Institutions
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia establishes the separation of state power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The relationship among these branches is governed by a system of checks and balances, while the judiciary remains independent. This arrangement is intended to prevent the concentration of political power and ensure that state institutions act in accordance with the Constitution and the law.
Serbia has a parliamentary system. The Government, headed by the Prime Minister, exercises executive power and directs national policy. The National Assembly passes legislation, adopts the state budget, elects the Government, and oversees its work. The President of the Republic is elected directly, but his constitutional powers do not include the general direction of the Government, ministries, and public administration. In addition to representing the state and expressing its unity, he exercises other specifically defined constitutional powers.
Since 2012, under the prolonged dominance of the Serbian Progressive Party, whose undisputed political leader is Aleksandar Vučić, political decision-making, personnel appointments, employee dependence, and limited institutional oversight have become increasingly interconnected. The institutions and cases examined in this chapter illustrate how party influence extends throughout the state apparatus and undermines the ability of public institutions to prevent abuses of power.
A particular problem is the concentration of decision-making power around a single political leader, regardless of the public office he holds. When institutional decisions are subordinated to his authority and the party hierarchy, the constitutional separation of powers loses its practical force. The assumption of responsibilities assigned to other state bodies, along with political interference in independent decision-making, undermines constitutional limits on government power. Institutions formally retain their legal authority, while their independence in practice continues to erode.
This form of control has significant implications for elections because it operates continuously, not merely during election campaigns. It determines who decides on employment, promotion, and the use of budget funds, but also whether a reported abuse will be investigated and sanctioned. As a result, voters arrive at the polls affected by institutional dependence, pressure from those around them, or the belief that public authorities will not protect their rights. Freedom of voting and equality in political competition also depend on how independently institutions can operate throughout the entire period between elections.
1.1. The Government and the National Assembly
The Government directs national policy, proposes legislation and the state budget, and makes decisions within its legal authority. The National Assembly is responsible for overseeing the Government through parliamentary questions, committee proceedings, public hearings, and the review of reports issued by oversight institutions. Political control becomes stronger when the same party hierarchy directs government decisions and the conduct of the parliamentary majority, while parliamentary oversight loses its ability to meaningfully scrutinize those decisions.
Suppression of Parliamentary Oversight
Short notice periods for convening parliamentary sessions and preparing for debate limit lawmakers’ ability to review proposals, obtain relevant documents, and challenge government decisions. In its 2023 report, the European Commission noted that most parliamentary sessions were convened with only 24 hours’ notice, a procedure intended for exceptional circumstances. The selective application of sanctions against opposition MPs was also noted.
The consequences for the electoral process extend far beyond individual parliamentary debates. If Parliament fails to effectively scrutinize abuses of public office, government spending, or the failure of responsible authorities to act, the ruling party retains the advantages that come with controlling state institutions. The absence of effective oversight allows public resources, government employees, and institutional authority to be used for political advantage without timely accountability.
Snap Elections and Disruptions to Parliamentary Oversight
Frequent snap elections disrupt the continuity of parliamentary work. Following the 2023 elections, an international election observation mission warned that the early termination of parliamentary mandates undermines legislative preparation and the ability to hold the executive branch accountable.
Political life therefore becomes a continuous election campaign. A public official retains institutional visibility and access to resources, while each new election cycle interrupts scrutiny of their work. Questions of accountability are displaced by campaign messages promoting a new mandate, new projects, and renewed appeals for public support.
The Intertwining of Public Office and Party Campaign
Under the Constitution, the President of the Republic represents the unity of the state. When the president's actions and political influence primarily serve a single party, the authority of the presidency becomes an instrument of partisan political competition. During the 2023 elections, international election observers found that the president's decisive involvement, combined with the ruling party's systemic advantages, created unfair conditions for political competition.
Government decisions and public projects are presented through the political authority of a single leader. This makes it difficult for citizens to distinguish between what institutions are doing with budget funds and what the ruling party presents as its own achievement.
Political Power Beyond Formal Office
Political control can persist even when a political leader moves from one public office to another. If the leader retains decisive influence over the Government, the parliamentary majority, and key appointments through the party hierarchy, the actual center of political power remains with that individual rather than with the formal authority of the office.
This distinction is also significant in the context of the 2026 parliamentary elections. Those elections were called on September 9, 2026, while Aleksandar Vučić announced his resignation from the presidency on September 27, stating his intention to run in those elections. A change in formal office therefore requires examining the actual relationship among the political leader, his party, and state institutions.
When the parliamentary majority fails to check abuses of executive power and the political leader retains influence through the party hierarchy, institutional resources remain available to the same center of political power. In this way, the ruling party's advantage is maintained even between election cycles.
1.2. The Public Sector
Political control established at the highest levels of government extends throughout the civil service, local governments, public institutions, and state-owned enterprises. Appointing politically loyal officials to key positions creates a hierarchy in which party affiliation and support for the ruling political leadership can take precedence over professional competence and responsibility to the institution. These officials make decisions about hiring, promotions, contract renewals, and other matters that directly affect employees' livelihoods. Party demands are therefore carried out through the administrative hierarchy, without requiring direct involvement from the highest levels of political leadership.
