid was intended did not correspond to the reported spending.
Such a distribution of budget funds also has broader institutional significance. When organizations connected to people in power or local political structures receive stable financial support, while independent initiatives do not have equal access to funds, public money can also influence the balance of power in civil society. In addition to providing immediate financial benefits, such funding can help create an organizational network presented to the public as independent civic support for particular government policies.
A common feature of the described mechanisms is the ability to link access to public funds to political loyalty. For large companies, such dependence can develop through the expectation of new contracts and subsidies; for farmers, through the uncertainty of approval and preservation of incentives; and for associations, through the continuity of budget funding. When decisions on economic support become a means of rewarding political cooperation or increasing the cost of opposition, their consequences directly affect the freedom of political action. Electoral advantages are therefore created not only during campaigns but also through long-term relationships that make citizens, businesses, and organizations dependent on institutions whose allocation of resources is controlled by the ruling political establishment.
2.5 Public Enterprises as an Infrastructure for Party Operations
Public enterprises and other state-owned enterprises manage a significant portion of public infrastructure and provide services of immediate importance to citizens. Their capacities include financial resources, office space, vehicles, equipment, and employees whose work is funded by the enterprise's revenues and, in certain cases, by budget funds. When these resources are used for party activities, the ruling party gains an organizational and financial advantage that its political opponents cannot match under equal conditions.
One of the main mechanisms of political influence is the way the management of public enterprises is selected. The law requires directors to be selected through open competitive procedures, but the long-standing practice of appointing acting directors has allowed politically dependent management structures to remain in place. According to an analysis by the organization Transparency Serbia, of the 34 state-owned enterprises covered by the review, only two entered 2026 with lawfully appointed directors. In 22 companies, acting directors had been appointed or retained in their positions in violation of statutory restrictions. Some directors remained in such positions for years, and even for more than a decade.
This management style increases directors' dependence on the political leadership that decides their appointment and tenure. At the same time, changes in the legal form of certain state-owned enterprises have not resolved the transparency issue. A study published in October 2026 examined 34 state-owned enterprises and found an average transparency score of 42.1 percent. None of the companies met the criteria for the highest transparency category. Such circumstances make it difficult to publicly monitor the management of assets, hiring, and business decisions.
The political dependence of management can be passed down to employees through the work hierarchy. In environments where public enterprises are among the largest employers, access to employment and contract extensions can become a powerful tool of party patronage. Collected testimonies describe demands that employees participate in party activities, attend political rallies, and identify voters committed to supporting the ruling party. Such pressure also extends to employees' families, friends, and acquaintances, as workers are expected to use their personal relationships to help fulfill party tasks.
A particularly clear example of party activities being organized through a company's management structure was documented at Dunav Osiguranje, a state-owned insurance company. Ahead of the Serbian Progressive Party rally on June 27, 2026, an internal email exchange was published in which managers were asked to submit lists of employees who would attend the rally, with precise instructions on the time and place of gathering. According to the published documentation, the instructions originated from the company's senior leadership and were sent to managers responsible for implementing them. This case demonstrates how the existing organizational structure of a state-owned enterprise can be used to mobilize people for party activities that are not part of their job duties.
Similar pressures were also documented through the testimonies of employees in other public systems. During the 2026 election campaign, an employee of Poštanska štedionica bank described demands for workers to provide signatures supporting the SNS electoral list and to participate in collecting signatures. According to her testimony, political engagement was linked to the possibility of pay raises and promotions, while employees who refused such tasks were labeled as disloyal. Similar allegations of efforts to secure committed votes and pressure employees on temporary or insecure contracts also emerged in other state institutions.
The use of employees for party activities also has an immediate financial dimension. Observers during the 2024 elections recorded testimonies that some public sector workers went to political rallies on organized transport during work hours. In Sombor, a case was described in which employees were clocked in for work, even though they were participating in party activities in Belgrade at the time. When work time paid for with public funds is used for a political campaign, the cost of the party's organization is effectively passed on to the public enterprise or institution.
An even more direct example involves the use of funds from the public enterprise Vršac to pay for transportation to ruling-party rallies. Documentation obtained from the competent prosecutor's office confirmed that this enterprise paid for three buses that transported supporters of the Serbian Progressive Party to rallies in Belgrade and Novi Sad. A total of approximately $1,100 was paid to the company "STUP Vršac" for the transportation. Although the payments were confirmed by contracts, the criminal complaint against the then-director, Dragana Stankov, was dismissed. Prosecutors did not find sufficient grounds to treat the payment as the criminal offense of abuse of office. This case clearly illustrates the difference between the actual spending of public funds for party purposes and the institutional assessment of its legality.
The use of official vehicles was also documented during the SNS rally "Serbia of Hope," held in Belgrade on May 26, 2023. Among the vehicles used to transport participants, cars and minibuses owned by municipalities, public enterprises, and other institutions were photographed. One particularly significant example involved a minibus belonging to the Municipality of Lebane that was documented in Belgrade, although official records described its trip as transportation for citizens attending the Agricultural Fair in Novi Sad. The Anti-Corruption Agency, after conducting a review, did not find a violation of the law, relying on the explanations and documentation provided by the institutions. The discrepancy between the vehicles' documented locations and the official explanations nevertheless raised questions about the effectiveness of institutional oversight.
Public property can also be used for political promotion through its allocation to other public entities. In March 2026, the Belgrade Public Utility Company "City Cleaning" lent municipal vehicles to municipalities where local elections were held immediately afterward. Among the recipients was the municipality of Aranđelovac, to which the assistance was presented as a contribution to improving municipal services. Transferring equipment for temporary use by another public enterprise may serve a legitimate purpose, but the timing and circumstances warrant scrutiny when such arrangements coincide with election campaigns. It is particularly important to determine the criteria for selecting municipalities, the actual needs of the users, and the circumstances under which the assets were lent.
The described cases show how public enterprises can become the organizational infrastructure of a political party, not only through the direct spending of money but also through the use of work time, official communications, vehicles, and the employees' dependence on management. When these resources are used to support party operations, the ruling party gains access to publicly funded capacities that its political opponents must finance independently. At the same time, the pressure on employees can be extended to their families and personal lives, thereby extending political coercion far beyond the workplace itself. Such an advantage is created and maintained throughout the entire electoral cycle, long before the formal start of the campaign.
2.6 Financing Party Activities and Concealing the Source of Funds
Funding political activities involves much more than money paid into a political party's account. Organizing events, renting venues, television advertising, voter outreach by phone, and hiring campaign staff all have economic value, regardless of who pays for them directly. When such activities are funded through private companies, associations, intermediaries, or public institutions, the actual sources of the money and the total value of the political support can remain outside of official financial reports. In this way, a political party can have significantly greater financial and organizational capacity than its reported spending indicates.
One of the earliest documented methods of concealing the source of campaign funds involved coordinated donations to the Serbian Progressive Party through individuals who were listed as donors but were not the actual source of the money. During the 2014 parliamentary elections, nearly all individual donors reported by the SNS contributed the identical amount of approximately $382. Serbia’s Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering identified 135 transactions in which citizens first deposited this amount into their own bank accounts and then transferred it to the party on the same day. The same pattern appeared during Aleksandar Vučić's 2017 presidential campaign, when among 6,789 individual donors, a full 98 percent paid the identical amount of approximately $382. Five donors separately confirmed that they had received the money from party officials, deposited it into their own accounts, and subsequently provided proof of payment. In this way, the formally declared donor did not have to be the actual financier of the political campaign.
It is particularly significant that some donors also described economic dependence on the party organization, including employment secured through political intermediation. Under such circumstances, the concealment of money transfers can be linked to pressure on people whose livelihoods depend on political loyalty. However, proceedings concerning the disputed donations from the 2014 campaign were discontinued in May 2022, after the Belgrade Higher Public Prosecutor's Office did not establish that the criminal offense of money laundering had occurred.
The Prosecutor's Office also stated that in some cases, the statute of limitations had expired for possible violations of political activity financing rules. Thus, the documented irregularities and testimonies about transferring other people's money were left without a full clarification of the actual sources of funding.
Another significant mechanism is the organization of party activities through private agencies and associations that are not formally part of the political party. During the 2023 parliamentary election campaign, a large call center was documented in Belgrade, where more than 100 workers contacted voters daily to assess their support for the SNS. The operation was organized by the M&J Lady agency, while workers were paid in cash at the offices of the Center for Education and Development of Youth of Belgrade (CEROB). The journalist's direct participation in the center's work made it possible to document the demand that the hired people vote for the SNS and confirm compliance with this condition by photographing a filled-out ballot.
The SNS's preliminary financial report did not show any expenses corresponding to the call center's operations, including the hiring of staff, communication services, and the use of office space. The party denied organizing or financing its operation, while the agency and the association also disputed any connection to its activities. The Anti-Corruption Agency did not initiate proceedings for lack of sufficient evidence, but the criminal complaint remained under prosecutorial review. As of September 2026, police had not interviewed a single person as part of the investigative measures requested by prosecutors, despite repeated instructions to do so. The proceedings had made little substantive progress for almost three years, while the source of funding, actual operating costs, and responsibility for organizing the call center remained unclear.