Temporary Appointments as a Means of Political Dependence
One particularly important instrument of political control is keeping senior officials in acting positions for extended periods. Rather than being appointed through open competitions and legally prescribed procedures, these officials remain dependent on repeated decisions to extend their appointments. Their job security therefore depends on political support, while temporary appointments, which should be an exception, become a long-term means of managing the state administration.
The scale of this practice is illustrated by the fact that, between May 2024 and August 2025, the Serbian Government issued 977 decisions appointing acting officials, only 197 of which complied with the law. The remaining decisions included unlawful extensions of temporary appointments and retroactive appointments. This system allows senior officials to remain dependent for years on repeated decisions by political leaders, rather than on legal requirements, professional performance, and accountability for their institutions.
Party Mobilization and the Collection of “Sure Votes”
The political dependence of public-sector employees becomes particularly apparent during election campaigns. Employees may be required to participate in party activities, attend political rallies, and collect information about voters expected to support a particular electoral list, a practice known in Serbia as collecting "sure votes." These records are maintained by party organizers as lists of expected supporters. When compliance with these demands is tied to employment, income, or career advancement, party mobilization becomes a form of political coercion.
This mechanism extends the pressure to citizens who are not employed in the public sector. An employee required to secure a certain number of votes turns to family members, friends, and acquaintances, placing them in a position where refusing to cooperate could jeopardize the employee's job. Personal relationships thus become a tool for recruiting voters on behalf of the party, extending pressure that originated within public institutions to a much broader circle of citizens.
In documented cases, demands for political support have also included photographing marked ballots, sometimes alongside personal identification documents. This extends workplace pressure directly into the act of voting, undermining ballot secrecy by requiring voters to prove their choices to individuals on whom their employment depends.
Pressure without an explicit threat
Political coercion does not necessarily involve an explicit threat of dismissal. Unfavorable work schedules, denied promotions, delays in obtaining permanent employment, or the refusal to renew an employment contract can have the same effect. When employees understand that refusing party demands could jeopardize their jobs, political compliance becomes a means of protecting their employment and financial security. Over time, this system can operate without explicit instructions because managers and employees already understand what is expected of them. Public administration and the broader public sector thus become a permanent infrastructure for party mobilization, transforming employees' professional dependence into a mechanism for securing electoral support.
1.3. The Public Prosecutor's Office
The Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade plays a significant role in Serbia's system of criminal prosecution. Its leadership exercises substantial authority over internal operations, case assignments, and its legally defined relationships with lower-level public prosecutor's offices. The institution is headed by Nenad Stefanović, whose tenure has been marked by numerous controversies involving politically sensitive cases.
These include the reassignment of prosecutors during major corruption investigations, the removal of cases from individual prosecutors, disciplinary proceedings against colleagues over public statements, and proceedings against police inspectors who investigated organized crime, investigations into alleged abuses involving state-owned enterprises and public procurement, requests directed at investigative journalists to obtain their reporting materials, and handling of revelations about political influence on the media, investigations into the operations of large companies, criminal proceedings related to civil and student protests, investigations into attacks on students, action regarding suspicions of the use of an acoustic device during mass demonstrations, and checks on civil society organizations. This range of cases demonstrates the significance of the institution headed by Stefanović and its role in matters that directly or indirectly touch upon the interests of the political authorities.
Of particular significance is how this prosecutor's office has handled allegations of electoral irregularities. During the 2023 and 2024 elections, documented irregularities included organized voter relocation, suspicious residency registrations, and manipulation of voter rolls. One example involves the organized registration in Belgrade of residents from a settlement near Smederevo. Prosecutors dismissed the criminal complaint filed in connection with this case, while the prosecutor who publicly called for an investigation into the irregularities was removed from a different criminal case the following day.
The most serious suspicions arose during the parliamentary and Belgrade elections on December 17, 2023. Independent election observers documented the organized transportation of voters by bus from other parts of Serbia and from Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly Republika Srpska. As Serbian citizens, these individuals were entitled to vote in the parliamentary elections. However, local elections were held in Belgrade on the same day, and eligibility to vote in those elections depended on registered residence within the city. Investigations uncovered numerous suspicious residence registrations, including large numbers of voters registered at the same addresses and at properties unsuitable for habitation. As many as 129 voters were registered at the address of a single unfinished building.
On election day, observers documented the organized arrival of buses from Republika Srpska and the use of logistics centers, including Belgrade Arena, from which voters were directed to various polling stations.
According to estimates by the opposition coalition at the time, approximately 40,000 people who did not actually reside in Belgrade were brought into the city through an organized operation. Although the exact number has not been independently verified, election observers' findings indicated the scale of organized voter migration and raised serious concerns that it may have decisively influenced the outcome of the closely contested Belgrade elections, undermining the electoral will of the capital's residents in favor of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party.