Covert financing of party activities can also be carried out through the direct use of local budgets. A particularly serious example emerged in the municipality of Žitište following the parliamentary and provincial elections held in December 2023. A criminal complaint was filed over the suspected use of approximately $100,000 in municipal funds to purchase food and hygiene product packages intended to win over voters for the Serbian Progressive Party. The criminal complaint identified three alleged organizers and 26 other suspects and was accompanied by documentation concerning the procurement and delivery of the goods. According to the complaint, the funds were withdrawn from the municipal budget, and the disputed spending was subsequently covered by a budget amendment adopted after the elections. The published delivery notes and invoices provide concrete documentary evidence for investigating the possible transfer of party expenses to the public budget, while the final determination of responsibility requires proving the actual distribution of the packages and the role of individual participants.
In addition to direct cash payments, political parties can receive economic support through the free provision of space, equipment, and other services. During the local elections in Kula, held on March 29, 2026, the restaurant "Kod Ćira" was used as one of the SNS's campaign headquarters. The restaurant's owner, Miodrag Simunović, confirmed that he provided the space to the party free of charge, while this service was not disclosed in its financial report. Just eleven days after the March 29 election, on April 9, the restaurant was awarded approximately $28,700 through a public funding competition organized by the Provincial Secretariat for Economy and Tourism. Over the previous five years, budget incentives equivalent to at least approximately $95,600 had been approved for the same recipient. This sequence of events does not, by itself, establish a quid pro quo, but it raises questions about the relationship between providing free support to a political party and receiving public funds.
A political party can also gain a significant economic advantage through preferential terms for television advertising. During the 2020 and 2022 election campaigns, the SNS used a total of approximately five and a half hours of promotional airtime on Pink TV, predominantly during prime evening hours. An analysis of contracts, invoices, and price lists showed that the average price per second for this type of advertising was approximately four times lower than the average price for regular commercials. The estimated difference between the amount paid and the comparable market value of the advertising exceeded approximately $3.15 million. The Regulatory Body for Electronic Media filed misdemeanor complaints against the television station for broadcasting purchased slots longer than legally permitted, while the Anti-Corruption Agency did not examine the reasonableness of the prices at which the political party purchased that airtime.
To understand how campaigns are actually financed, it is particularly important to recognize that a preferential price can represent an economic benefit that is not visible from payment records alone. If the party receives significantly more promotional space than it could afford under comparable market conditions, its actual capacity for political advertising exceeds the value shown in the financial report. The estimated price difference is not in itself proof of an illegal contribution, but it provides a basis for examining whether the political party was granted a special benefit and whether its value had to be reported. In the case of Pink TV, this represents a potential economic advantage worth millions of dollars, extending beyond a single advertising contract and affecting the ruling party's ability to promote itself during elections.
The cases described illustrate how the actual sources of campaign funding and the full economic value of party activities can remain beyond public scrutiny. In the case of formal donors, the actual source of the money was concealed. The call center's operating costs were handled through private intermediaries rather than reported as party expenditures. In Žitište, suspicions arose that municipal funds had been used to win over voters. Free services and preferential advertising rates also allowed the ruling party to benefit from resources whose full economic value was not reflected in its reported expenditures. International election observers have specifically pointed to the insufficiently regulated financing of campaigns through third parties and the need for more effective oversight of such activities.
For the electoral process, it is not only crucial whether an irregularity will be detected afterward, but also whether the relevant institutions will react while the financial and organizational advantage is being realized. If institutions respond only after the advantage has been gained, the advertising has already aired, the gatherings have taken place, voters have been contacted, and the political benefit has already been secured. When the actual financiers, intermediaries, and the full value of party activities remain unknown, citizens lack full insight into the interests behind political power, while competing political parties are denied a level playing field in the electoral process.
2.7 Economic Dependence and the Consequences of Political Dissent
Private ownership does not necessarily mean that a company is economically independent of government institutions. Private companies often depend on government contracts, permits, tax inspections and other regulatory oversight, commercial leases, and decisions by local authorities. When government authority is used to demand political support or punish public opposition, economic relationships become instruments of political pressure. Unlike the public sector, where party demands can be transmitted directly through the state hierarchy, in the private sector they often come through employers whose businesses depend on continuing cooperation with institutions controlled by the ruling party.
Such mechanisms have also been documented during previous election cycles. A study of political pressure conducted ahead of the 2022 elections included testimonies from private business owners and employees who were required to attend party rallies, identify committed voters, and secure support for the ruling party. Some employers described pressure from local political officials and the dependence of future business opportunities on their willingness to cooperate. These demands were then passed on to employees, with threats of termination or other consequences for their employment. Expectations that private companies provide funds for party activities were also documented, while political loyalty was linked to the possibility of obtaining government contracts and other business advantages.
Similar pressures were also reported among employees of the private companies "DTL Tekijanka" and "Almex" from Pančevo. According to collected testimonies, workers were required to provide signatures supporting the ruling party and identify voters committed to supporting it. These demands were communicated through company management, while some employees complied out of fear of losing their jobs. Although the employers' responsibility has not been formally established, these allegations point to pressures within companies where the state is not the direct employer.
Adding particular weight to this kind of coercion is the employees' economic dependence on management's decisions regarding contract extensions, salary, and professional advancement. Efforts to identify and secure committed voters extend this pressure into employees' private lives, as they are expected to obtain political support from family members, friends, and acquaintances. In this way, an employee's economic dependence on their employer becomes a means of exerting political influence over a wider circle of citizens, while refusing a party's request can be perceived as a risk to the economic security of the entire family.
Private business owners can also face political pressure through the use of inspection and enforcement powers by government authorities. In February 2025, the Novi Sad restaurant "Barrique," whose owner Dušan Obradović supported student protests and participated in a work stoppage, was fined a total of approximately $1,670 for placing an advertising sign in a public space. Obradović did not dispute the violation, but pointed out that the authorities had tolerated the same practice for years, while other restaurateurs on the same street had only received warnings. The fine was issued immediately after his public involvement in protest activities. This case raised the question of selective enforcement of inspection powers and the possibility that legitimate inspections could be used to economically discipline politically active entrepreneurs.
Milan Blagojević of Kikinda faced even more serious economic consequences. For nearly sixteen years, he operated Pub J in commercial premises owned by the city. After he publicly supported the student protests, local authorities declined to renew his lease, although he maintained that he had consistently fulfilled his contractual obligations. Blagojević had previously been subjected to numerous inspections, and in his establishment, he had allowed civic forums and other public activities to be held. He linked the decision not to renew the lease to his political activism. Following legal proceedings, he was ordered to vacate the municipally owned commercial premises, which meant he lost the ability to continue his family business. He and his family announced they would leave Serbia due to the loss of their primary source of income.
The cases from Novi Sad and Kikinda show different ways in which public authorities can directly affect the economic position of private entrepreneurs. In the first case, it involves an inspection and a monetary fine, while in the second, a local authority's decision on the use of commercial space led to the end of a long-standing business. The timing of decisions, the institutions' prior practices, and their treatment of other businesspeople in comparable circumstances are particularly important for assessing possible political pressure. The central issue is the selective exercise of government authority, rather than the mere occurrence of an inspection or the expiration of a contract.
Economic pressure can also be exerted without the immediate imposition of a penalty or the termination of business cooperation. A private company that derives a substantial portion of its revenue from government contracts may face political coercion through the threat of losing future contracts, having existing business relationships terminated, or encountering difficulties collecting payments owed to it. In smaller markets, where alternative business partners and sources of revenue are limited, such a risk carries special weight. A business owner who assesses that public opposition to the government could threaten their business may refrain from political engagement, legally funding opposition activities, or providing business premises to political opponents of the government. Economic dependence can thus also limit the material possibilities for political competition.
The consequences of such actions can extend well beyond the business owners directly affected. The visible loss of a business, commercial space, or opportunities for collaboration with public institutions can serve as a warning to other owners and employees. In local communities, where personal, business, and political relationships are closely intertwined, the fear of similar consequences can lead to self-censorship and withdrawal from public political life, even without a new immediate threat.
Such mechanisms have a dual effect on the electoral process. The ruling party can gain additional organizational support from economically dependent employers and their employees, while political opponents can lose collaborators, financial support, and space for public activity. At the same time, citizens who fear losing their jobs, income, or their family's economic security make political decisions under the pressure of potential consequences. The secrecy of the ballot does not, by itself, eliminate the pressures voters faced before entering the polling place. When refusing a political demand carries the risk of economic consequences, the electoral playing field becomes unequal long before Election Day.
Financial amounts originally reported in Serbian dinars or euros are expressed in approximate U.S. dollar equivalents using reference exchange rates from October 16, 2026. These conversions are provided for readability and do not represent the exchange rates prevailing when the underlying transactions occurred.