However, the most serious aspect of this case is not the transportation of voters itself, but the evident abuse of state institutions through which the authorities enabled such voting in Belgrade's local elections. Registering a place of residence, issuing identification documents, and entering voters into the electoral register are official administrative procedures. The documented irregularities indicate that state administrative procedures were used in an organized manner to enable citizens who did not actually reside in Belgrade to meet the formal requirements for voting in the city's local elections.
Such an operation called for an examination of the entire chain of responsibility, from officials who approved residence registrations and facilitated the issuance of identification documents to those who organized the transportation of voters and directed them to polling stations, as well as the individuals who may have directed the operation politically. Under Article 6 of Serbia's Criminal Procedure Code, public prosecutors are required to initiate criminal proceedings when there are grounds to suspect that an offense subject to public prosecution has been committed. Prosecutorial action does not depend on the prior submission of a formal criminal complaint.
Despite extensive publicly available documentation, no comprehensive investigation has been made public that would clarify how organized voter migration was carried out or establish the potential responsibility of state officials and political organizers. Formal criminal complaints were also filed with the relevant public prosecutor's offices. CRTA, an independent election-monitoring organization, filed eleven criminal complaints concerning irregularities in the 2023 elections, including criminal complaints against officials responsible for residence records and voter registers. According to CRTA's published review, none of these criminal complaints resulted in the filing of an indictment. The prosecutor's office in Belgrade reviewed individual criminal complaints and referred some to other prosecutor's offices with jurisdiction, but no comprehensive public account of the entire mechanism emerged.
The treatment of CRTA by the same prosecutor's office is particularly revealing, given the organization's role in independently monitoring elections and documenting irregularities. In February 2025, police officers entered CRTA's offices and those of other civil society organizations at the request of the Special Department for Combating Corruption within the Higher Public Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade, as part of an examination of how American funding had been used. While reports of possible misuse of official state records resulted in no indictments, the organization that documented those irregularities became the subject of prosecutorial scrutiny. This disparity in the prosecutor's response raises further questions about the institution's impartiality and its treatment of independent election observers.
The significance of Nenad Stefanović's position lies not only in the proceedings initiated by his prosecutor's office, but also in cases where effective accountability has been absent. In the case of organized voter migration, despite publicly documented irregularities and filed criminal complaints, no comprehensive investigation has been made public clarifying the role of government officials, the possible misuse of official government records, and the possible responsibility of political organizers. This failure to provide an effective institutional response allows the political advantage gained in a contested election to persist without an appropriate legal response.
When public prosecutors fail to ensure that responsibility for possible abuses of state institutions during elections is effectively investigated and established, the consequences extend beyond individual electoral contests. The absence of sanctions creates conditions in which the same mechanisms can be repeated, while those in power retain the political advantages gained through their use. Through both its decisions and its failure to act, the public prosecution service can thus become part of a system that enables the preservation of political power rather than ensuring legal protection for free elections.
1.4. The Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia is the country's highest body of constitutional review, responsible for safeguarding the constitutional order, ruling on the constitutionality of laws and other regulations, and resolving certain electoral disputes. The Court's independence is particularly important when there are allegations that state institutions have been used to secure political advantages. If the Constitutional Court fails to provide timely protection, citizens may be left without an effective legal remedy precisely when judicial intervention is needed to prevent or address the consequences of electoral irregularities.
Vladan Petrov, a professor of constitutional law, has served as president of the Constitutional Court since January 2026. He publicly supported Aleksandar Vučić's presidential candidacy in 2017, became a judge of the Constitutional Court in 2019, and was unanimously elected its president on January 22, 2026. Petrov continued making public political statements while serving as a Constitutional Court judge. According to research by the Bureau for Social Research, Petrov made 171 television appearances between January 2025 and January 2026, including 35 on Informer TV, primarily discussing political issues. On September 16, 2026, while serving as president of the Constitutional Court, Petrov publicly commented on the upcoming parliamentary elections, describing the Serbian Progressive Party as a well-organized political party and its opponents as an undefined and unstable political grouping. Such public political alignment by the head of an institution responsible for protecting the constitutional equality of all electoral participants raises serious questions about the Court's impartiality.
Of particular significance is Petrov's public admission on April 8, 2026, that a judge assigned to report on a case or the president of the Constitutional Court can delay proceedings in certain cases across multiple judicial terms. He stated, "I, too, have set aside cases I found difficult."" The statement came during a discussion about the Constitutional Court's failure to rule on the disputed December 2023 Belgrade elections. Requests for constitutional review of those elections were filed in early 2024, but the Court did not dismiss the request as moot until June 2026, after new elections had been held. As a result, serious allegations of systemic electoral irregularities were left without a substantive constitutional review that could have affected the disputed electoral process.
Constitutional review loses its protective function when politically sensitive cases are not resolved in time for judicial decisions to have meaningful consequences. Delays in judicial proceedings allow contested election results and the political advantages gained through those elections to remain in place without timely constitutional review. Combined with the Court leadership's public political alignment, such delays undermine confidence in the Court's ability to independently constrain executive power. Under these circumstances, the Constitutional Court, which should serve as the final constitutional safeguard against abuses of political power, can, through its own inaction, contribute to preserving that power.